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CHAIRMAN LEROY GREENE: All

we will come to order. I have some

other members of the Subcommittee right now who have other
so do I, for that matter. But we're scattered at our

with the

ttee
at a

the other one's at another committee meeting, and so forth.
any case, we are recording all the remarks at this hearing so that we will be able to review
them when and if we can find some leisure time for that purpose. In fact, it won't be leisure time; it
will be working time.
This is the Senate Subcommittee on Nuclear Facility Safety and Emergency Preparation. The
members of the committee are myself, Senator Leroy Greene, as chairman; Senator Hersch Rosenthal
and Senator Newton Russell are the other members of the committee. And we all serve on the parent
committee which is the Senate Committee on Energy and Public Utilities, which Senator Rosenthal
chaired.
m

The Chernobyl nuclear power plant tragedy in Russia not only sent nuclear fallout all around the
world, but it once again opened the question of safety of nuclear generating facilities in California
and other parts of our nation and, in fact, the world. Presently, the United States meets 15% of its
nuclear energy needs from the nuclear option.
California is the most populous state in our country and is still growing.

Sacramento and

vicinity are considered to be one of the fastest growing metropolitan areas in the country.

Thus,

there will be a growing demand for electrical power to meet the population and business growth in
this specific area.
The state currently meets its energy needs with a mix of options: solar energy, hydroelectric
power, combustion power plants using gas or oil, geothermal, cogeneration, and nuclear power. There
are three nuclear plants currently producing electrical power in California and one that is no longer
in service.
All power plants, other than nuclear, are under the direct control of the state of Calihrnia.
However, nuclear power is controlled by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission

a feder8l agency.

Consequently, there is a limited role for the state in the design, the

and the operation

of a nuclear facility.
Now the question is, what is the state's role in nuclear power?
The best way that it can be described is that what happens inside the fence of a nuclear facility
is under control of the federal government. What happens outside the fence is under state control.
That's a gross oversimplicification, of course; but the state is concerned about the total situation.
However, the state does not have any control inside the facility other than setting the rates that a
regulated utility can charge for electrical power.
The hearing that is being held at this time is targeted on establishing a basis of understanding of
what options exist to ensure that nuclear power facilities are safe for operation in the state of
California. We also want to examine the status of state, local, and plant emergency preparation in
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to hear from one

we're

this

this

of energy is the
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in time, so the

those who care to add

We

members of

and how Nell are

and the utilities

be

written

O:Jr

or any of its investigations to be anti or pro nuclear

That's not our purpose.
the state of

from the Nuclear

to

we do

some

be

to
open

an

next week

the record of this

the efforts of all who will be testifying today to assist the Legislature m
state action.
and

are the exclusive concern of the

Mr.
VIC
you, Mr. Rosenthal.

AllO:

Mr.

Mr.

It's nice to be back in the

as they now
not

this meeting because I think it couldn't be
from the disaster at C::hernob

the people in the Sacramento area
is located in my district.
power

issue. And I

emergency

Rancho Seco

Half of my constituents are

but even those who are

the committee for

but because of

to the

customers share a common regional concern with
have on such an

t~ith

Capitol with rny former colleagues in

for

because of the concerns

the

<'!!so

as we call the Senate in Washington.

in the other

And I want to thank you, Mr.
more

nice to be with you.

of

across the river who are PGr3cE
and I certainly want to

this afternoon's session and other sessions that you

to

add, while I know you're specifically focusing on issues

a ten-mile

I wonder if you might not wish to look somewhat

because we know from the accident we've seen m the Kiev area that ten miles ts
for concern. l\nd as one who represents
would

without

an alarm

who are at

we would broaden our coverage and concern of other regions

counties further to the west and north.
CHAIRivlAN GREENE:

Well, I assure you that if Polaf1d could be concerned, so can Ne,·ada,
-2-

CONGRESSMAN FAZIO: I understand.
CHAIRMAN GREENE: Or
CONGRESSMAN
and not containments

I think we

very

circumstances.
that are

the case of

use.

in

DC or New York

y

iously, we have different

be far broader than perhaps the traditional close circumference

the

But I particularly want to focus my brief period before you, because I do

another
on

invited here at the iJurcau of

appointment that I had to make prior to

-- in this case, SMUO. I have a real

relationship between the federal government and the local

belief that we now have at NRC a highly sensitive commission and staff who have decided under a
great deal of public pressure, from a variety of individuals and interest groups, to pay

y

close attention to the two Babcock and Wilcox plants that are currently shut down: the one, in
in the Ohio area, Davis-9esse, as well as Rancho Seco.
mechanically.

These are particularly

plants

Somebody analogized them to a hot rod -- high performance but very sensitive to

operate.
And

think it's fair to say that while there are so:ne very successful

with

and Wilcox designs -- the Duke Power Company, for example, has used them with very little
trouble -- it has become of national concern. And we in this area, not only concerned about
but also about the rates that we pay for power, are in the middle of this

\J/e have to be
and more sensitive to

perhaps, and I think that's healthy, more aware of the problems at the
what we can do as citizens and what we can see our
management, appointed, doing in the

and our

to resolve these

I am particularly concerned with what I think has been an attitude over time at the

SMUD generally, that might be described as macho or a defiant
interfere in their business.

toward

at

who want to

I think there's been a certain blend of arrogance and defensiveness in

terms of how that plant has been managed. I think there has been an experience over time of people
doing what could be said to be a relatively minimum compliance with NRC
there's been an overreliance on contractors and an
employed by SMUO to function in the control responsib

I think

number of

managers

ty they have.

But I think it's also fair to say that SlvlUD has seen the error of

it~3

ways to a large

always because of their own insights; in part, because of criticism from a

not

of sources. I think

under the new management, personified with the appointment of Dewey Lowe, and under a number of
moves that have been made both in terms of

zational structure and new

there is an

effort to change, not only the methods and procedures of managing Rancho Seco, but
attitudes which govern their relationship with the NRC and with the

the

and with the state

and others who are obviously having an effect on their O;Jerations out there.
Now, the community may be focusing more criticism today and perhaps might have focused
even ;nore a few years ago or months ago; and that is a healthy and to be
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the
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who
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treat the
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as a result
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criticized.
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pressure,
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that are

kind

by staff and

one administration to the next

among the five com!nissioners.
I

have come to the conclusion
somewhere
for better

restructure the Nuclear

lines of the
for worse, can carry out a

number of
of

think
not to

case of Rancho
any means a

in the

of time

af view and

cies

critics.

as I indicated

tre;nendous pressure,

the nuclear

ut to in effect provide the
guide the recovery of this

in the llost

think we've had the
the director

the

of

and

of Nuclear
can on behalf

and Mr.
their staffs

of very close attention
the

of

I don't tnink we have found it easy for SMUD, its managers, etc., to satisfy the demands
NRC and I'm sure that the people of this community,

even rnore than

national

I'rn

constituency concerned about nuclear power would not want it any other way.
Rancho

people in this community who will under no circumstances
I'm sure there are many who will be adamantly in favor.

the

But I think most of us would take the

that we under any circumstances want to know that we have a

one

that has co;ne through the tough times and is not likely to have the kind of

errors that

brought about the rapid cooldown, the most recent serious incident, that brought about the shutt
down of the facility.
I think, on the other hand, there are many people concerned about safety who roalu:e ,.vhat the

stakes are for Sacramento and for S:v1UD in the investment that's been made at Rancho Seco.

t\nd

should the facility go down again with any serious kind of incident or problem, I think many people
realize it may well stay down.

That means that 913 mcgaN3tts of power, 57 percent of the

generating capacity of the utility, would not be available to the people who paid to have it built. Its
Joss would result in approximately a 50 percent time rate increase to buy replacement generation.
/\nd that, under any circumstances, would not be easy when you consider the difficulty of siting a
fossil fuel plant, a coal plant, a gas plant.

Any of these may have air quality

certainly tremendous cost implications in the $2-3 billion range.

and

The kinds of rate increases that

have beco:ne all too familiar for Sacramento ratepayers would be dyvarfed by the kind of
that would be required to replace the kind of power that we can currently generatfl out of this
which has an amortization cost to us I believe of $30-40 million a year at this point.

kinds

debt services can't be ignored and will continue until the plant is paid off. And so,
the plant available to provide the power to us, SMUD is in position

we not nave

to look to very

alternative sources.
I've been one of those who has been very active in attempting to make more
hydroelectric power, of fighting against the sale of WAPA, for example, or the poNer
administrations that the Administration has proposed,

for the

and i

the existing intertie, creation of now capacity, so that we can import poNer from the \Jorthwest
where it is still in surplus, wasted annually. These are options that s:v1UD has looked to
in order to cut some of tho costs that are involved in keeping up with their 8-10

rate

increases that are simply required to serve as future growth.
As you indicated in your introductory remarks, this is a high growth area.

estimated 2.4

percent annual rate generation mix occurs. We are in a position of having constantly to fight to keep
up with the kind of growth that's occurring in our community. And this cannot be handled

by

diminishing resources in the hydro area, particularly at the prices that Pm afraid so:ne of our friends
in the Northwest wish to charge us.

And I look at Mr. Rosenthal because 98

of all the

ratepayers in the state have a stake in making these alternatives make sense.
'Ne all understand then that

appropriately.

the NRC has a terribly

job here in

Their reputation is on the line as well as Sl'v1UD's. I think it's possible that NRC can
-5-

both
y

to be more
start

case when

the NRC in the

up in tho

in

those that

are

deals with nuclear issues. The attitudinal

certainly

The

not only

ile Island but now Chernob
There are solutions.
v~~ater

reactors.

lear future.

be a new

There are alternatives.
may be some sort

there may also not

future away
There

for

because there are so many

be a

which we have not

And I think what we as
to crop

that that
are troubled

events such as the disaster that we've seen

the Soviet Union.

to

it may attack.

the most safe and cost
think that the committee that I sit on

y

attitude as any

the nuclear
which I think
of

when

cheerleader
the others.
in terms
within the

with

purview of
with you.

can
think

to

are critics of all

as honest and candid as
think

don't see a merger

nearby.

have a future.
think

be in

think

of

have

their

as
as business
So

nearb

energy providers.
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think

next six months as
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as the nuclear

v~~orks

u:1derstand a lot :nore about
what that energy future
Thank

for

your

\Aiith us.

I

know you have to go to the Bureau of Reclamation now. Thank you very rnuch for
CONGRESSMAN FAZIO: Thank you very

and I

Mr.

your
my remarks in

if you don't mind.
Yes, I do want them. Thank you.

CHAIRMAN

CONGRESSMAN FAZIO. Thank you.
CHAIRiv1AN GREENE: Now, is there is a
MR. DAVID N. MILLER:
district

representative

Congressman

ve

My name is David M

afternoon, Mr.

for

Congressman

Congressman cannot be here today.

Robert

I am the

y,

Matsui,

the

you were

He had wanted, when he did find out

schedule a hearing, to be here. I do have a statement that he had prepared to be presented if he
get an opportunity to come here today, and I'd like to read it to you
CHAIRMAN GREENE:

Can you tell me how long it is?

members of the committee.

Because we can put it in the record.

We will be transcribing all our stuff here. Can you simply tell us about it and we will have the actual
verbiage there?
MR. MILLER: Sure.

It's very brief.

Basically the Congressman's concerns reflect around the

oversight that the NRC has provided to nuclear generating plants particularly those that have
designed by Babcock & Wilcox.

Congressman

initiated a number of

wi

to---particularly after the latest shutdown at Rancho Seco in late December.
excerpts from his statement that I believe capsulize

~is

I can

try
you a few

concerns.

CHAIRMAN GREENE: All right.
MR. MILLER: ''Last January, I was skeptical when the NRC announced its intention to conduct
a

long-ter~n

safety review of all B&Vv reactors. While I welcomed the

of the action.

I had discovered a pattern of

concern is highest, there is a

at the NRC.

of activity. But when the furor

the motives
When public or
NRC

seems to

subside as well.
"This particular safety review seems to me to be no more than a public relations

As a

result of my own investigation, I found that the NRC already knew that B&W reactors have
flaws that make them more vulnerable to operationaL transients. I found that the NRC
trouble. I also had

that design vulnerabilities coupled with poor management were a
one Commissioner tell me that the NRC had simply failed to take

action to correct these

problems.
"A quick look at the current status of ••. NRC's

long-ter~n

safety review I think bears out my

original observation. First of all, little has actually been accomplished besides the obligatory
relations.

But second, the NRC has turned over that safety review to the owners of the reactors

themselves. I am not reassured when the industry is responsible for its own safety review, and I fail
to see the objectivity in self-regulation.
"What concorns 1ne rnost," however, "is the fact that there is di:lsonsion within tho Commission
itself on this matter.

Commissioner James Asselstine has called for an independent safety revie'N

group, including experts from outside the NRC, to conduct a thorough review of the safety

-7-
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under the worst
final
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occur at

at least once
chance of a

nuclear

y
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Is that

"When the NRC says that there has been no undue risk to the public at any U.S. nuclear plant,
what they are really saying is that no one has been radiated. In other words, if it works, there is no
need for concern. That, in my opinion, is the space shuttle excuse. We

to redefine what

an

acceptable risk and double our safety efforts to match
the NRC

the record my

"Finally, Mr. Chairman, I would like to

and the NRC documents relating to emergency plans at Rancho Seco. 11
Thank you for the opportunity to speak today.
to have his

CHAIRMAN GREENE: Thank you and inform the Congressman that we're

as the

remarks and his enclosures as well. We do want them for our record and for our
issue is before us. Thank you very much.
MR. MILLER: Thank you.
CHAIRMAN GREENE:

~--luclear

At this time, I'd like to call on Darrell Eisenhut from the

Regulatory Commission (NRC).

And while you're getting yourself ready here, we have,

course,

been joined by Senator Hersch Rosenthal from Los Angeles. Senator Rosenthal is the Chairman of
the parent Committee on Energy and Public Utilities and serves with me on this Subcommittee as
does Newton Russell, who has not been able to join us yet. Sir.
MR. DARRELL EISENHUT:
name is Darrell Eisenhut.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee.

My

I'm the deputy director for Reactor Regulation with U.S. Nuclear

Regulatory Commission.
With me here today is Frank Miraglia, who is a division director in the office of Reactor
Regulation. He is in fact the division director who has the overall responsibility for overseeing the
safety of the B&W reactors around the United States as well as a number of other things.
It's a pleasure being here today and to address this committee, to address several of the issues
surrounding both Chernobyl and, in fact, the NRC's oversight of plants in the United States,
particularly Rancho Seco.
The letter of invitation specifically referred to the Chernobyl disaster. So, let me first make a
couple of comments about that. We certainly have expressed our sincere re

to the

the disaster. Clearly, it was an accident of a very large magnitude; but we all rnust le:irn from that
event.
The U.S., of course, has been tracking the event very closely.

Over the first

we tracked it through an interagency group, the task force appointed by the President.

of weeks
Since that

time, when the activities have evolved and changed following the event, we have been
following it through an NRC tracking team that we've been working with.
participating with the IAEA.
Vienna, Austria.

y

We've also been

That's the International Atomic Energy Agency headquartered in

We also have participated, of course, through our exchange agreements with a

number of the other countries around the world that are part of the OECD organization
headquartered out of Paris. So we've had quite a bit of activity in the international 8rona through
and including rneetings that have been held last week aml that lire ongoing this week ab3o in Vienna.
First, let me say that the Chernobyl reactor is quite dissimilar from any reactor that is
-9-
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SENATOR NEWTON RUSSELL
y

EISENHUT:
RUSSELL:

Then

and said there

but it

wasn't like the ones

containment

OK.

Let me address

Based on

does not have a
the United
re

in steel
in

many

would esti

i1tit

t'o; n brqn dotnr:

over the facility.
the event because we were

y didn't read the newspapers that

with what was

up with other---with understanding
SENATOR RUSSELL: If you

have been very

you

also. And I can understand

out
I

on the

a few newspaper

In

MR. EISENHUT: I did see a

sir.

initially following the Soviet

many

didn't have any idea what this

facility really looks like. We have never been there. We don't have firsthand
what the facility looks like.

of actually

To the best of my knowledge, no one in the United States does.
and we

have been people who have been to the facility and have worked there from time to
have pieced together everything we have today.

The facility does not have anything like this

containment structure.
What leads to the confusion is the reactor core, if you will, is a very
It has individual tubes, pressure tubes, running through the reactor.

graphite structure.

Some 1600 tubes through the

reactor. Each one of those tubes that goes through the actual graphite reactor has a pipe that goes
off on the top, puts water through the steam generators and back in the bottom.

So there are

literally 1600 pipes that run in loops at this facility. Portions of those pipes appear to be encased in a
structure, a concrete and steel structure. The principle being, apparently, to keep water from any of
those pipes if it should rupture from getting into the reactor because this is a graphite reactor. It's a
very large mass of graphite. There doesn't---over the reactor as best as we

from all the

information we have on the reactor design, there is a confinement

over the

reactor. But based on everything we know, it doesn't appear to be an

like the

of the
concrete

and steel structures in the United States.
CHAIRMAN GREENE: Now, Mr. Eisenhut, if I may---are
SENATOR RUSSELL:

Well, if he

let him finish my

unless you want

to move on.
CHAIRtv1AN GREENE: It's on this point.
SENATOR RUSSELL: Go ahead then.
CHAIRMAN GREENE:

Because we are concentrating on the

was containment on the Russian event. It's

obvious that

as to whether or not
blew a hole

according to the pictures we saw and I assume it was the plant. You know, so

the
had, it

didn't contain, OK? You blew a hole through the roof.
But we keep on talking about that. At the same time you have made mention of the fact that
all our commercial nuclear plants in this country have containment.
commercial,

using the word

Which leads me to believe that at the same time you're saying all our nuclear

plants in the United States do not have containment building.
MR. EISENHUT: If I could reserve on that question just one second and I'll add two qualifiers to
this.
CHAIRMAN GREENE: Surely.

turns out in
over
the

reactor
of an event

We don't believe there's any commercial
-- that are

as we understand
in

the
the

accident
containment structure.
that reactor core
reaction.
it goes back

the

There's one reactor in the United

dome.

That is a commercial

this

the

GREENE:
in commercial

MR. EISENHUT: Certainly, sir. The very vast amount of electric power that's
in the U.S. is under our control. There is only one
lit y in Washington, that in

facility that I'm aware

is used to

at

The rest are used as

ties.
in

in

CHAIRMAN GREENE: Well,
MR. EISENHUT: The plant---I'm sorryt
CHAIRMAN GREENE: Isn't

MR. EISI::NHUT: There are other DOE/DOD facilities, both at
some in Savannah River, Georgia.

Washington; there are
where there are

Those are the two large groups of

military facilities. We have not done a review of those facilities, and we have not

asked to do a

review of those facilities.
CHAIRMAN GREENE: But you would think that the major portion of the nuclear plants are in
commercial use?
MR. EISENHUT: The major portion of the DOE facilities, I believe, are not in power use.
CHAIRMAN

Gf~EENE:

No, they're not in power use.

MR. EISENHUT: That is, they do not produce electricity as I'm using power.
CHAIRMAN GREENE: Well, I know,

you've got nuclear plants and they're generating for

whatever purpose, OK? And I'm suggesting---I'm trying to get at the question of what

of

that generation, that nuclear generation is something that you review as opposed to what percent you
do not review. How big is the noncommercial facilities, whether they're producing Willkie buttons or
whatever the heck it may be?
MR. EISENHUT: OK, let me try to put it in a different framework. There are
in the United States a hundred power plants that are

that are under our

purview.

There are on the order of five, about five, reactors---facilities that are not under our purview that
are large scale facilities. There are also under our responsib

fall the what I will call research and

test facilities. There are facilities---even in the Washington, DC area, there's the National Bureau of
Standards, which is a part of the Department of Commerce, has a 20-megawatt facility that we do
regulate. So those kinds, sir, we do regulate.
CHAIRMAN

Let me ask you this question, a different

different

relating to the personnel operating these plants, OK, the technical help that's inside the

be the

engineers or other levels of technicians. Does the state in your opinion have any role to play in, say,
licensing, for example, of nuclear engineers or technicians and so on? Could the state say that you
would have to have such-and-such a kind of license to pursue---or prove this level of competency
before you could operate in the plant? Or are we not able to do that because it's under the federal
jurisdiction?
MR. EISCNHUT:

Well, sir, I really am not going to embark and to try to attempt to answer

that. It's really not rny area of expertise and 1 think it goes really into the legal aspects of state's
rights versus the federal authority.
CHAIRMAN GREENE: Do you know of any state where you have a plant that you overview that

an

that we are
that's needed.

had both

over many, many years, ever

Rancho Seco.

years.

the December 26
for a

So
of
at all the detai
December---at the end of

was going to be shut down for a number of months. And when you do it, you decide that it's not
one thing that you can put your finger on has led you to that, but this overall lingering

of

problems.
can be made

as you look at this plant, I'm confident that

exactly

reliably. It can be. There are other facilities

it around the

United States that are operating with very, very good
One of the representatives this

either Congressman Fazio or---

CHAIRMAN GREENE: Yeah, Congressman Fazio.
MR. EISENHUT: ... referred to one of the Duke facilities which just set a

record.

believe they operated for some 400 days straight with no interruptions. In fact, I think it was in
excess of 400 days. They can be made to operate safe and reliable.
~ow,

this utility has undergone a number of management changes.

management changes before the December 26 event.

They started making

And they've certainly made major changes

since the December event. And in our opinion, management clearly is one of the keys to the overall
performance. The actual board of directors has made some changes.

They've started taking more

interest in the plant, in my personal opinion. They've started to look at it harder. And I think they're
going to have to continue to demand from their management that high level of performance.

The

utility has a new program in place. They are taking a retrospective look at what's going on at the
facility.

They have made a commitment to go back and look at tho design, look at the detail

management through the organization, the maintenance, the training of the personnel. All of those
things need to be looked at.
SENATOR RUSSELL: Question.
CHAIRMAN GREENE: Yes, Senator Russell.
SENATOR RUSSELL:

You have the same plant. And during a period of

problems. Now you say that the thing is turning itself around and I think I heard you say basically it's
different or new management, whatever. Is that basically what you're saying?
MR. EISENHUT:

I think a key ingredient is that they have brought in new management and

have made some changes.

The very next thing I was going to say though is that there will

undoubtedly be even more management changes. There will be design changes. There will be changes
to the procedures and the training at the facility.

There will be more of those that will be needed

prior to the plant starting up, and there will undoubtedly be more that will be deferred until after it
starts up.
SENATOR RUSSELL:

And none of that is under state purview, is it?

The training, the

requirements for safety or this widget or that widget?
tv1R. EISENHUT:

I think that's correct, Senator.

It's directly under federal statutory

responsibility given to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
SENATOR RUSSELL: Will your testimony include any observations as to what you think---how
you think we can assist or help or implement or intervene or interfere or whatever?
MR. EISENHUT: I don't know, but let me be very candid. I've talked to a number of concerned
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CHAIRMAN

The various

y, I

the passage of time that increase in sensitivity on the part of the ,11anagement of

the utili

district, as to the problems related to this plant. The particular thing that happened last
-- I know when Senator Rosenthal and I were out at the plant just within the last several
showed us that there in that cabinet is

wire on that terminal,

equipment was brought in here x years ago,

that

whatever it was, years back.

And

over

that connection came lose and it became an intermittent rather than a constant connection.
The signal goes through the computer system here that says shut her down. And here we were, you
know, in trouble with that thing cycling through. They then had to go back there and start off and
check every single connection of every single wire in the whole damn plant, by the

you

know. And found little problems here and there that suggested that the maintenance was not Nhat it
ought to have been, you know, from the word go. Senator Rosenthal.
SENATOR ROSENTHAL: Veah, I guess I'm a little confused by what I'm hearing you say after
having read these, you know---every couple of years I guess we do a systematic assessment of
licensing performance called SALP.
MR. EISENHUT: Yes, sir, we do that about every 18 months.
SENATOR ROSENTHAL: 01<. I looked at the one that was done through May 31 of 1985. Let
me just read what you said, or what the agency said.
Now, this is looking at the plant from December 1, 1983 through May

1985. "Summary of

Results. Overall, the board found the licensee's performance to be acceptable and directed toward
safe facility operation.

The board found that the licensee's overall performance has

somewhat since the last SALP evaluation period. Individual areas which contributed to
improvement were plant operations, surveillance, and licensing activities.

overall

In addition, the board

found management attention and the licensee's level of performance had improved in the areas of
radiological controls in engineering and construction during the latter part of this evaluation period.
A licensee's performance in the areas of emergency preparedness, security and safeguards and
refueling were found to be unchanged. Some improvement was noted in the areas of maintenance and
fire protection." And then you go through functional areas and you point out which were improving
and which were unchanged.
Now, in the light of that, how does that general evaluation mesh with the recent event at
Rancho Seco, particularly since in the period before December 26, the plant was done for almost 250
days that year? Don't positive evaluations like this give support to Nuclear Regulatory Commission
critics' claims that there is a lax federal regulation of nuclear facilities?
:v1R. EISENHUT: Yeah, they can if they read them out of context. For exampie, let me give
you some insights into what we call the SALP process. I'm not specifically familiar with that exact
piece of paper, but I can certainly understand the bottom line.
If a plant ever is unacceptable, the plant gets shut down.

1-\ll right?

So, we would formally

order the plant shut down. So that is the bottom-line level, is the plant acceptable? And anyone who
gets one that says it's acceptable, every utility
edge.

So that part of it you could understand.

tho country knows they're at the very bottom
If you read it in that kind of framework, you know
-17-

If in fact

And

the motivation

facilities. We've

of problems, at Oa\ is-9esse in Ohio, at Rancho Seco here, Crystal River in Florida, and of course, in
'79, the TMI accident. We have, in fact, probably doubled the oversight on B&W facilities over and

above what it is on other facilities around the U.S.

yes,

one further question at this

SENATOR ROSENTHAL:

we are ....
The

states that

record of emergency performance with respect to emergency preparedness and

and

and refueling is unchanged and graded at level 2. What does level 2 mean?
OK, in the overall jargon, level 2 means it's basically acceptable, but it's not

MR. EISENHUT:

outstanding, and it's not so unacceptably bad that they have to take some action to fix it up right
away.
We grade them in three categories: a 1 means it's performing better than the normal and better
than the minimum requirements; 3 means it's down to the bare minimums and should be improved.
SENATOR ROSENTHAL: So that means, a level 2 means that it could be improved.
MR. EISENHUT: It could. In fact, we would hope that their target would be

1'1

Level Iin each

case.
SENATOR ROSENTHAL: But you indicated on that SALP report that it was unchanged, which
means that it was •.•
MR. EISENHUT: It's previous.
SENATOR ROSENTHAL: ••• spoke to previously.
MR. EISE:NHUT: That's correct.
SENATOR ROSENTHAL: Is there any indication that that will become a 1?
MR. EISENHUT: Certainly I hope so.
SENATOR ROSENTHAL: We're talking about security and safeguards, emergency preparedness.
I mean, we're not talking about what actually happens to the plant. We're talking about what we do in
case something happens.
MR. EISENHUT:

That's correct.

And certainly I hope the overall target is a level 1 and I'm

sure that the utility will tell you in a little bit they're committed to do just that.
CHAIRMAN GREENE: I think we had better move on, but I'd like to ask you one final question.
When something goes wrong at the plant, an event of one kind or another, I presume that there's some
requirement that you immediately be contacted?
MR. EISENHUT: Yes, sir. For various kinds of events, we're notified on various time--CHAIRMAN GREENE: What I wanted to ask is not the notification to you, but the notification
beyond the federal level.

Is there any notification that's required to the state, to the city, to the

county, to somebody other than the feds?
MR. EISENHUT:

Yes, there are, sir.

I would suggest the panel on emergency preparedness

could best address that, because they actually are the ones that have that.
CHAIRMAN GREENE:

I'm just asking in the sense of your Commission whether thnrn's any

requirements in this area.
MR. EISE:NHUT:

We have a standard policy, certainly that if any event occurs at a facility of

any real magnitude, certainly we're in contact with not only state, all federal and state authorities,
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Certainly, these did exist. But two things are important to recognize:
1.

They are virtually all related to failure of adequate management controls.

2.

The reactor design is, in our opinion, a good one and not the root cause of our poor
operating record.
Rancho Seco is basically a sound and safe plant, despite some design flaws which will

continue to be corrected. The reactor safety systems have functioned as designed when they
were called upon in transits or shutdowns we have experienced.
Every one of the identified problems has been or is being aggressively addressed. We have made
changes, and we will continue to make changes to increase the plant's margin of safety.
I.

The plant staff and management has been increased significantly.

In 1984, staffing at

Rancho Seco was about 500. By the end of 1986, it is planned to more than double, with
most of that increase occurring in 1986.
2.

Plant training programs have been given special attention. New management and training
staff have been added bringing the total of 40 full-time trainers. New training facilities
are being added as rapidly as possible. We have committed a new plant specific simulator.
Existing training is being upgraded; and significantly more training is being requirement.

3.

New management and staff have been added to the nuclear maintenance department.
New maintenance training programs are being developed and conducted.

Preventive

maintenance -- and I reiterate -- preventive maintenance rather than reactor fixes is now
the watchword.
4.

And

more

recently,

a

comprehensive

new

plant

performance

and

management

improvement program, the first ever undertaken by the District, has been developed and
is being implemented to evaluate and test plant systems and procedures which are key to
plant safety and reliability. they are being analyzed to determine if the failure can cause
a reactor trip, challenge a safety system, or cause an overall undercooling following a
reactor trip.
The key to this program is to assure that the safety systems and back-up equipment are
not challenged. This is a dramatic shift from past design and operating philosophy.

This

attention to detail will vastly improve plant reliability and its margin of safety.
5.

Management systems are also being provided to assist our managers and supervisors in
carrying out the planning and oversight activities.

These include personnel, computers,

software, and accounting support which will help them manage resources more effectively
and meet committed schedules for modification.
Rancho Seco is indeed one of the greatest assets the Sacramento community has. It represents
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8.4 inches of steel.
GENERAL LOWE: Well, but General, the occurrence, just once in our lifetime might be the end
of our lifetime, you know. And I don't think I have to worry about a second one.

I have to

about that first one.
GENERAL LOWE:

Rest assured, we are just as concerned with public health and safety and

that's our first concern.
CHAIRMAN GREENE:

I'm sure you are.

We would like to have that information if it's

available. Senator Rosenthal.
SENATOR ROSENTHAL: I believe that you are concerned about the operation of the plant and
the safety. It seems to me that you do a poor job of public relations. I don't know how you're going
to begin to change people's impression about how safe it is if in fact you cancel kinds of---some
things that---something that's supposed to take place today for example -- a SMUD Energy
Symposium, at which people could have been informed about the changes that were taking place. You
could have provided some desirable information at a critical time. And it just seems to me that you
lost an opportunity to do aPR job which is so necessary. In the light of that now, of people's concern,
there's now an initiative. It seems to me that unless you begin to inform people about tho changes
that you're bringing about and the kinds of things that you're doing to begin to allay some of these
fears, you're going to have an initiative that's going to say you're out of business.
GENERAL LOWE: I think your point is well taken, Senator Rosenthal. As a matter of fact, the
symposium was cancelled because of lack of interest. A few days before the deadline we had only
received 60 applications to attend.

Our break-even point was over 300.

And because of a tight

schedule, we decided, particularly with all the news about Rancho Seco, to cancel for really
budgetary economic reasons and those ratepayer dollars.
SENATOR ROSENTHAL: I understand.
GENERAL LOWE:

On another point, there

IS

a state law that was passed, I believe early in

1980, that prohibit SMUD from advertising or manning a public relations program or such.
have personally spoken to the local service clubs.

Now, I

I have been to the editorial boards of the locAl

papers and news departments of television stations in the local area and will continue to do that. We
plan to continue that communication to, as you say, get the word out with respect to what we're
doing. And we're trying all we can under all those handicaps.
SENATOR ROSENTHAL:

Now, in terms of what happens outside of the plant, we had some

discussion as we visited the facility with you last week about the kinds of drills that you're now
involved in.

And Senator---the Chairman wanted to know if you had thought about the need for an

actual unannounced emergency drill.
GENEF~AL

LOWE: Yes, we---

SENATOR ROSENTHAL: Whether or not that type of activity might happen. It seems to me
that you might very well bo doinq things that people know arc happening in tryinq to respond Lo some
kinds of emergency. But unless you actually test, you don't really know whether people are going to
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assure yourself that you will not lose communication during emergency periods of time.
GENERAL LOWE: We will certainly look at that for our emergency operating facility.
CHAIRMAN GREENE: OK, thank you. Who will go next? OK, B&W.
MR. J. H. TAYLOR: Good afternoon, members of the Subcommittee and staff members. My
name is J. H. Taylor. I'm a Senior Technical Consultant and Manager of Licensing for the Nuclear
Power Generation Division of Babcock & Wilcox. I've worked for B&W for a little bit over 32 years,
and nearly all of that has been been in the nuclear arena.
I want to say I'm pleased to have the opportunity to be with your subcommittee to contribute
what we can to the subject that you're deliberating.
It seems appropriate to make a brief statement concerning our company.

B&W today is a

diversified company with many areas of involvement in the energy business. Our company began over
120 years ago with the development of an innovative steam boiler. Since that time, we have become
a major supplier to the electric utility industry in supplying central station boilers and related
equipment to both domestic and international utilities.
B&W involvement in the nuclear industry began in the early 1950s. Since that time, we have
been involved extensively in both the Navy nuclear and the commerciul activities. Currently, we are
a major fuel supplier and a component supplier to the nuclear Na\·y. We're also a major fuel supplier
and service supplier to the commercial nuclear power industry.
B&W's involvement in the

lar~e

central station nuclear power business began in the 1960s, in the

early 1960s. There was some involvement before that in some smaller projects like the nuclear ship
Savannah, but in the commercial area, the large central station work began with our company in the
1960s. Currently, there are eight B&W plants with operating reactors in the United States and four
additional plants are under construction. We have also just been granted a license for a large nuclear
power plant of a similar design to those in the United States in Germany.
My written comments contain an isometric configuration of the designs of the plants that we
have built and they're all basically similar.
B&W reactors were designed, licensed, and built to the same regulatory and code require nents
as the other plants that were going through the cycle at that same time period. However, although
the regulatory and code requirements were common, the performance characteristics of the B&W
units are different. This difference was designed into the plant to allow the utility load dispatchers
to respond to load changes more rapidly than other plants.

This capability was built into the plants

primarily through the use of a different configuration of steam generators.

Now, tho use of a

different type of steam generator in the B&W plants has both pluses and minuses from an operational
standpoint. For example, on the plus side, the tubing on the B&W generators is much more readily
inspectable.

From the very beginning, the B&W plants have had very strict water chemistry

requirements for the steam generators.

And when you combine this more readily inspected steam

generator tubing with very strict water chemistry requirernents, the

B<~W

pl3nts have accumulated an

outstanding record of steam generator tube integrity. Now, from a safety standpoint, tube integrity
is important.

On the other hand, on the down side, because of the ability that the steam generators
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condensers

MR. TAYLOR: Yes, indeed. The use of simulators is growing all the time. We have had---B&W
has had a simulator in its Lynchburg offices since about 1969. That simulator is still in use. it's being
constantly upgraded.

And as a matter of fact, simulators are now being planned at nearly every

facility in the country and simulators are becoming more popular in fossil plants as well, because
fossil plants are becoming more complex and require a lot of operator training.
SENATOR RUSSELL: What kind of hour requirements are there for this utility x which has just
built one of your plants and they're looking now for a staff to operate it? What kind of requirenents
are there for so many hours on the simulator?
MR. TAYLOR:

That's becoming a very uncommon situation now because the utilities are

bringing in people from their other nuclear plants. That was a common condition back 10 or 12 years
ago. But it depends a lot on the background of the class that is being put through the training. If you
have a group of people, and this was very common in the early days, a group of people who had come
from the nuclear navy and had had extensive operating experience in submarines or aircraft carriers,
the amount of training they would require would be one thing. If it were a group of people who were
being brought in from a fossil plant, the normal way to introduce those people was to bring them into
the conventional part of the plant to give them experience there and then gradually work into the
nuclear part. But it varied a great deal depending on the background of the people that were being
put through the training program.
SENATOR RUSSELL: It sounds like it's sort of a---each utility does its own thing in terms of
training.
MR. TA. YLOR: Each utility---there is a lot of variability among the utilities. But the one thing
that is very common is the operator licensing process which is regulated by the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission. And the examinations that the operators must pass to become a control roorn operator
or a senior reactor operator are common among the utilities.

So it's a preparation for those

examinations which is quite varied.
SENATOR RUSSELL: I guess that's all controlled by the NRC.
MR. TAYLOR: Yes, there are specific regulations dealing with training.
SENATOR RUSSELL: So we don't get involved in that then, do we?
MR. TAYLOR: Do you mean you the state?
SENATOR RUSSELL: Right.
MR. TAYLOR: That's my understanding, but Pm not certain of that, sir.
SENATOR RUSSELL:

What about---one more question, please.

What about---are there any

requirements to test these people for drug abuse, substance abuse?
MR. TAYLOR: That's something which is outside of Babcock & 1Nilcox's purview.
SENATOR RUSSELL:

Well, I understand that, but you know enough about it to be able to

answer the question in some regard, I would assume.
MR. TAYLOR: Yes.
CHAIRMAN GREENE: I believe that Senator Rosenthal had asked those same questions out at
the plant. Senator Rosenthal.
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much time here and we've got two more panels here. May we hear from Electrical Power Research?
MR. JAMES F. LANG: You may.
CHAIRMAN GREENE: Thank you. Briefly.
MR. LANG: Briefly.
CHAIRMAN GREENE: All right. Turn up the juice.
MR. LANG: Well, I'm Jim Lang and I work at the Electric Power Research Institute in Palo
Alto in the Nuclear Safety Analysis Center.

Because the Chernobyl incident kicked off at least a

current flurry of concern, I was going to discuss differences and similarities between U.S. reactors
and the Chernobyl reactors.
CHAIRMAN GREENE:

Would you keep in mind, however, that our purposes have to do with

people, you know, that have nothing to do with the plant really. Of course, it has to do with those in
the plant, but the other 99 percent are not, like 99.9.
MR. LANG: I think that one of the important points is and the ease with which a plant may be
operated •••
CHAIRMAN GREENE: All right, go to it.
MR. LANG: ••• and that varies. I put up a chart up here. If you have extraordinary vision or
binoculars you can refer to it as I go through, and I'll mention that Darrell Eisenhut stole part of my
thunder, so I'll try to make brief the parts that he already mentioned. Thank you.
Our job is to really understand the Chernobyl accident and determine what actions or what
lessons there are for U.S. utilities to learn from that accident in Russia.

The first step is to

understand the Chernobyl design and how it differs from our own.
The first obvious difference between the Chernobyl reactor and our light water reactors, which
are depicted in the top row, and incidentally light water is regular water like you drink, except in
reactors it's just kept a little purer -- the first obvious difference is the Societ use of graphite
neutron moderators.

They use a whole lot of graphite in their core whereas in the U.S. we have

chosen light water moderation for our light water reactors.

The Soviet design evolved from their

weapons system where to produce weapons grade material they use graphite and low enrichment
uranium.

They just allowed the power reactors to evolve from that. The U.S. light water reactor

selected---or the U.S. designers selectors light water for the moderator to avoid potential problems
with graphite such as flammability, hard to ignite but it can burn, chemical and physical changes that
can occur in a reactor, and the immense physical size of a graphite reactor. 'vlr. Eisenhut mentioned
the 1600 pressure tubes that run through this reactor.

And there are 1800 tons of graphite in the

reactor, and it's about 40 feet across. It's a huge machine. Each of those individual pressure tubes
has its own pipes connected to the inlet and outlet end, yielding both size and complexity.

In

addition, the U.S. designers wanted a self-limiting reactor. So if coolant is lost, the reactor will shut
itself down. That's in fact what we've achieved and that isn't obtained in the Chernobyl case.
The next major difference between U.S. and Soviet reactor designs is in the defense-in-depth
barriers provided to ensure that nuclear fuel and fission products cannot escape the core. This bears
on the discussion of containment. The Chernobyl reactor and U.S. light water reactors use the same
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is, the core melt-type of accident, or emergency planning in the detail that we do. Finally, we think
that our limits for reactor operation, which is part of the licensing process for reactors, emergency
procedures, realistic operator training, and many other operations-related features that we've
instituted in the last seven years and are important to reactor safety here do not receive the same
level of attention in the Soviet Union.
So, in conclusion, I can say that there may well be lessons for us from the Chernobyl accident.
The wise man learns from the mistakes of others. However, because of the design differences I just
talked about, the improvements made in reactor operations in the U.S. over the last seven years,
information from the Soviet Union is not turning up any deficiencies in our reactor designs.

Rather,

the lessons from Chernobyl may some day suggest opportunities for further improvement.
Thank you for bearing with me.
CHAIRMAN GREENE: Thank you, sir. May we hear from Dr. Ibser.
OR. HOMER IBSER: Thanks for the opportunity of talking with you.
In response to the question that was raised earlier by Senator Russell, I'd like to read a short
paragraph before I start my remarks. One knowledgeable federal scientist challenges that scenario.
He says he knows of no plausible chemical reaction that would provide enough oxygen for a major
explosion within the core.

This is referring to the Chernobyl event.

If the explosion took place

outside the core, he doubts that it would have stripped away the six-foot-thick concrete shield that
surrounds the reactor.

The scientist and expert in reactor fuel has been directed by the Energy

Department not to discuss the Soviet accident with the press; however, he spoke with science before
the order went out and later asked to remain anonymous. I thought you might be interested in the
reference to the six-foot-thick concrete shield which surrounds the reactor.
The Chernobyl accident is particularly sobering and its educational value is enhanced if, as
appears to have been the case, it didn't involve a full-scale nuclear reactor core meltdown. Morris
Rosen of the International Atomic Energy Agency team investigating the accident and a Moscowdatelined Washington Post article indicate that the reactor had been operating at only 6% or 7% of
full power "for a prolonged period" before suddenly escalating, within 10 seconds, to SOCYo of full
power at the time of the accident.
If the reactor operated at a small fraction of its rated power for a prolonged period just
previous to the incident that destroyed it, the huge inventory of relatively short-lived fission products
ordinarily present in the reactor fuel elements would have largely decayed, and nothing near the sort
of a core melt that might have resulted from radioactive heating by fission products (had the
accident occurred at full power) actually took place. This may explain the Soviet proposal to seal the
reaction in concrete, which would otherwise appear rather futile.
Even though it appears not to have been a full-fledged nuciear plant accident, Chernobyl
deserves our attention. Land within 30 kilometers (over 18 miles) of the reactor has been abandoned
as unfit for habitation or agricultural use; that's over 1000 square miles, somewhat more than the size
of Sacramento County. As we sit here, we inhale a bit of radioactive iodine from Chernobyl, more
than halfway around the world upwind from us.
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SENATOR RUSSELL: And who makes that study? The NRC?
DR. IBSER: The sample5 are sent off to engineering testing laboratories. As a matter of fact,
Rancho Seco's samples are not now in the pressure vessel. They were sent off to 8avis-Besse--SENA TOR RUSSELL: Are you saying there are no samples in the pressure vessel?
DR. IBSER: Yes, but I would consider this not a major point because the samples at an earlier
time were withdrawn for inspection at a time when the Nuclear Regulatory--CHAIRMAN GREENE: You know, I really---gentlemen, we're not here to take the plant apart,
put it back together or do anything else with it.
safety of the populace.

We are here to discuss items that relate to the

I don't care to get into the design of that plant.

That's between NRC,

Electric Power Research, Babcock & Wilcox, and SMUD.
As to the comments you're making, yes, I'm aware of what you said and yes, I'm also aware that
those particular sample materials have been tested and apparently from those that have done the
testing, they do not find that the problems you contemplate have occurred. Beyond that I can't tell
you whether they were there to sweep the plant or whatever it was you said. May we go on?
DR. IBSER: Yeah, I would just like to respond that an NRC staff member was quoted in one of
the Science articles about Rancho Seco's problems, that if the pressure vessel had been ten years old
inste8d of three years old when it had its first severe pressurized thermal shock in 1978, it might very
well have cracked the pressure vessel.
CHAIRMAN GREENE: And he also said that nobody else on the Regulatory CommissiorJ agreed
with him, did he not?
DR. IBSER: I'm not aware of tnat.
CHAIRMAN GREENE: I see. OK. May we continue. We're running out of time.
DR. IBSER: Please. Would Sacramento be given the bad news promptly if a serious release of
radioactive material occurred at Rancho Seco?
answer.

Past behavior of SMUD's staff may suggest an

After the Chernob yl incident, Rancho Seco held a news conference to give reassuring

misinformation to local news media. A Rancho Seco nuclear engineer claimed that since our reactor
is "all metal" (the Chernobyl reactor was carbon moderated, and the carbon caught fire), fire was not
a hazard. Actually, the zirconium (metal) tubes which contain the fuel pellets at. Rancho Seco can
react with steam to produce enough heat to melt the fuel. According to Soviet Premier Gorbachev,
the explosion which blew the top off the building housing the Chernob yl reactor resulted from
hydrogen generated by the zirconium-steam reaction.
CHAIRMAN GREENE: Once again, this co;nmittee and its membership are not qualified to pass
judgment on the things you're talking about. With my engineering degree and all, which just happens
to be in a little bit different field -- I know something about hydroelectric power and the likes, not
too much about nuclear -- we are not competent, nor do we have any voice in these matters that
you're currently discussing. The matters that you're discussing should be properly taken up with the
national Regulatory Commission and others of that kind who have some voice in these matters.

We

are not here to determine how that plant was designed. It's standing up there. And we're here to find
out that if something does go wrong what do we do about it. And if the federal government that has
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The purpose of the American Physical Society study group was to "review the adequacy of the
technical base upon which phenomenological models for radionuclide release from postulated severe
reactor accidents are constructed, the adequacy of the models themselves, and the correct use of
complex computer codes that incorporate these models in the analysis of accident sequences."
The study was funded by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission by a contract to the
American Physical Society.

Much of the information on which our report is based was provided

through documents and testimony of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and its subcontractors. We
also reviewed documents and testimony of Electric Power Research Institute, the Nuclear Society's
special Committee on Source Terms, and the Industry Degraded Core Rulemaking Program, and
others. However, our report is an independent assessment of the information available to us as of
December, 1984; it was not subject to approval by any of the above organizations except for the
American Physical Society.
I'd like to briefly summarize the findings of this report.
SENATOR RUSSELL: Excuse me, again. What was your group, this independent group? What
was it called?
DR. GOREN: The American Physical Society Study Group.
SENATOR RUSSELL: I see. OK.
DR. GOREN: It is the professional society of physicists in the United States. And although I
am not a physicist myself, I was invited to participate in this ••••
SENATOR RUSSELL: Thank you.
DR. GOREN: These are excerpts from our Executive Summary. The full copy of the Executive
Summary and the conclusions from the report will be given to the record.
CHAIRMAN GREENE: This data is up to December of '84?
DR. GOREN: Yes, we completed our study in December '84.
So it's relating to information you got prior to that point in time,

CHAIRMAN GREENE:
obviously.

DR. GOREN: That's correct.
CHAIRMAN GREENE: Thank you.
SENATOR RUSSELL:

And so I can put your comments in context, is there any philosophical

direction this group has as pro- or anti-nuclear? or are they all over the lot?
DR. GOREN:

It was all over the lot, I would say. But it was designed to be an independent

assessment. For example, I have never done any work prior to this related to nuclear energy. I have
·Norked on problems of the---engineering problems that would be relevant, but I have never applied
them to these specific applications.
SENATOR RUSSELL: So it's a balanced group?
DR. GOREN: It was a balanced group.
SENATOR RUSSELL: Thank you.
SENATOR ROSENTHAL:

Pardon me.

Did you say that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission

paid for this report?
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gases may pass or beds of ice in some reactors where the gases are required to pass.
So these three factors have led many people to predict much lower emissions in the event of an
accident--CHAIRMAN GREENE: Would that suggest an increased problem in decommissioning the plant?
If you're plating out on the walls and so on, would that increase the problem of a decommission?

DR. GOREN: I'm not able to say, but my guess would be that you would rather have it plate-out
on the inside •••.
CHAIRMAN GREENE: Oh, !---there's no question about that. None whatever. None whatever.
3ut suppose that you're plating out inside the plant, you've stayed within the containment building,
OK? The question is, when you could ever go in there and clean it out or do anything with it or throw
it away, whatever you're going to do, has that---have you increased the problem on that end of the

line?
DR. GOREN: I could only guess. My guess is that the timing would be the same because the
timing is dictated by the speed at which the radioactivity decays.
CHAIRMAN GREENE:

But if it's plating out on the walls, if the matter is there rather than

going through a fissure or crack in the building out in the atmosphere, we've now got to contain. It's
right here in this building, OK? How do we get it out of here?
Dr~.

GOREN: Well, you must realize that there are many different radioactive species. Not all

are calculated to leave. And the problem of decommissioning a plant in which the nonvolatile species
which are probably the more hazardous ones over the long run, that would be I think independent as to
whether or not the iodine and cesium were allowed to escape. Still, there would be within the plant
boundary so'ne of the other materials such as cerium, lanthanum, and plutonium.
C:Hi\IR!v1AN GREENE:

Suppose that material did escape, OK? How bad off are we and how

quickly? Or is that outside your sphere of knowledge?
DR. GOREN: Well, that's outside my sphere of knowledge.
CHAIRMAN GREENE: All right, thank you, sir. Go ahead, Senator Rosenthal.
SENATOl~

ROSENTHAL: Did you indicate then that the report says that we have less to worry

about regarding radiation outside the plant?
DR. GOREN: The report says that in many accident scenarios and sequences, there is less to
worry about than was implied in the 1975 study. On the other hand, we were not so sanguine that we
would endorse the specific numbers that were being calculated because there remain a large number
of uncertainties.
SENATOR ROSENTHAL: Well, until you know for sure, shouldn't we presume the worst case?
CHAIRMAN GREENE:

WeU, what he's saying to us, I think, Senator Rosenthal, is that they

would now project the worst case as being a somewhat less worst case than earlier without giving you
any information whatever about what to do about it because that's outside their sphere.
SENATOR ROSENTHAL: OK.
CHAIRMAN GREENE: What he set down was he sat down with his computer and he made some
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CHAIRMAN GREENE: Again, thank you. I think we best move on. If anybody has a comment
they just have to make, go ahead and make it. If not, let's move on to our next panel, which is what?

All right, something here?
DR. IBSER: I wanted to make one brief remark, if I may.
CHAIRMAN GREENE: OK.
DR. IBSER:

In the light of remarks that were made by two previous members of the panel

regarding the improvement of the staff at Rancho Seco, as a matter of fact, I know that SMUD has
been looking hard for people, technical people at Rancho Seco, for years. The problem is that there
is a severe shortage.

I see no particular reason for assuming that there are now prospects for

suddenly greatly enhancing the technical staff at Rancho Seco.
CHAIRMAN GREENE: All right, thank you, sir. All right, this panel is on Emergency Planning
and Coordination and we hope somebody's got some other---there we go.
their first remark?

Who shall h:mor us with

Let's start with Nick Nikas, Federal Emergency Management Administration

(FEMA).
We're going to try, folks, I don't know if we're going to succeed, but if we can not take up too
much of your time, we'd appreciate it if there's some way to hold you to five minutes apiece because
there's 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30 minutes right there. We'll stick our two cents in and an hour is shot to
hell, OK?
MR. NICK NIKAS: I think I can do it in five minutes.
CHAIRMAN GREENE: All right.
MR. NIKAS: You have copies of this testimony?
CHAIRMAN GF<.EENE: Yes, that'll be in our records.
MR. NIKAS: A copy will be available for the record.
A little bit of background to begin with. I'm with the Federal Emergency Management Agency,
Region IX, in San Francisco. The particular area of concern in rny work is radiological emergency
preparedness.
CHAIRMAN GREENE: Attaboy, that's what we want to know about.
MR. NIKAS: The Three Mile Island (TMI) nuclear power plant incident in March 1979 raised
public interest in the nuclear power industry, its relation to federal, state, and local governments,
and the need for improved emergency pr_eparedness around the nation's nuclear power plants.
Before TMI, offsite emergency planing at nuclear sites, by the utilities and local and state
authorities, was done under the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC) oversight and basically on a
voluntary basis. Specific requirements for offsite emergency planning as a precondition for licensing
had not been established; and as a result, the capabilities to respond to a radiological accident varied
greatly.
One of the major lessons learned from TMI was the necessity for a comprehensive, coordinated
response plan by every level of government for a possible radiological emergency at each commercial
nuclear site.

TMI also revealed that such emergency plans had to be integrated with onsite

capabilities, thus affording the public living near the power plant the best possible protection in the
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MR. NIKAS: In reference to our response?
CHAIRMAN GREENE: Hey, this plant just blew. Come on. I need action. What are you doing?
MR. NIKAS: Weil, what we're doing at this region is assembling the staff and dispatching an
element of that staff to the Office of Emergency Services

______ in Sacramento.

CHAIRMAN GREENE: Then your Washington headquarters is notifying somebody somewhere.
Where? Sacramento? San Francisco? Where are they, your people?
MR. NIKAS: They're in San Francisco. Our offices are in San Francisco.
CHAIRMAN GREENE: OK. So, Washington, OK?
MR. NIKAS: Yes. Well, we would get that notification from NRC.
CHAIRMAN GREENE: All right.
MR. NIKAS: There's a dual track.
CHAIRMAN GREENE:

Yeah, but would San Francisco get it or would they get it from you?

From NRC? Does it go from NRC to you to San Francisco? Or does it go from---?
MR. NIKAS: Sir, I am in San Francisco.
CHAIRMAN GREENE: All right. But where does NRC call? Are they calling you or are they
calling Washington?
MR. NIKAS: Well, they've called both places.
CHAIRMAN GREENE: All right. So you would know as soon as Washington knows you would
know?
tAR. NIKAS: It would not take very long for us to get the word. Yes, sir.

CHAIRMAN GREENE: Ach. Within a minute or two or three?
MR. NIKAS: As long as it takes to--CHAIRMAN GREENE: Or ten or twenty or an hour?

Are we talking about an hour? Are we

talking about five minutes?
MR. NIKAS: Well, ah--CHAIRMAN GREENE: rm just trying to get at, that plant blew and I'm trying to find out what
you're going to do and you're not---you haven't told me yet.

The plant just went up, rnan.

I need

action. What is it? Come on. There's a cloud up there, you know, floating around while you're sitting
here talking.
MR.

Oi<, I think I can safely say that we could expect to get the word within 15

rninutes. We could expect to get word--CHAIRMAN GREENE: In that case, I don't need it any longer. I think I'm dead.
MR. NIKAS: Well, I think you're wrong.
CHAIRMAN GREENE: Gees, I hope you're right. But if you're not, who's going to be here to
argue about it, right?
MR. NIKAS:

Well, you know, I think that we can discuss the matter that way and not get

anyplace. If you're interested in hearing what our systems are in getting the thing on the road, I'd be
glad to

them to you.

CHAIRMAN GREENE: I'd be glad to hear you do it.
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MR. NU<AS: OK then, we'll dispense with this and I'll try to explain how the system would work
in terms of our response at the federal level in Region IX. We would get the word that the accident
occurred.

And without waiting for a detailed analysis, the regional director would dispatch an

element of his staff to the Office of Emergency Services where we would interact with the state of
California, get the details, feed that information back to the regional director, and assuming that it
was the type of accident that would require our support to state and local jurisdictions, he would
dispatch his resources to a federal response center, which we are now in the process of organizing
adjacent to the Office of Ernergency Services, where we would assemble federal agencies for the
purpose of directing any support or assistance that we could and which the
jurisdictions require.

stat~

and local

Now that involves all of those federal agencies that would have a direct

involvement in trying to deal with this accident.
CHAIRMAN GREENE: And---ah--MR. NIKAS:

Our requirement, as of right now, is to organize and make that emergency

response center, the federal response center, operational within 6 to 12 hours of our notification of
~he

accident. And that's really moving.
SENATOR RUSSELL: Senator Greene?
CHAIRMAN GREENE: Yes, Senator Russell.
SENATOR RUSSELL:

How many federal agencies would be cooperating with the Office of

Emergency Services? In this disaster?
MR. NIKAS: About---anywhere from seven to ten?
SENATOR RUSSELL: Could you tell us what they are?
MR. NIKAS: Yeah, there's the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the Environ:nental Protection
Agency. There's the Federal Emergency Management Agency.
There is the Department of
Agriculture, the Department of Transportation, the Department of Energy. Well, the Department of
Defense may or may not be involved, depending upon the circumstances.
SENATOR RUSSELL:

What kinds of things---Agriculture, I guess, looks at the milk and the

food products. The others I'm not quite sure what they do. Obviously, they look at the plant to see
what's happened and how they can contain the radioactivity if there is any coming out.
MR. NIKAS:

There is a great deal of activity going on both at the Office of Emergency

Services and the Emergency Operations Center and within our own federal response center and in the
field. For example, EPA would be involved in assisting in 'Tlaking dose assessments and measuring the
rate of radioactive activity outside the boundaries of the plant. DOE would be involved in similar
technical activities. The Department of Agriculture would be concerned about the impact on food
and water and things like that. We would have the role of coordinating these federal activities in a
way that would provide for the dissemination of important information as rapidly as possible, both
laterally and vertically and through our emergency news centers to the public.
SENATOR RUSSELL: You mentioned the Department of Transportation.
moving of rr-opln nnci rnnt.nrial nnd whnt.ovor nart.

,,r

That would be the

tho ni'On?

MR. NIKAS: Yes. Whatever support the Department of Transportation through the Regional
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Emergency Transportation Coordinator could provide, they would be prepared to.
SENATOR RUSSELL:
that l<ind of thing?
MR. NIKAS:

That would be then, most likely, Arrny trucks, National Guard trucks,

Whatever transportation was available in the federal community.

Ye has that

authority to mobilize and use those resources.
SENATOR. RUSSELL: And how do you---maybe we'll hear this from other people. But how do
you then interface with the county and the city that are---cities that are involved in there? Are you
in authority or is the City of Sacramento and the County of Sacramento calling the tune? How does
that work?
MR. NIKAS:

Well, within their own jurisdictional boundaries, local -- I think it's part of

California state law •••
SENATOR RUSSELL: Right.
MR. NIKAS: ••• that local jurisdiction maintains authority and responsibility. We would respond
to their requests.
CHAIRMAN GREENE: Senator Russell, in each county where there is a nuclear plant, within
state law there is an obligation for a county plan. And you know, then it goes back to the state and
so on. You're actually more longer range than short-range, aren't you, your reactions? I rnean, when
I say what are you going to do right now, you're really not that.
MR. NH<AS: That's right.
CHAIRMAN GREENE:

You're the long-range thing.

You're not the instantaneous response

which would be coming from the county, the city, and the state.
MR. NIKAS: We are not. That's right.
SENATOR ROSENTHAL: Mr. Chairman?
CHAIRMAN GREENE: Yes, Senator ••••
SENATOR ROSENTHAL:

What kind of federal regulations are there for actual drills of

emergency plans?
MR. NIKAS: OK, the regulations currently require that---well, the process involves reviewing
the plans, approving the plans, validating the plans through exercise. Then we have a public hearing
to make certain that everyone's concerns are heard and dealt with as best we can. Once that's done,
you're required to exercise once every two years. The purpose of those exercises again is to update
procedures and the planning to make sure that it's as good as we can make it. That's required once
every two years.

CHAIRMAN GREENE: But that's a--SENATOR ROSENTHAL: Has a---well, maybe I have to ask the state. I've not been aware of
an unannounced ::!rill to some situation. Is that required or not required?
MR. NII<AS: Yes, it is required. It's required to take place at least once within six years of the
time that the plant is licensed and the planning has been validated. To rny knowledge, at least in this
region, there has been no unannounced plan per se. But there are plans to conduct those unannounced
drills. The exact parameters under which they will be done have not been settled as of yet. There is
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GREENE:
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we

scenarios and making the exercises as realistic as we can, we can

by the

assurance that we can

a measure

sir.

Do you have any

whatever, and it's always hard to get

as to whether

had any planning of this kind at all? Because we

have some fair notion of what happened at Chernobyl as far as warning

know what

and so on, you

their own

how long it took them to evacuate and so on. Do we have any

all as to whether they have any plans of these kinds?

information

MR. NIKL\5: I personally do not have that information.
CHAIRMAN

Have you heard of anybody that knows anything about that? No? OK,

thank you.
MR. ROSS A. SCARANO: Mr. Chairman, I'm not aware of what kind of plans that they have.
But

what we have

evacuate until

since then, we understand that they did not '!1ake a decision to

hours after the building blew, but that when they did, they did evacuate about

46,000 people, I believe, in about four hours.
CHAIRMAN GREENE:

Well, one wonders whether they were preparing in those 36 hours to

evacuate or whether they said, wait, we're not going to do it and then they said, yes, we're going to
do it so call out ttle troops, you know.

MR. SCARANO: We have no ideCi.
CHAIRMAN

You don't know whether they used that 36 hours or not for preparation.
No.

MR.

all

can we move on? Can you finish?
what I'd like to say is that it must be understood that the

MR.

there, lies with the local jurisdictions in the state.
technical

and the application of the regulations as they've

the statutes. Our

is to help insure that state and local governments are ready

primarily is
come down

Our job

to any kind of accident.

to
My

based on the
fro'l1 the state are

data available is that the state of California and the
to respond to any foreseeable accident. Thank you.

Thank you. May we 'nOVe on? OK, NRC.
my name is Ross Scarano. I'm with the NRC Region

MR.

V

located here in
In the

you a copy of my paper and rather than--Appreciate that and just kind of sum up for us.

MR.

Yeah, Pll try to go through it so that we may all understand what the NRC
as what the NRC role might be in the case of a nuclear incident. Senerally,

I can say that the
there is
a

would not

a license nor let a licensee keep operating unless we find that

assurance that

protective measures can and wiH be taken in the event of

emergency. Now, we

-- that would be the

those findings on an evaluation of the licensee's on-site plan

that we would do as an inspection program out of ;ny office -- and the other
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It occurs to me that you could develop the perfect plan on paper that
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ever

all agree and rave about how

it is.
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-- and
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we'll never have one, but do you think that there
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rchea!'Sals and how extensive they are or are not?

MR. SCARANO:

I think we
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to

where we, the

and Rancho Seco discussed this particular incident and, you

know, what carne
sticks

it
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one

to be done. We talked about the type of training; for instance,

what
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my mind that there is
emergency did not
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the kind of
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as well as what they are

what the
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by Rancho Seco. We do monitor that training and

y ours.

SENATOR

Do you have certain

and guidelines that they must do? You
them however they do it?

Yes.

There

that are listed as a minimum in those

programs.

that I mentioned to you, about maybe some training and
decision-makers'

we're

we missed

of the required training.
we have

and so

in Rancho Seco from '80-84, revisions,

decade only two: one in '82 and one in '84; and limited exercises in
Diablo

'83

and you have one every year. And San Onofre,

between what's
MR.

at in our own program and saying,

tnink

i~s

as wide as

on Ht Rancho Soco and, say, Diablo
be characterized. The requirenent is that

and

is an annual exercise that the licensee must go
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SCARANO: As a matter

of our licensees

this?

I do

you

at
a

the first
in

Then you go over to

of

of '84, and that's it.

MR. SCARANO:

Yeah, I was

that the licensee must go

to the annual

SENATOR RUSSELL: Whatever that is.
MR. SCARANO: This is

drills that the offsite

to the exercise
of what Rancho is

would be going through. So this is
SENATOR ROSENTHAL: Oh,
MR. Nli<AS: Yes.
SENATOi~

ROSENTHAL: Offsite

SEI~ATOR

RUSSELL: Well, it doesn't look like

compare that with

This is--there

to

Sacramento
at

would Hke to comment, I suppose, when it's their turn. 3ut it
more than what's

it looks like Diablo
1 mean,

Rancho Seco is kind of
MR. SCARANO:

rln'""nn

look that way

all of the reactors

to '84 time

the months in between are not that
Rancho

RUSSELL:

do---

has---

a limited exercise it says.

MS. CAROL HOPWOOD: That's a
MS.

a heck of a

sir. I have to say that

arena

exercise.

Was there a ••• ?
: It was

MR.

MS. VASQUEZ: It was a corrective exercise.
SENATOR

with =-EMA

has one every year from
And then they with limited

Rancho

has one more

that, why is that? \\/hat's the difference? Does
Does

know? Amador?
but I think
MS. VASt,JlJLZ: [ yuoss the stale
SENATOR RUSSELL:
MS. HOPWOOD:

it

throw the hot

For one th

Senator

the state.
I can

and I know

a

it for

and

because I was the coordinator down there for San Onofre before I came up here.
SENATOR RUSSELL: Well, !---we're in Rancho Seco right now.
MS. HOPWOOD:

But Rancho Seco with regard to the frequency of the drills, there has been

some change in the requirement laid upon the outside jurisdictions. And it was, I believe, beginning in
1982 that all of the nuclear power plant offsite jurisdictions went to a biennial exercise period rather

than an annual exercise.
SENATOR RUSSELL:

OK, then it looks like Diablo Canyon voluntarily has done some good

thin•]S. I guess we heard that comrnent earlier.
MR. NIK.AS: That's correct. The requirement is once every two years. That's the hard and fast
requirement.
SENATOR RUSSELL: That's a state statute.
MR. NIKAS:

But voluntarily, of their volition, as is the case for Diablo Canyon juridictions,

they can exercise more often and they have chosen to do so.
SENATOR RUSSELL: OK.
MR. NIKAS: And they have asked on occasion, I think for each one of those exercises so far,
for an evaluation from FEMA. But the hard requirement is once every two years.
SENATOR RUSSELL: OK, San Onofre and Diablo Canyon have done more than they needed to
do. OK.
SENATOR ROSENTHAL: All right, may we hear from the state?
:v1S. VASQUEZ: Yes. Those with the blue packets---do you have those in front of you.

SENATOR ROSENTHAL: Yes.
MS. VASQUEZ: My statement is contained in there. I'm Ann Vasquez from the state Office of
Emergency Services. Rather than read the statement in the interest of time, I'll tell you •..
SENATOR ROSENTHAL: Yes, briefly.
SENATOR RUSSELL: (Inaudible.)
MS. VASQUEZ: •.• what's in the packet. Do you have one? There's a yellow book in the packet
that reflects a summarization of the effects of a serious nuclear power plant accident in California.
We did that under Senator Gararnendi's legislation, 1183 (1979).
SENATOR

F~OSENTHAL:

Oh, yeah. That's it.

SENA TO.~ RUSSELL: Oh, yeah.
MS. VASQUEZ:

That explains the zones and basically what we felt could happen during a

serious accident.
You also have in there copies of the legislation that have supported this project since 1980. The
legislation mandates that the utilities pay for all the operations on the state and the county level, and
those funds are washed through my office. The local jurisdictions provide us with annual budgets and
work statements, and we keep up and audit that process.
In there is also my statement; and then because one of your people -- I think it might have been
Mr. Fadelli -- called my office and said, we wonder how OES operates during a nuclear emergency,
there is an organizational chart for emergency operations in the back of the packet as well.
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SENATOR ROSENTHAL: Yes, there's a calendar ••••
SENATOR RUSSELL: :Jh! I see.
MR. NIKAS:

Also, Senator, the schedule for the dissemination of public informatio:1 on an

annual basis is shown on that matrix that was furnished with your folder.
SENATOR ROSENTHAL: Right.
SENATOR RUSSELL: The problem I guess is that -- you know, this is terri fie. We get this and
we put it up on the wall and we mark our calendar on it but nobody reads the information or
remembers it. And I guess there's nothing you can do about that.
MS. VASQUEZ:

No, well, actually, remember that around the nuclear power plants within a

ten-mile radius is the siren system. It's the only emergency which we're that prepared for. And when
those sirens sound, they mean one thing and that's turn on your radio and television.

And that is

basically what that information tells them.
What the situation is, is that during a nuclear power emergency the local jurisdictions and the
state would come out with immediate information over the TV and radio system.
SENATOR RUSSELL:

How would they get that?

How would Sacramento County know, as

apparently they didn't seem to know in Chernobyl and that may be for other reasons, that the people
needed to be evacuated or they didn't need to be evacuated?

There was such a mass of

misinformation from our perspective. Maybe it was different over there.
MS. VASQUEZ: I understand that.
SENATOR RUSSELL:

But how does Sacramento County know that there is x amount of

radiation level and that means that in 10 miles, 20 miles, 100 miles we've got to clear everybody out?
How do they know that for sure without all kinds of false alarms and the press running around like
crazy talking to anybody who will give them an opinion on anything?
MS. VASQUEZ: I understand. Carol.
MS. HOPWOOD:

With regard to that question, Senator, we have what is termed the "Unified

Dose Assessment Center." It is composed of nuclear health physics people from state, from SMUO,
from the county, and we---they have a computer-assisted program where they make dose projection.
SENATOR RUSSELL: Does the federal government in their group play a part in that?
MS. HOPWOOD: Yes, they're in there; so is the Environmental Protection Agency and a number
of other federal agencies.
SENATOR RUSSELL: So they are all together in this, wherever you do this site.
MS. HOPWOOD:
facility.

It's down at corporate headquarters at SMUD, in their emergency onsite

In addition to that, we can get dose projections off the computer; but in addition to that,

the counties also have a series of teams.

With regard to Sacramento County, we use our health

sanitarian people and they are given a special type of training.

They will actually go out into the

field and they will track the plume or the cloud. They have very, very in-depth training regarding
these instruments.

And in addition to tracking a plume, they can also through a particular type of

instrument learn if we have particulate matter down and in fact if we have iodine concentrations out
there.
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SENATOK RUSSELL:

Well now, do you have to wait until the federal folks come from

Francisco?
MS. HOPWOOD: No, no, no. Within---once the utility has decided on the level of emergency
classification, they are required by federal guidance to alert the offsite jurisdictions as to what that
level of classification is.

Once that occurs, if it's above an unusual event, then the County of

Sacramento would activate its emergency operations center. We would call all our people in. If we
get to an alert, our emergency operations center comes up. If we go to a higher step of emergency,
then I and some of my staff respond to the emergency onsite facility at SMUD and we direct the
county forces from that area. But it's a very quick response time. And I'm on 24-hour call. We have
a call-out list of people for the county and we are five deep, so if I am not available, then the next in
line is.

And we are always on call. So we can come up very, very quickly. That's how---first, we

have----so we have two levels. We have a capability to make dose projections, using a computer-aid--assisted system; and we can actually put people into the field in protective gear and using very
delicate instruments to actually tell us what is out there and we can track the cloud. So that's how
we would know.
And then we also have meteorological capabilities -- which way the wind is blowing, is it
raining, is there fog? And based on those various scenarios, then you can ascertain what is the best
protective action guides to--SENATOR RUSSELL: And there are escape highways listed?
MS. HOPWOOD: There are a number of highways out there and routes that we would use. The
ideal---depending on the nature of the incident, if you have a puff release or a single release and it
stopped, ideally you would want to shelter the population and let the cloud pass. You do not want to
be moving your populations through the cloud and giving thern unnecessary doses of radiation. If you
have a continuous release, you would try to evacuate the population away from the cloud or around
the cloud, rather than through the cloud.
We have a very comprehensive plan. Our Sheriff's Department responds and they set up a series
of roadblocks. And we have the capability to actually send certain people into the area to evacuate
people who for whatever reason -- either they do not have a series of transportation rneans or we do
have some special facilities out there -- and we take those particular people into special
consideration.
SENATOR RUSSELL: How do you keep the media from misinforming?
MS. HOPWOOD: We have an ernergency news center which is set up at the SMUD site, at the
Emergency On-site
officers.

~=" acility.

And all of the counties, as well as S\1UD, have public information

In addition to that, within my Emergency Operation Center, we also have a public

information officer; and we have a facsimile copy machine. We have land-line capability, telephones.
We have two-way radios. So that all of us have the same information at the same time. That was
one of the lessons that was learned as a result of the TMI accident, that there was enormous amounts
of misinformation being put out and enormous amounts of misinformation given to the public even
when they had that information.
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SENATOR ROSENTHAL: On December 26, something happened at Rancho Seco, OK? What did
you do?
MS. HOPWOOD:

I received a call at 4:30 a.m. in the morning.

And I was informed by my

County Communications Division that there had been an incident at the plant and it was classified as
an unusual event. The plant---I don't recall all of it right now, but that it was cooling. It was cooling
1nore quickly than they had anticipated.

At that time, they told me it was nothing more than an

unusual event and not to worry about it, that at that time the plant was under control. So I went
back to bed. They said they would advise us if there was any further information. I happened to be
on jury duty at that time; and when I got down to the court at 9 o'clock, I was astounded to find out
that it was---or at least the press was involved and there had been a press conference subsequent to
that.

And of course, none of my staff knew about that because it was an unusual event category

which is not that unusual and really as a rule is not--SENATOR RUSSELL: An unusual event is not unusual?
MS. HOPWOOD: No, I wouldn't say so. I think that they happen on a somewhat routine basis.
mean a low-flying plane can come over the plant and that can be categorized as an unusual event. Or
you may somebody driving around in the night out there on the hills around the plant and you see the
lights and security gets real concerned about that.

And that could even be classified uncertain

circumstances as an unusual event.
So it triggers a response in that you are aware that something's going on at the plant. And tnen
depending on what further information you have as a follow-up guide to that, you determine what
you're going to do from that. But I was led to believe at that point that there was not a great deal of
concern.
SENATOR ROSENTHAL: OK. You heard about it approximately 4:30 in the morning.
MS. HOPWOOD: That is correct.
SENATOR ROSENTHAL: What time did it actually take place?
MS. HOPWOOD: About 4:12, 4:15.
MS. VASQUEZ: 4:15.
SENATOR ROSENTHAL: So it was a pretty quick ••••

MS. VASQUEZ: Senator, could I add some information to that?
SENATOR ROSENTHAL: Yes.
MS. VASQUEZ: One thing that hasn't come out in this hearing is t;,at the Office of Emergency
Services maintains an electronic notification system tied into all three nuclear power plants in
California.

And when certain things happen at those plants, whether we're called or not, that board

goes off. And when that board goes off, I get a call at home or on my pager. I'rn also on 24-hour or I
have a duty officer replacing me. I received the call about the same time the board went off which
wan o<1tlior t.han t.hoy rocoivod tho notifir:1tion by

mintttr~g.

I ro[lponded :J[l :1oon :1:1 I ret:oivod thn

notification from my warning control officer to the office. I live five :ninutes from there. And we

all receive---we have a ring-down system where all of us can talk to the plant at the same time; and
when we use the ring-down system to receive the information, there were some questions at the time
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on the information. So from that point forward, about 5 a.m. in the morning until about noon that
day, all three of us were in contact at some time or another recognizing that although we didn't feel
it was any classification other than unusual event, we did recognize that the control rootn was not

following the procedures they had been trained to us and not giving us the information they were
required to by procedure.

But we never felt during that time that it was anything more than an

unusual event.
SENATOR ROSENTHAL: OK, now, what has taken place since then to change whatever took
place in the plant?
SENATOR RUSSELL:

Before we get to that, can I stay on this situation?

The lady from

Sacramento said it was unusual and so she felt comfortable in going back to bed. You felt that they
were following procedures, but it was not that of a crisis. Did you go down to the plant---I mean, to
your office when you got the call? Or were you---?
MS. VASQUEZ: Actually I received a second call fro:!l my warning controller. We have a 24hour warning controller at the Office of Emergency Services.

And the reason I responded to my

office is because my warning controller said, "The information they have given me does not match up
with the information I should be filling in on my form."

The control room is supposed to follow a

form we all fill in together. And with that in mind and since I am such a short distance away, I went
down. Call it dedication.
SENATOR RUSSELL: Well, OK, they weren't filling in the form, whatever that means. 'Nhat
did you do about that? Did you call back or---?
tv1S. VASQUEZ:

Yes, I had the warning controller recontact the control roo.n on several

occasions; and when we still weren't satisfied, I also called the local jurisdictions to discuss with them
the fact that the procedures were not being followed and that I told them I was getting in contact
with the utility through other means to find out why this was going on.
SENATOR RUSSELL: And did you get---receive cooperation?
MS. VASQUEZ: Yes, I received cooperation, but as the NRC individual has indicated, sometime
later down the road there were miscommunications. In other words, one person would say there was a
release or we don't know if there is a release or there was no release.

And that kind of

miscommunication, we were not satisfied with.
SENATOR RUSSELL: Boy.
S[NA TOR ROSENTHAL: It's so frustrating. If in fact somebody is not doing so<nething so that
at least we're aware of what's happening, there's no penalty.
iv1S. VASQUEZ: Just a minute. Before the NRC jumps out of their seat, immediately ••.
SENATOR ROSENTHAL: ••• a slap on the wrist. Who got fired? I mean, I just---I want to know
what---how---unless there is something significant that brings about the change so that it works the
way it should work, what are we talking about?
MR. SCARANO:

There's---as---! mentioned earlier that I did have an inspection team that

went down to the site and followed up on this.
including this particular incident.

And the inspection team covered quite a few areas

In the areas of emergency preparedness and radiological
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monitoring, not any of which really are involved in this particular incident, we are going to have an
escalated enforcement action. It is in the works and will probably occur within the next two weeks.
It will be incumbent on the licensee to take corrective actions and to provide to us satisfaction that
those corrective actions will work prior to consideration of a restart.
SENATOR ROSENTHAL: OK, and that's fine. Supposing three months from now something else
happens. I guess--MR. SCARANO:

We feel it's a matter of training.

And you know, I've been involved m

exercises and drills and emergency plans all over this nations. I've been involved in the response of
the NRC. And I can tell you with no hesitation that communications is the biggest hang-up all across
the board. There is no way to guarantee that communications are going to be absolutely perfect.
That's like a common thing. And all that can be done and the counties are very good at holding the
licensee, as well as we are, to the wall to minimize the infractions on communications. It, indeed, is
the biggest problem.
SENATOR ROSENTHAL:

Unless there is some harsh penalty of some kind, I don't know how

you're going to prevent it from happening again.
SENATOR RUSSELL: Does it require---?
SENATOR ROSENTHAL: What can we do at the state level to improve communications?
MR. SCARANO: Well, I feel quite confident, as a matter of fact, the county folks that are
involved

in

this are very conscientious folks and they can't do their job without proper

communication, so they're really hard-nosed about trying to get what they need. I think that it's a
continuing process, particularly with Rancho Seco. I have to admit that we have more problems in
communications and training at Rancho Seco than we do at the other two nuclear power plants in this
state.

And we're looking for some management commitment to turn this around. And we've been

talking to these folks for some time about emergency preparedness. And it has been hard in the past
to get management to really put their attention on it.

There's no payback.

kilowatts. It's in some people's minds throwing money down the drain.

It's not turning out

We need a broader-minded

manage!' that can look at the bigger picture. Hopefully, we have that now; but only time will tell.
SE:NA T'OR ROSENTHAL: So in your opinion, you think that the present management is capable
of providing that kind of leadership so that the persons in the plant will respond in a proper manner?
MR. SCARANO: Only time will tell, Senator. We will be watching it.
SENATOR RUSSELL:

You're in charge of the training, I mean you oversee the training inside

the plant, correct?
MR.. $CARANO:

That's---we're in charge of monitoring that tr8ining, that's correct. Not in

providing it, but monitoring---making sure that it's being done.
SENATOR RUSSELl_:

And you have developed in your agency the guidelines which tells this

plant what they have to do?
MR. SCARANO: That's correct.
SENATOR RUSSELL: And how often do they have in-house drills?
MR. SCARANO: There is a schedule for the in-house drills. They have been adhering to that
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schedule. Where we have a--SE!'..JATOR RUSSELL: What is the schedule?
MR. SCARANO: It's on an annual basis.
SENATOR RUSSELL: Once a year?
MR. SCARANO: Pardon me.
SENATOR RUSSELL: Once a year?
MR. SCARANO: Yes. But it really---really encompasses a lot of minor portions of that plant
th"lt, you know, they arc not all done at one time is what--SENATOR RUSSELL: In other words, you don't have one big drill once a year and forget it.
MR. SCARANO: That's correct.
SENATOR RUSSELL: You have a lot of little things that are going on all the time? Part of the
training?
MR. SCARANO: Yes. And what I was going to lead to is, our biggest problems is not so ;nuch
of holding the drills, but their training program needs a lot of help; and the major reason Nhy we're
having this enforcement conference is that it is a repeat item. It is an item that we have found them
to be lacking in for the last couple of years.
SENATOR RUSSELL: Apparently, how---only just the last couple of years?
MR. SCARANO: Ummmm, I've been on the scene since '83 and it's been recurring since '83.

I--SENATOR RUSSELL: How about before you came on board? Did you hear stories about good
or bad or indifferent in terms of their training portion?
MR. SCARANO:

I heard a lot of stories about Rancho Seco and that's why I gave it a lot of

attention when I carne in '83. So what we're hearing is that this has been a perennial problem for
many years exceeding---going beyond your purview. Do you have the authority then to say, look, this
place is in such shape that we're going to have drills twice a year?
MR. SCARANO:

We could certainly state that we are not satisfied with the results and put

pressure on to make performance better.
SENATOR RUSSELL: Why don't---haven't you done that?
MR. SCARANO:

Well, as a matter of fact, what we're seeing is the culmination.

The

particular notification problem that was part of this December incident in and of itself is not tnat
major. It's just not that unusual. If it were the only notification problem that occurred in the last
four years, we probably would just slap them on the wrist and say, you know, you ought to perk your
training up. What's particularly irritating to me is that, you know, these are recurring items.

And

what has occurred is that there has never been, you know, a major problem out at Rancho Seco. What
we have been seeing is a lot of indications of things that, you know, can lead to real problem areas.
And so we've beeR after them on that ....
SENATOR RUSSELL: You know, it's easy for us to sit up here on Mount Olympus and look down
and say, this is a perfect world and why don't you do it the way we think it should be done. And most
of us really don't know what we're talking about in terms of practicality. We know what we want and

we're frustrated because we can't get it. But it seems to me that you have the responsibility, your
agency does, to insure that whatever plant is under your purview, and we're talking about Rancho
Scco at this time, that their training come up to some standard of operation and that if they continue
and recurringly do not, it seems to me then you ought to have some sort of ability to exact a
monetary fine or to do something that they would have to start paying a price other than just your
trying to browbeat them into doing something that they for whatever reason aren't doing.
'v1R. SCARANO: You're absolutely correct. And the enforcement conference that I referred to
will take into consideration a monetary fine.
SENATOR RUSSELL: You have that ability now?
MR. SCARANO: That's correct.
SENATOR RUSSELL: Well, from Mount Olympus up here, it seems to me that you should use
that. Because from what we hear, there are positive signs of improvement with new management and
so forth. I mean, rm encouraged with that. But it seems like this has been going on for. such a long
time that there's something inherently flawed, not necessarily in the plant itself, but maybe
something inherently flawed in the people who are running it and the management.

And I'm sure

they're good people but---so that means it's got to be the training, the rehearsals. And I guess that's
where you co1ne in. And you know, we can't do anything other than to say to you, please, come down
on them and come down on them hard in whatever ways you can to get them to do the training over
and over and over and over again till they get it right. I know in the military that's what they do. If
you don't run the obstacle course right, you go back and do it again and again and again and again. So
why can't tnose kinds of things---I'm sure it's not as simple as I picture it, but why can't those kinds of
things take place.

And I urge you to do it for the security and peace of mind of everybody around

here.
\IIR. SCARANO: I understand, sir.
SENATOR ROSENTHAL:

May we hear from the other two witnesses?

Also, the gentleman

from Amador, my understanding, you testified before an Assembly committee speaking about a larger
emergency radius than ten miles. Would you carne in on that?
MR. SEAN CROWDER: Correct. ::Jutlined in my written presentation, it concerns that. Right
now the only planning done is within 10 miles, and that's extensive planning including sirens and
evacuation.
My county believes that that 10 rniles should be expanded an additional 15.

And in that

additional 15 miles should be some additional planning to look at such things as evacuation times,
whether or not there are problems with prisons, correctional facilities, identification of handicapped
people. We do not think that it is going to be cost effective to put i:-t sirens throughout that entire
25-mile area. And it's not going to really be cost effective to do a great deal of planning. But right
now, the planning, at least for Amador County stops at the 10-miles boundary.
done beyond that for the City of Jackson.

And no planning is

Translated into the other counties, it goes into higher

population areas there.
So we believe it would be appropriate for the state to look at an additional 15 miles in planning
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so that there is something on the books that will give us some guidance should something serious
really happen that goes out to 18 or 20 miles.
I'll just briefly touch on my other items.
Senate Bill 1976 which are outlined here.

I also suggested that there be some amendments to

One of the questions I keep hearing from the Senators is

what can the state do to help the situation. I believe that there are wide-open areas for legislation
for the state to take a look at. I think that the state Office of Emergency Services should be given
some type of enforcement authority -- I don't know exactly what. There are situations that don't get
corrected at Amador County---don't get corrected around the plant that the state could take more of
an aggressive lead role. FEMA and the NRC have no direct authority over the counties. And the line
of authority through the state is questionable. I think that it would be appropriate for the Legislature
to take a look at that. There's nothing that mandates, you know, the level of preparedness.
SENATOR ROSENTHAL: Would you---what do you mean by questionable? What---give us an
example of something you think should have some response from the state or the county.
MR. CROWDER: OK. As an example of one thing, we had a situation with being able to set off
the sirens in Amador County. We had a problem and we asked the utility to correct that by putting in
a siren-activation panel in a remote location. It took the utility two years to complete that. That
was even with the state of California encouraging. Our county believes that the state of California
should have been able to put some pressure on the utility to speed that up because that

W8s 3

mr~jor

i tern. So there's an example of specifically what we feel should be happening.

SENATOR ROSENTHAL: Can we have the state respond?
MS. VASQUEZ: We were aware of that situation. We were aware that the jurisdiction had the
capability of back-up notification of. the population same as they would for any other type of
emergency except nuclear power. The utility was remiss in the amount of time it took them to clear
it up. We were at them constantly. And we have high hopes for the new utility administration and
this never happening again.
SENATOR ROSENTHAL:

In that particular case, do you have the ability to fine or to bring

about a change quicker than what appears to have been happening?

MS. VASQUEZ: No, sir, we do not.
SENATOR ROSENTHAL: Well, maybe we ought to take a look at something.
MR. CROWDER: Amador County firmly believes the state needs some enforcement authority
in such situations.
SENATOR ROSENTHAL: We're talking about so:nething which could be serious. Tl,cre ought to
be some police power.
iv1S. VASQUEZ: I have a little bit of difficulty responding here because that's sort of a policy
decision •.•
SENATOR ROSENTHAL: I understand.
MS. VASQUEZ:

... and the full title of my office is the Governor's Office of Emergency

Services. So I can't respond to that. Whatever DES is directed to do by code or law, oh, yes, we'll do.
SENATOR ROSENTHAL: Thank you. Yes, further.
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MR. CROWDER: That in summary outlines what my presentation was.
SENATOR RUSSELL: Let me ask this question in that regard. If the Legislature were to put
some enforcement capabilities in somebody's hands on this kind of a subject, where should that lie?
In your Office of Emergency Services?
MS. VASQUEZ: Sir, again I have problems with that being a policy---! just---1 couldil't answer a
question like that.
SENATOR RUSSELL: Well, it's--MS. VASQUEZ: That's the kind of thing I guess over time we, you know, could help the
Legislature in providing whatever input we could to help pick the appropriate place.
SENATOR ROSENTHAL:

Let me ask the counties. We have Senate Bill 1976, introduced by

Senator Campbell.
MR. CROWDER: Correct.
SENATOR ROSENTHAL: Were you aware of the bill?
MR. CROWDER: Yes, I am.
SENATOR ROSENTHAL: All of you were aware of it?
SENATOR RUSSELL: Are they for it?
SENATOR ROSENTHAL: Pardon?
SENATOR RUSSELL: Are they for it?
SENATOR ROSENTHAL: Were you in support of it?

- - - - -:

Of course.

SENATOR ROSENTHAL:

Did you think there was something could be done?

\11/ere there

problems with it? Did you appear before a committee, for example, to indicate some interest in it?
MR. CROWDER:

I appeared before the Assembly meeting and made some recommendations.

And since then I have written a letter to Senator Campbell outlining two recommendations the
County of Amador makes for changes.

We believe that the current law which has a sunset clause

should be eliminated, that basically emergency planning should be mandated for the counties and the
state until such time as decommissioning of a plant.

Right now it's every two or three years

depending on who will be asked to carry the legislation.
The other area that my board is concerned about is that the wording be changed to actually
address reimbursement for actual costs of nuclear power plant planning as approved by the state of
California.

Right now it's limited to the lesser of the actual amount or $100,000.

In tne case of

Rancho Seco, the SMUD Board has been most cooperative in making certain that the offsites have
sufficient money. But our Board would like to see that as legislation.
SENATOR ROSENTHAL:

Anybody else want to comment -- counties -- on this?

OK.

San

Joaquin.
MR. MICHAEL COCKRELL: My name is Mike Cockrell. I'm with San Joaquin County, Office
of Emergency Services.

And I have submitted written testimony for the Senators and for the

audience.
Back when Senate Bill 1183 was mandated for the local agencies to prepare emergency response
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plans, the three counties got together .and developed a joint powers agreement. Since then we have
developed our emergency plans.

These plans have been tested and the drills and exercises we've

already discussed.
Presently, FEMA has stated there is no 111ajor deficiencies in the response efforts of the
counties. The San Joaquin County Ernergency Plan has been accepted by the Board of Supervisors and
the state of California. Our County feels that the public in San Joaquin County can be adequately
protected.
County.

Examples are the floods and chemical spills and other incidences that happen in this
Many aspects of response are redundant.

Emergency operations centers, field command

posts, public warning, and evacuation -- we feel we have performed adequately in those of incidences.
Presently, the County must plan for many types of emergencies. The County has put hundreds
of hours in training, planning, and exercises for Rancho Seco; and we will keep that commitment. For
the future, we are planning a large-scale exercise in October '86. The problems we anticipate are
mainly communications.
As far as cooperation, the three counties have worked pretty well together. The utility in their
planning has not had good interrelations with the counties. They've done their planning; we've done
ours.

A state plan has to concern themselves with the county-wide.

We feel that now the state

should take their plans and work with the county plans so that we will know how they will fit
properly.

The same way the federal government should work through the state CJES so we know

exactly how the federal agencies will respond to the incident.
SENATOR ROSENTHAL: Now, wait a minute. What you said then, is that you haven't actually
sat down with the plant---the state, the counties, and the plant and talked about these?
MR. COCKRELL:

We've discussed it.

When the utility developed their plan, it was mostly

internally. They are now taking actions on training to see how their plan does follow through with th9
counties on notification, etc., exactly how does it work.

The federal agencies now are providing

documents and guidelines on how they will respond so that we can have a better view of that.
MS. VASQUEZ:

As a point of clarification, when the three jurisdictions gathered together to

write their initial plans, staff members from my office participated in that, strongly directed how
their plans were going to be written in terms of what the state plan already said, so the coordination
was there at the time. And when the local jurisdiction plans are reviewed by my staff and my office,
a concurrent review is conducted of the portions of the utility plan that affect the offsite
jurisdictions and we look for a lack of interface on that material.
'v1R. COCKRELL: I think Ann misunderstood me. We were aware of their plan efforts. We had
no direct input in tho development of their plans specifically.
The utility, we feel, still lacks a good-faith effort in responding quickly to the county needs for
supplies, manpower, equipment, etc.
As far as the conclusion, we feel the local planning is co11plcte.
considerable effort into emergency response planning.

The counties have put

That the utility, the state, and the federal

planning efforts should be now coordinated with the individual counties. Finalty, SMUD does need to
revise its attitude in working with local agencies.
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We have heard the idea of new attitudes with

SMUD. For San Joaquin County, we'll take a "wait-and-see" attitude for that itself. Thank you.
SENATOR ROSENTHAL:

OK, thank you very much.

We have the third and final panel.

Unfortunately, two of the .11embers had to leave. And I hope we'll get their testimony for the record.
George Appel, Chief of the Sacramento County Fire Communications Center, and the Sacramento
County Sheriff's Department of Communications had to leave.

Did we get---did they have any

written presentations for us? Would the staff please request whatever they were going to present to
us so tnat we'll have that as part of our information. OK, let's see, San Juan Unified School District.
We're going to have to leave here shortly.

The room is going to be used for something else.

And

please short---we want your testimony for the record.
MR. CARL THOMPSON: My name is Carl Thompson, Senator. I'm Assistant Superintendent for
Business Operations with San Juan Unified School District. Do you want me to confine my remarks to
only the nuclear response problems or---?
SENATOR ROSENTHAL: Yes, yes.
MR. THOMPSON: OK. We have not had very much experience with a nuclear emergency since
we really haven't had one that has caused major problems in this area. We do have some experience
in disaster preparedness.

I was Disaster Preparedness Officer with the Riverside Unified School

District. For 12 of 14 years that I was there I was on the emergency response team with the city.
And my departments tend to respond to those kinds of emergencies here in San Juan.
We had an occasion recently, in February, with the rains, to get involved in somewhat of an
emergency situation. And as has been alluded to earlier by other speakers, communication has been a
major problem. In Riverside, for example, they have a structure where each of the various public
agencies has a primary and secondary responsible party on the city's disaster team.

.~nd

these

indidividuals in an emergency report to the city manager through the disaster preparedness officer.
And of course, there were several emergencies during my time down there and it worked very well.
In contrast to that, the problems we had in February and March with the rains, we do not have
that kind of a structure here.

I think probably because except for those agencies whose primary

function is disaster preparedness or emergency services, there has been some diminished interest over
the year and there's not been a real need for a structure, a cohesive structure. From our standpoint, I
think that's something that we need. There must be an overall structure. There needs to be periodic
meetings.

There needs to be tests of that structure, so that when you have an emergency, people

respond and do so appropriately.

We had difficulties with erroneous information corning from the

state Office of Emergency Services, the county, the radios.

People were saying our schools were

closed when they weren't, and a number of things like that. So that's our primary concern.
SENATOR ROSENTHAL: Would the parents of a child in school feel secure if a drill occurs?
MR. THOMPSON: In what way? What kind of drill? For a nuclear crnorgcncy?
SENATOR ROSENTHAL: INhere does a parent find their child?
MR. THOMPSON: As with any emergency, we would keep the kids in school until it was safe to
rele8se them.

We release them to a parent who would get them home via school bus or same other

means. Again, because Sacramento is outside of this 10-mile range, for exa,'llple, I've never seen the
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material that is typically sent out that they were describing earlier about what's sent out to people,
what to do in a nuclear emergency. We don't get that kind of information. So we aren't included in
those things. And San Juan has about 45,500 students. So that could become a major problem.
SENATOR ROSENTHAL:

Well, maybe we ought to provide the information even though you

may never need it.
MR. THOMPSON:

Yes, I agree.

Again, if we have a structure that deals with all kinds of

emergencies including these and we incorporate representatives from ali of the school districts in the
area, the appropriate other governmental agencies, then everyone will be privy to this information.
We are in the process now of developing a manual for our division which includes all kinds of
emergencies, not only power failures, but downed aircraft, you know, all kinds of things I ike that.
SENATOR ROSENTHAL: As I looked at this calendar, and the portion speaking about hazards
of one kind or another, safety tips, be prepared, have on hand for an emergency, fire and other
hazards, power lines, what about radiation, emergency response plan summary, what to do, shelter,
evacuation of schools, etc. It seems to me that this kind of information, which is four or five pages,
perhaps ought to be reproduced.
\~R.

THOMPSON:

I would agree.

Certainly we have the vehicle with our instructional

programs to disseminate that information to students and parents alike.
SENATOR ROSENTHAL: OK, thank you very much.
MR. THOMPSON: Thank you, sir.
SENATOR ROSENTHAL: Yes, Citizens for Safe Energy, would you like to---?
MS. MARTHA ANN BLACKMAN: Thank you. As others, in the interest of time, I will only hit
highlig'lts of my statement which I have prepared for you.
SENATOR ROSENTHAL: Thank you.
MS. BLACKMAN: Time and again Citizens for Safe Energy has addressed many facets of the
problems related to Rancho Seco. And time and again we have been told that those problems were
old problems and that they weren't having those problems anymore. And we always find, or we have
found that in fact the record does speak for itself.
The third .worst nuclear accident in a decade occurred at Rancho Seco when the 25-cont light
bulb was dropped onto a control panel and caused the fastest cooldown in U.S. history. The recent
December 26 incident was the third fastest cooldown. The tenth fastest cooldown was also R.ancho
Seco's.

This is of special significance because of the vessel---because of the problem of

embrittlement of the reactor containment vessel.

Bombarding a reactor vessel with highly

radioactive particles causes the metal to beco:-ne brittle, no longer flexible enough to withstand the
fast overcooling which could shatter tho walls of the reactor. This loss of containment would lead to
a release of radioactive materials, contaminating our valley and much beyond.
Past experience has shown many other problems at Rancho Seco, including some of the
following (I'll just read a few of these):
-

A communications misunderstanding between plant workers caused 4,500 gallons of

radioactive coolant to be dumped in a sump.
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- A 3,000-pound cask dropped from 10 feet above the open reactor when a thick metal cable
holding it broke. It missed the reactor mouth by inches, striking instead a protruding flange and
seal plate. Six days earlier a heavier 7-ton load was lifted directly over the highly irradiated
spent fuel assemblies in clear violation of NRC rules.
- SMUD claimed that radioactive iodine detected in milk from a farm near Rancho Seco was
caused by fallout from Chinese nuclear testing in 1976 and not from the plant. Dr. Homer Ibser
claimed that the odds were "one in 5,000 trillion" that a single atom of radioactive iodine still
lingered from the blast and the NRC agreed with his calculations.

There was a trial at that

time.
SENATOR RUSSELL:

I think he also said that we are breathing radiation from the :=hernobyl

plant.
MS. BLACKMAN:

We are at this time.

They have detected that in milk that Rancho Seco

sampled ....
SENATOR RUSSELL: So if we're doing that, why is it not logical to assume that it might be the
Chinese blast rather than the plant?
MS. BLACKMAN: At that particular time, those particular radioactive particles had decayed
beyond their half-life extent, for radioactive iodine has a very short half-life of eight days. The NRC
did agree with him in his conclusion and it is part of the court transcript that they did agree with this
particular calculation with him.
- A brand of circuit breakers used to shut down the plant proved "unreliable" and malfunctioned
at least fourteen times.

We wonder why it had to malfunction fourteen times before they

decided to do something about it.
- In November 1982, former General Manager John Mattimoe told the NRC that the utility did
not have time to provide information requested for congressional hearings.

He wrote, "No

major steam generator repairs are anticipated for Rancho Seco for the next five years." Two
days later, a steam generator tube leak occurred at the plant.
- Radioactive water was discharged into Clay Creek until 1984 when it was discovered that
SMUD had used calculations suited to release in an ocean or a large lake, body of water.
Approxirnately 13 million gallons of this wastewater was released.
- Auxiliary batteries which would provide power to the plant in the event of an emergency were
found corroded and of no use.

We have to keep electricity to the plant whether the plant is

providing electricity to us or not.
SENATOR ROSENTHAL: Let me ask a question, and I don't want to minimize the accidents and
things that

hav~

taken placo. What should tho stato do?

MS. BLL\CI<MAN:

I think we should continue to study it so that we know and are informed

enough to deal with the problems that we have. When Three Mile Island occurred, the reporters, no
one, even knew the right questions to ask. I don't like to say it, but we have come a long way since
Three Mile Island. We've carne a long way since Chernobyl even. And it's not a very pleasant way to
come a long way.

And I'rn not exactly looking forward to a third experience anyplace in ti1is world
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So I think what we have to do is continue to

where we have to learn from experience
the

don't have any choice in

as we're all

and

we're

the

the

be the rule of the

continue to let this

and we
as that's tne

because as

It's

a

NRC, from all authoritative bodies.
time that it's

from the public, from the

back

we can. We have a record of SMUD

ail

matter as far as I can see.
among the ten worst ractors m the United

- Rancho Seco has consistently been
States.
- SMUD did not implement ali the

changes after the Three

Another problem at the Ranch deals with our

radioactive waste storage are8.

spent fuel pool has been re-racked twice so that it was daub
additional amounts. No Environment Impact
spot".

once and then doubled again to hold

one percent of the cesium 137 in the pond

was enough to contaminate Sacramento County to the point
low~level

The

was prepared for this potentially dangerous "hot

Dr. Ibser also did a calculation that a
There is also a

Island accident.

it being uninhabitable.

radioactive v.Jaste storage area at Rancho Seco. SMUD has proposed

the instaliation of ponds for the evaporation of the liquid waste, but they've met much opposition
from neighbors and others. Testimony has been

that

ponds will leak -- it's being lined

~-

if

they do it with a plastic, thick plastic.
An experimental project was done a few years back where balloons were released fr:>m Rancho
Seco because people were interested in knowing where the radioactive materials might go.

Within a

half-hour launch of balloons in one particular morning, b!=illoons were found in Stockton to the south,
near Lake Tahoe to the northeast, Pine Grove

the

the northwest, which showed that if there's a

Sacramento to the north, and l_akeport to
overall pattern at all to the wind pattern in this

area, it is really that there is no pattern at all.
It is difficult to believe that in the event

nuclear accident at Rancho Seco that we

could evacuate everyone who needed to leave within
The ton-mile radius around Rancho

time needed to do so.

was not very informed before the NRC

they receive information relating to accidents at the
us more information. We said, "Why don't

it in the

the paper?" As soon as tho NRC mandated it,
previous to

us information.

We've been asking them for years to
did it.

books? Why don't you

3ut we had been asking them for years

And we ask now that they also

town, because we're too close to not know what to do should

us information for this part of

is event carne about that we have to

deal with it. The "Public

which includes Sacra:nento

what's happening. Otherwise, we

like

The potential for a "worst case
C::hernob

could not

potential does exist.

because of
Rancho

it in

should definitely know

do when they don't know what's happening.
does exist here.

While the identical accident (like

nuclear technologies, the fact remains that the
manual contains a summary which lists the ten

general emergency conditions which are the worst case

of those ten list a breach or a

possible or an ultimate breach of containment. tv1r. Mattimoe, who was the general manager, stated

categorically you could not possibly have a breach of containment. And I was wondering, why would
they put it in the emergency manual, half of the ten worst accidents if it can't possibly occur?
There is also a problem related to transporting nuclear waste.

Spills or accidents on our

freeways could be disastrous. The route is taken from Rancho Seco, west on Twin Cities Road, north
on Highway 99, north on Interstate 5, east on Interstate 80.

During a recent meeting with the

Sacramento County Board of Supervisors, it was noted that a portion of the freeway on I-5 near the J
Street exit was especially prone to accidents. This is a rather serious consideration when you figure
we're only a few blocks away from the State Capitol when you're I-5 at the J Street entrance.
The true costs of nuclear power have been hidden for years.

The Wall Street Journal,

September 17, 1985, says that in 1984 direct nuclear subsidies totaled $15.8 billion, which was nearly
as much as the total retail revenue from those 84 nuclear output plants. This figure doesn't include
the Price-Anderson ceiling on liability for nuclear accidents. Federal loans and guarantees saved the
industry $3.32 billion in financing costs.

Tax breaks added another $10.2 billion.

The liability of

SMUD in the event of a major accident is $640 million. I would expect the State Capitol is worth a
little bit more than that even if you start putting all our pretties together that we have, that we love.
As a nuclear power plant operator, SMUD could also be assessed up to $10 million in the event of
another nuclear power plant accident in the United States. So that means that ratepayers here have
the responsibility for another $10 million that we might have to deal with.
Rancho Seco is connected to the entire cycle of radioactive contamination.

And I think we

have to realize that that's also part of what we're dealing with here. The land which is being mined
for uranium is poisoning the environment around it. Mill tailings are left in huge piles to irradiate the
land. A lot of this land belongs to Native A;nericans and much of it is sacred to their religion. Mined
uranium has to be refined, enriched and fuel fabricated.

There is transportation dealt with in each

one of these cycles and we have to keep concerned with transportation in all of these. There's a large
potential for accidents in all of these cycles. Fuel has been loaded at Rancho Seco and the release
activity continues as well know. As a matter of fact, 56 percent of the time that they were releasing
radiations over the past we found that they did not have the correct weather calculations; 56 percent
of the time that they used incorrect weather calculations. That means that it either blew indirectly
to populated areas, most likely; or -- this is conjecture on my part -- but if it was released when they
would not be allowing it to go, it either settled back down on the area around them or came into a
dense population area, which is what they don't want it to do.
Fuel is removed from the core after it's used.
thousands of years.

Sarno of it will be radioactive for hundreds of

At some time in the future, this spent fuel is supposed to be stored in a place

where the living earth will not shift or roll ..• ever.
SENATOR ROSENTHAL: Mr. Chairman?
MS. BLACKMAN: I have about two more things I'd like to say.
SENATOR ROSENTHAL: OK.
MS. BLACKMAN:

And then I'll be finished.

I would like to suggest things that we have

proposed to SMUD to do. VIe would like them to begin preparations for the permanent decommission
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for alternative energy to

a

and closure of Rancho Seco. We want them to

workers at Rancho Seco

a

the Ranch. We want them to
who have had to put up with

energy, revenue, and
financial base and it would also

to us.

we had this

like them to provide accurate and

We

morale at SMUD.

contribute to an increase in

that

reliable information for this zone which we are

a 50 percent chance of

a nuclear accident occurring within the next twenty years is much higher for Rancho Seco than
normal because we've had a lot more problems at Rancho Seco than most people have.
One more word.
MS. BLACKMAN: If you haven't seen the Bee article starting on the 18th of this month, I would
like to know if there's no chance of a major

suggest you read five days' worth of Bee

accident, why the heck are we preparing for it and spending so much money on it and worrying about
it if there's no chance of an accident happening to us in our neighborhood. And I think that's all.
been happening out there, and I think we've had

I'd like to say that we learn lessons

enough lessons to learn already.
CHAIRMAN GREENE:

All right, thank you very much.

May we hear from the final witness?

Who is it?
MR.

_ _ _ : The Ratepayers.

CHAIRMAN GREENE: The
MS. DEE PRICE: Yes. My name is

My

but I will

is very

to

summarize it. I'd like to say we've certainly learned a lot today that I will take back to our members.
Much of what I have said in the

and I've prov

The accident at Chernobyl has made one
fully regarding radiation.
informed.

very evident: we must educate the public more

and the industry to work

frighten. And it'll be committee

such as this that will

to inform, not to

ish that. We're dealing with a

holds no place in this issue.

danger. And

We have not asked for the

concerned

been addressed.

The word radiation evokes panic because the public has not been fully

Now is the time for the

are answered.

has

We have asked

of Rancho Seco nor
the

we until more

of the

the mismanagement of the

y, we are

and the retention of those persons who have been

involved in the management and supervision of the

over an approx

10-year period.

are ANGRY about the effect this has had on our rates and the
board of
to

We

of an elected

to dismiss those persons who have

and who will continue

so if retained.
We don't want to point the

N!<.C IHw done

out there.

at
The

y.

We've qot n

assessed

out there.

Wf~

hnvo

snlvn it. B11t

And ob

has been poor and has failed, and we resent that, because we are being asked to pay for it.

th::ir job

We would strongly suggest and support legislation that would prohibit the operation of a nuclear
reactor by a municipal utility district. With a public utility such as PG&E, Southern Cal Edison, San
Diego Gas and Electric, there's at least a check and balance between the staffs of the utility and the
PUC. We wish right now we had that option.

At this time, we would also support special legislation to allow the PUC to oversee or review
the effect this mismanagement has had and will have on our rates.
We would also ask that this Subcommittee continue these types of hearings, and we will be
willing to cooperate and assist in any manner that we are able.
I would also like to say, I say the calendars for the first time. I live within the 10-mile radius. I
have lived within 10 miles of Rancho Seco since 1959, before it was constructed. I have never gotten
a calendar. I don't know who mails them out. (Laughs.) But I really would like to have a copy of that
calendar.
Thank you for inviting us to speak.
CHAIRMAN GREENE: Thank you very much. Appreciate all your attendance here today.
MR. THOMPSON:

Senator, if I may, Roy Erickson from San Juan School District is a

curriculum director and has just a brief statement to make also.
CHAIRMAN GREENE: All right.
MR. ROY ERICKSON: I'd very quickly like to say, I've heard the question asked, what can the
state do to several of the questions.

One of the things that I would lil<e to see in the area of

curriculum, delivering this to the children the notion of what to do in an emergency really should be
incu-nbent on the state to develop some guidelines and to develop some curricula. We have Assembly
Bill 3848 that's law now, that talks about nuclear age education; but I don't find any mention of tne
emergency provisions in this.

Perhaps an amendment to this bill or some kind of a bill that would

authorize the state department to develop some guidelines on what it is that we tell children, because
that's the big issue out there. We don't know for sure what to tell children about an emergency. We
don't know what to tell about the effects of radiation. We have heard testimony today that was very
confusing to me sitting back there. And so it would be a direction that the state could help provide
us for that. We could deliver within the school system through the curriculum. Thank you.
CHAIRMAN GREENE: Thank you very much. You made a cogent point there. Incidentally,
don't know anything that would prevent the Department of Education to try to make a search to try
to figure out what to tell people in the first place, but you're right. You're going to need to push, and
maybe we can find the means of pushing them here.
I want to thank you all for giving us your assistance today.

And you know, Mrs. Ratepayer

Association, have a copy of the calendar and you can mark today's date on it as one of the days that
you testified before us.

I want to thank the audience for putting up with this time and this use of

'
your energy and ours. We have a long way to go. I hope we've made some kind of a start.
One of the
things is that you've all had something to say of importance in terms of what your interests are, you
know, and what your positions are. I think we must, nonetheless, find some other way of carrying on
our objectives. Because our objectives are more singular than the nature of rnuch of the testimony.
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to us about the technology of the makeup---the metallurgy of steel, you know,

One is
containers.
germane

be teaching in our

Another is talking about what we
that case.

have

The Citizens for
that

on what safe

of v

does not

be that

answer

is

energy. Is that
MS. BLACKMAN: It's reasonable until such time--CHAIRMAN GREENE:
MS. BLACKMAN: I have to

if you---

your

is that a reasonable

before too.

y it. I've done this for

CHAIRMAN GREENE: Certainly.
MS. BLACKMAN: It's reasonable until

a

of

wastes as far as we're concerned.

don't mean storage, but disposal, neutralization of
CHAIRMAN

no

time as

OK, thank

MS. BLACKMAN: Thank you.
CHAIRiv1AN GREENE: In any case, what you see arc our own tasks relate to what it is possif:Jle
for the stat!) to do. And there are certain things, many of which have been covered here today, that
are beyond the possibility of the state doing anything
in areas where legally we cannot---we can

where they lie within

outside the fence.

and

We can't cross the fence and

operate inside the fence, if you know what I'm trying to say, you know, where the plant is.

our

problems are that we have to know what's going on inside the plant in order to know what we must
defend against. Senator Rosenthal.
SENATOR ROSENTHAL: I just want to comment on that. It is true that we don't control what
goes on inside the fence.

But I think it's also true that if S:v1UD is aware that we are looking over

their shoulder in terms of the training, in terms of whatever is
not legally or officially have any

place

then while we may

1 think that

over

will

hear us.
CHAIRMAN GREENE: One of the

we will look

of what right can we exercise and the terms of

is that question

or

physicist, the nuclear engineer, or

or certifying the nuclear

you

on

that we can satisfy ourselves of some level of excellence of the

plant

there that have to meet

certain requirements in order to do those
ROSENTHAL:

And also we

to them that

simulator because there's a certain turnover in

to be

know, in state law, we have continued education and other
CHAir~MAN Gr~EENE:

Yeah,

You

of areas. It just scorns to me that---

we've heard indications when we were out 2t the plant that

they do have the equivalent of that, but
but it

send them back East. It's not, you

onsite here.

to be onsite.

MS. BLACKMAN: Excuse me. If I

shortly here. It's rny understanding that the

Lynchburg simulator has a few differences than our simulator here.
CHAIR1v1AN GREENE: Yes,

to have this

sure it does.
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MS. BLACKMAN: Atso, it's going to cost almost $10 million to build one. And SMUD's having
enough trouble with rates; they don't want to do that I guess.
CHAIRMAN GREENE: No, I don't even know where you'd build it. That means anotner building
too for that purpose. But in any case, that's a concentration on only a portion of the problem that
we're interested in. What we're interested in knowing is that if something goes wrong, OK, what do
we tell the kids at school, what are you to do, OK? How is information communicated? Nhat is the
means? I tried to express it earlier and I couldn't get anywhere with the federal man -- it was the
wrong man to talk to, I guess -- when I said, assume that 20 miles or 25 miles from here, that's not
Rancho Seco, that's Chernobyl, OK, and it just blew. Quick. What do we do? Quick. Hurry up. It
just blew this minute. What happens? And his answer is, well, as far

Hs

the fods somewhere between,

what was it, 6 and 12 hours they would put their organization together. Yeah, and that stuff's co.ning
down out of the sky in the meantime, you know, and so on. Well, but he's an---all right, then I finally
catch on.

I'm talking to the wrong person.

He's long-term.

He's long-term effect.

When that

something---when Chernobyl went right here, south of us, you know, what happened then? What lines
of communication---if it's Rancho Seco, we'll relabel it, and it just blew, what do they do there? You
know, they immediately notified their headquarters at SMUD.

They immediately notified NRC.

What did they tell the county? What did they tell the state? What happens to those people they told?
'We saw over the SMUD building where the headquarters are, where these people are supposed to
gather themselves together -- the city, the county, the state officials, and even NRC people, and the
communications link with Washington, and so on, yeah, OK. i3wt let me see what happens.
these people do?

'What do

There's Joe and Jane Citizen out there and their kids, Susie and George, are in

school over here. What happens? What do you do? How long does it take? Are we all dead before
you do anyything?

You know, what happens? Chernobyl -- it took them too much time before they

moved anybody out. And now the first---what is it, we're up to 15 so far and maybe it'll be a couple
hundred or whatever, you know, before the end of this line and maybe a lot more than that. One
doesn't know. What is the direction of the prevailing winds in this area? And can you count on those
prevailing winds to be prevailing in that direction when the bomb goes off, you know? These are all
kinds of things that we have to know about and we don't know at this time, but at least we've reached
out here.

We've made our beginning. But it looks to me like it's a fairly long journey. And I thank

you all for your patience for this day.
--ooOoo--

-69-

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ROBERT T. MATSUI

BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NUCLEAR FACILITY SAFETY
AND EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS
COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND PUBLIC UTILITIES
CALIFORNIA STATE SENATE
MAY 28, 1986

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for giving me the opportunity to
participate in today's hearing.
Even before the Chernobyl nuclear disaster, I had deep
concerns regarding the safety of some

u.s.

nuclear power plants

and the effectiveness of federal regulatory efforts to ensure
that safety.
My concern with nuclear reactors designed by the Babcock &
Wilcox Company in particular dates back to the accident at Three
Mile Island in 1979.

Despite safety reforms adopted after Three

Mile Island, serious problems have continued to recur with
alarming frequency at other B&W plants.

The Rancho Seco nuclear

plant outside Sacramento, for example, has had so many problems
that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission last week ranked it the
sixth worst nuclear reactor in the country after the five TVA
nuclear reactors.
Last January, I was skeptical when the NRC announced its
intention to conduct a long-term safety review of all B&W
reactors.
the action.

While I welcomed the idea, I questioned the motives of
I had discovered a pattern of activity at the NRC.

When public or congressional concern is highest, there is a
flurry of activity at the NRC.

But when the furor subsides, NRC

activity seems to subside as well.
This particular safety review seems to me to be no more than
a public relations ploy.

As a result of my own investigation, I

found that the NRC already knew that B&W reactors have design
flaws that make them more vulnerable to operational transients.

I found that the NRC already knew that design vulnerabilities
coupled with poor management were a prescription for trouble.

I

also had one Commissioner tell me that the NRC had simply failed
to take effective action to correct these problems.
A

q~ick

look at the current status of the NRC's long-term

safety review I think bears out my original observation.

First

of all, little has actually been accomplished besides the
obligatory public relations.

But second, the NRC has turned over

that safety review to the owners of the reactors themselves.

I

am not reassured when the industry is responsible for its own
safety review, and I fail to see the objectivity in selfregulation.
What concerns me most is the fact that there is dissension
within the Commission itself on this matter.

Commissioner James

Asselstine has called for an independent safety review group,
including experts from outside the NRC, to conduct a thorough
review of the safety vulnerabilities in the B&W design and the
adequacy of past NRC efforts to ensure that B&W plants meet
acceptable safety standards.

I agree with him entirely and I

have asked the NRC to follow his suggestion.

However, I regret

to say that the other members of the Commission have rejected
this proposal.

As a result, I am afraid that we will see

business as usual at the NRC and no guarantee that accidents at
B&W plants will be made any less likely.
In the wake of the Chernobyl disaster in the Soviet Union,
these issues have grown in importance.
its scrutiny of the safety of

u.s.

Congress has increased

nuclear power plants and the

adequacy of the NRC's regulatory efforts.
Last week, the Energy and Commerce Committee's Subcommittee
on Energy Conservation and Power held a hearing on the safety of

u.s.

commercial nuclear reactors.

Given my concern with the

effectiveness of NRC regulation of B&W plants, I was asked to
participate in that hearing.
If I could, I would like to take a few minutes to reveal
some of the more important disclosures.
In regard to Rancho Seco, the NRC admitted to me that they
could have prevented the December 26, 1985 incident if they had
followed one Commissioner's advice and initiated a generic safety
review of B&W plants

afte~

the June 1985 shutdown of the Davis-

Besse plant in Ohio.
Each NRC Commissioner told me that if they had known the
extent of the problems at Rancho Seco beforehand, they would have
closed the plant down.

They said that management is the key to

nuclear safety, and they admitted that management problems at the
Rancho Seco had not been effectively regulated.
In regard to the safety of B&W reactors in general, one
Commissioner told me again that it does not make common sense to
I

have the industry itself conduct its own safety review and that
the Commission has reverted to a pre-Three Mile Island proclivity
toward self-regulation.
As far as the lessons of Chernobyl are concerned, the NRC
admitted that the Soviet plant actually had more safety features
and was much closer to American reactor designs than Western
experts had originally assumed.

The Chernobyl plant did have

adequacy of the NRC's regulatory efforts.
Last week, the Energy and Commerce Committee's Subcommittee
on Energy Conservation and Power held a hearing on the safety of
U.S. commercial nuclear reactors.

Given my concern with the

effectiveness of NRC regulation of B&W plants, I was asked to
participate in that hearing.
If I could, I would like to take a few minutes to reveal
some of the more important disclosures.
In regard to Rancho Seco, the NRC admitted to me that they
could have prevented the December 26, 1985 incident if they had
followed one Commissioner's advice and initiated a generic safety
review of B&W plants after the June 1985 shutdown of the DavisBesse plant in Ohio.
Each NRC Commissioner told me that if they had known the
extent of the problems at Rancho Seco beforehand, they would have
closed the plant down.

They said that management is the key to

nuclear safety, and they admitted that management problems at the
Rancho Seco had not been effectively regulated.
In regard to the safety of B&W reactors in general, one
Commissioner told me again that it does not make common sense to
I

have the industry itself conduct its own safety review and that
the Commission has reverted to a pre-Three Mile Island proclivity
toward self-regulation.
As far as the lessons of Chernobyl are concerned, the NRC
admitted that the Soviet plant actually had more safety features
and was much closer to American reactor designs than Western
experts had originally assumed.

The Chernobyl plant did have

and double our safety efforts to match that definition.
Finally, Mr. Chairman,

~

would like to include in the record

my correspondence with the NRC and an NRC document relating to
emergency plans at Rancho Seco.

•

Thank you •
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(SENATOR LEROY GREENE -- CHAIRMAN)
HEARING ON
"EMERGENCY RESPONSE TO NUCLEAR FACILITY SAFETY ISSUES"
MAY 28, 1986
INTRODUCTION
MR. CHAIRMAN AND MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE, I AM DEWEY LOWE,
GENERAL MANAGER OF THE SACRAMENTO MUNICIPAL UTILITY DISTRICT
CSMUD). I WAS APPOINTED TO MY CURRENT POSI~ION IN SEPTEMBER,
1985, AFTER MORE THAN 35 YEARS OF SERVICE IN THE UNITED STATES
AIR FORCE.
I WOULD LIKE TO THANK YOU FOR INVITING ME TO TESTIFY BEFORE
YOUR COMMITTEE ON THE SUBJECT OF RANCHO SECO FACILITY SAFETY.
WHILE I WILL FOCUS ON THAT SUBJECT, MY COMMENTS WILL INCLUDE A
BRIEF STATEMENT ON EMERGENCY PLANNING WHICH IS THE SUBJECT FOR
THE NEXT PANEL. I AM SUBMITTING FOR THE RECORD WRITTEN
TESTIMONY WHICH IS MUCH MORE COMPREHENSIVE THAN WHAT I AM ABOUT
TO SAY.

PAGE 2
SMUD OVERVIEW
THE SACRAMENTO MUNICIPAL UTILITY DISTRICT WAS FORMED BY A VOTE
OF THE ELECTORATE AND BEGAN PROVIDING ELECTRIC SERVICE IN
1947. CURRENTLY ITS 890-SQUARE-MILE SERVICE AREA INCLUDES
NEARLY ALL OF SACRAMENTO COUNTY AND A SMALL PORTION OF PLACER
COUNTY. THE SOLE ACTIVITY OF THE DISTRICT IS TO GENERATE,
TRANSMIT AND DISTRIBUTE ELECTRIC ENERGY FOR ITS 384,000
CUSTOMERS.
THE DISTRICT'S 3100 EMPLOYEES ARE GOVERNED BY A FIVE-MEMBER
BOARD OF DIRECTORS, ELECTED BY WARD, FOR STAGGERED FOUR-YEAR
TERMS.
SMUD IS THE SOLE OWNER AND OPERATOR OF THE RANCHO SECO NUCLEAR
GENERATING STATION. POWER FROM THIS FACILITY REPRESENTS 54
PERCENT OF THE TOTAL GENERATION RESOURCE OF THE DISTRICT. THE
DISTRICT WAS ASSISTED BY BECHTEL POWER CORPORATION IN THE
SELECTION, DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION OF RANCHO SECO.
SYSTEM IS SUPPLIED BY BABCOCK AND WILCOX.

ITS REACTOR

EMERGENCY PLANNING
SMUD HAS BEEN ACTIVELY INVOLVED IN EMERGENCY PLANNING WITH THE
SURROUNDING COUNTIES STARTING BACK IN 1971.

NUMEROUS

REGULATORY CHANGES HAVE OCCURRED SINCE THAT TIME, PARTICULARLY
AFTER THE THREE MILE ISLAND ACCIDENT. THESE CHANGES HAVE

PAGE 3
RESULTED IN SIGNIFICANT IMPROVEMENT IN EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS.
WE REMAIN TOTALLY COMMITTED TO ASSURING THAT OUR UTILITY'S, AS
WELL AS LOCAL COUNTY AND STATE, PLANS ARE FULLY INTEGRATED AND
STAND READY TO DEAL WITH ANY MAJOR ACCIDENT IN THE UNLIKELY
EVENT IT WERE TO OCCUR.
RANCHO SECO SAFETY
YOU HAVE NO DOUBT READ AND HEARD OF THE MANY PROBLEMS FACING
THE DISTRICT AS A RESULT OF THE FOLLOWING INADEQUACIES AT
RANCHO SECO:
I

LACK OF ADEQUATE STAFFING

1

POOR TRAINING

I

POOR MAINTENANCE

1

POOR ATTENTION TO DETAIL
POOR MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS

e

CERTAINLY, THESE DID EXIST; BUT TWO THINGS ARE IMPORTANT TO
RECOGNIZE:
1.

THEY ARE ALL RELATED TO FAILURE OF ADEQUATE MANAGEMENT
CONTROLS.

2.

THE REACTOR DESIGN IS, IN OUR OPINION, A GOOD ONE AND
NOT THE ROOT CAUSE OF OUR POOR OPERATING RECORD.
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RANCHO SECO IS BASICALLY A SOUND AND SAFE PLANT.
DESPITE SOME DESIGN FLAWS, WHICH WILL CONTINUE TO BE
CORRECTED, THE REACTOR SAFETY SYSTEMS HAVE FUNCTIONED
AS DESIGNED WHEN THEY WERE CALLED UPON IN TRANSIENTS
OR SHUTDOWNS WE HAVE EXPERIENCED.
CORRECTIVE ACTION UNDERWAY
EVERY ONE OF THE IDENTIFIED PROBLEMS HAS BEEN OR IS BEING
AGGRESSIVELY ADDRESSED.

WE HAVE MADE CHANGES AND WILL CONTINUE

TO MAKE CHANGES TO INCREASE THE PLANT'S MARGIN OF SAFETY.
1.

THE PLANT STAFF AND MANAGEMENT HAS BEEN INCREASED
SIGNIFICANTLY.

IN 1984 OVERALL STAFF AT RANCHO SECO

NUMBERED ABOUT 500.

BY THE END OF 1986 WE EXPECT IT

TO HAVE MORE THAN DOUBLED WITH MOST OF THAT INCREASE
BEING ACCOMPLISHED IN 1986.
2.

PLANT TRAINING PROGRAMS HAVE BEEN GIVEN SPECIAL
ATTENTION.

NEW MANAGEMENT AND TRAINING STAFF HAVE

BEEN ADDED BRINGING THE TOTAL TO 40 FULL-TIME
TRAINERS.

NEW TRAINING FACILITIES ARE BEING ADDED AS

RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE.
SPECIFIC SIMULATOR.

WE HAVE COMMITTED TO A PLANT
EXISTING TRAINING IS BEING

UPGRADED AND SIGNIFICANTLY MORE TRAINING IS BEING
REQUIRED.
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3.

NEW MANAGEMENT AND STAFF HAVE BEEN ADDED TO THE
NUCLEAR MAINTENANCE DEPARTMENT.

NEW MAINTENANCE

TRAINING PROGRAMS ARE BEING DEVELOPED AND CONDUCTED.
PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE RATHER THAN REACTIVE FIXES IS
NOW THE WATCHWORD.
4.

A COMPREHENSIVE NEW PLANT PERFORMANCE AND MANAGEMENT
IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM HAS BEEN DEVELOPED AND IS BEING
IMPLEMENTED TO EVALUATE AND TEST PLANT SYSTEMS AND
PROCEDURES WHICH ARE KEY TO PLANT SAFETY AND
RELIABILITY.

EACH KEY SYSTEM AND COMPONENT IS BEING

ANALYZED TO DETERMINE IF ITS FAILURE CAN CAUSE A
REACTOR TRIP, CHALLENGE A SAFETY SYSTEM OR CAUSE AN
OVER- OR UNDER-COOLING FOLLOWING A REACTOR TRIP.
THE KEY TO THIS PROGRAM IS TO ASSURE THAT THE
SAFETY SYSTEMS AND BACKUP EQUIPMENT ARE NOT
CHALLENGED.

THIS IS A SHIFT FROM PAST DESIGN AND

OPERATING PHILOSOPHY.
THIS ATTENTION TO DETAIL WILL VASTLY IMPROVE
PLANT RELIABILITY AND ITS MARGIN OF SAFETY.
5.

MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS ARE ALSO BEING PROVIDED TO ASSIST
MANAGERS AND SUPERVISORS IN CARRYING OUT THEIR
PLANNING AND OVERSIGHr RESPONSIBILITIES.

THESE

'.
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INCLUDE PERSONNEL, COMPUTERS, SOFTWARE, AND ACCOUNTING
SUPPORT WHICH WILL HELP THEM MANAGE RESOURCES MORE
EFFECTIVELY AND MEET COMMITTED SCHEDULES FOR
MODIFICATIONS.
RANCHO SECO CONTINUED OPERATION
RANCHO SECO IS ONE OF THE LARGEST ASSETS THE SACRAMENTO
COMMUNITY HAS.

IT REPRESENTS 54 PERCENT OF SMUD'S TOTAL

ELECTRIC GENERATION AND IS ONE OF THE CHEAPEST RESOURCES WE OWN.
RANCHO SECO'S CAPITALIZED COST OF $642 MILLION EQUATES TO

APPROXIMATELY $70p P~R ~~~~~±t WHICH IS A TREMENDOUS BARGAIN
TO SACRAMENTO ELECTR1CttY USERS.
RANCHO SECO IS FUNDAMENTALLY A SOUND AND SAFE NUCLEAR
GENERATING STATION.

WE INTEND TO CONTINUE TO IMPROVE ITS

MATERIAL READINESS AND ITS MARGIN OF SAFETY.
DESIGN FLAWS WE ARE CONTINUING TO CORRECT.

WE HAVE SOME
WE HAVE HAD

MANAGEMENT PROBLEMS AND MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS BREAKDOWNS.
ARE BEING CORRECTED.

THEY

OUR OBJECTIVE IS TO OPERATE A SAFE AND

RELIABLE NUCLEAR PLANT AND TO ACHIEVE A GREATER THAN A 70
PERCENT CAPACITY FACTOR FOR RANCHO SECO BY 1990.

WE INTEND TO

REGAIN THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE OF THE PUBLIC THAT WAS ONCE
CHARACTERISTIC OF THE SACRAMENTO MUNICIPAL UTILITY DISTRICT.
THANK YOU.

TESTIMONY OF
DEWEY K. K. LOWE
GENERAL MANAGER
SACRAMENTO MUNICIPAL UTILITY DISTRICT <SMUD)
BEFORE THE
SENATE SUBCOMMITTEE
ON
NUCLEAR FACILITY SAFETY AND EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS
<SENATOR LEROY GREENE -- CHAIRMAN)
WEDNESDAY, MAY 28, 1986 -- 1:30 P.M.
HEARING ON
"EMERGENCY RESPONSE TO NUCLEAR FACILITY SAFETY ISSUES''

INTRODUCTION

I am Dewey K. K. Lowe, General Manager of the Sacramento Municipal Utility
District <SMUD).
District.

As such, I am responsible for the administration of the

I was appointed to the General Manager's position in

September, 1985, ending a career of more than 35 years with the United States
Air Force.

My last assignment was as Commander of the 15,000-employee,

Sacramento Air Logistics Center at McClellan Air Force Base where I held the
rank of Major General.

I hold a Bachelor of Science degree in economics and

business administration from the University of California at Berkeley, a
Doctor of Jurisprudence degree from the University of San Francisco Law
School, and am a graduate from the industrial college of the Armed Forces at
Fort McNair, Washington, D.C.

I am also a member of the state bar of

California and Federal Bar Association.
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SMUD OVERVIEW

Organization and Powers

The Sacramento Municipal Utility District was formed by vote of the electors
in 1923 under provisions of a statute <Municipal Utility District Act)
approved by the State Legislature in 1921 and subsequently codified as
Division 6 of the California Public Utilities Code.

District headquarters are

in the City of Sacramento, and its service area <890 square miles) includes
the principal parts of Sacramento County and a small portion of Placer County.

Although organized in 1923, the District did not commence electric operations
until the start of 1947.

At that time, the District acquired, by cash

purchase, Pacific Gas and Electric Company's <PGandE) electric system which
was located within the District's service area.

Since 1947 the District has

provided all electric service within its service area.

Districts formed under the Municipal Utility District Act (the Act) have broad
powers to acquire. construct, own, and operate works for the supplying of
light, water, heat, power, transportation, and other services for their
inhabitants.

The only activities of the District have been the generation,

transmission, and distribution to, and promoting the efficient use of electric
energy by, its 384,000 customers.

The District is governed by a board of five directors elected by ward for
staggered four-year terms.

The Board of Directors <the Board) appoints a

General Manager who is responsible for the District's operations.

The Board
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also appoints the Assistant General Managers, Accountant, Secretary,
Treasurer, and General Counsel, all of.whom serve at its pleasure.

The

appointment and removal of other employees fall under the jurisdiction of the
General Manager.

Except for special administrative and technical personnel,

employment is under a civil service system adopted and administered by the
General Manager.

The Act confers upon the District the necessary rights and powers for the
conduct of its business, including the right to sue and be sued, to exercise
the power of eminent domain, to enter into contracts of all kinds, to take
property and construct works, to fix rates and charges for commodities or
services furnished, to incur indebtedness and issue bonds or other
obligations, and to invest its funds.

Management

The Board sets the operating budget, approves major expenditures, sets rates
and makes policy decisions for the District which management administers.

The

present members of the Board are as follows:
Name
Ann L. Taylor, President
Cortus T. Koehler, Vice President
Paul w. Carr
John T. Kehoe
Clifford R. Wilcox

Occupation
Businesswoman
Educator
Suslness Executive
Business Executive
Agribusinessman

Term Ex8ires
December
December
December
December
December

31 ' 1988
31' 1988
<,
~I

'

1986

31' 1988

31, 1986

The management of the District's 3100 employees is under the direction of its
General Manager, who serves at the discretion of the Board.
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GENERATING RESOURCES

By the end of 1985, the total customers served by the District had reached a
record high of 383,796.

This made SMUD the third largest municipally owned

utility in the continental United States in terms of numbers of customers.
Peak demand soared to a new high in 1985 when on July 9 it reached 1,851
megawatts -- a 121-megawatt increase over 1984.
customers

Total energy sales to

also reached a record 6,881,631,000 kilowatt-hours, or 8.2 percent

over a year earlier.

Initially, SMUD met its obligation to its customers by purchasing wholesale
power from Pacific Gas and Electric

Company.

In 1954 the District also began

buying Central Valley Project power from the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation <now
known as Western Area Power Administration <WAPA).

Since that time the

District has developed a number of its own generation resources.
earned a reputation as a progressive utility.

SMUD has

It has one of the most

diversified generation mixes in the world.

Upper American River Project

In the late 1950s SMUD started construction on its own hydroelectric project
on the South Fork of the American River in El Dorado County known as the Upper
American River Project <UARP>.

Completed in 1971, the UARP development has

eleven reservoirs and seven power plants capable of producing a total of 659
megawatts.

It is SMUD's cheapest source of power with 1985 production costs

of 6.47 mills per kwh.
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Rancho Seco

The District began construction of its 913-megawatt rated nuclear generating
station, known as Rancho Seco, in 1968.
miles southeast of Sacramento.

The plant is on a 2,500-acre site 25

The plant uses a pressurized water-cooled

reactor which was furnished by the Babcock & Wilcox Company <B&W).

Cooling is

by means of water from the Folsom South Canal of the Central Valley

Project~

The initial cost of Rancho Seco, including switchyard and transmission but
excluding decommissioning and nuclear fuel, was approximately $342 million.
Plant modifications, installed to improve plant safety and reliability or
satisfy new Nuclear Regulatory Commission <NRC) requirements, have increased
this cost by $300 million since the plant become commercially operable in
April 1975.

Additional plant modifications <remaining changes ordered by NRC

primarily as a result of the March 1979 incident at another B&W plant, Three
Mile Island Unit No. 2 <TMI-2) near Harrisburg, Pennsylvania), emergency
preparedness facilities, other NRC requirements, and renewals and replacements
are expected to increase the plant cost by another approximately $382 million
through 1991.

SMUDGEO #1

The District has completed a 72-megawatt Cnet) geothermal unit, known as
SMUOGEO #1, in the California Geysers area.

The plant began commercial

operation in December 1983 and produced 621 million kilowatt-hours of
electrical energy in 1985.

The plant operated at a 96.1-percent capacity
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factor from the start of commercial operation through December 31, 1985.

The

production cost of energy generated from this plant, consisting of steam
purchases, operating expenses, and depreciation was 28.8 mills per
kilowatt-hour for the year ended December 31, 1985.

It has already earned a

reputation as the most efficient geothermal power plant in the country.

McClellan C. T.

The District, in conjunction with the Air Force, has completed the
construction of a 49-megawatt peaking combustion turbine generating p1ant at
the McClellan Air Force Base site.

The $26.2 million gas turbine project was

completed in January 1986.

SMUD P. V.

In 1980 the District, in cooperation with the Department of Energy <DOE> and
California Energy Commission <CEC>, undertook development of a photovoltaic
installation at a site adjacent to the Rancho Seco nuclear plant.
one-megawatt became operational in July 1984.

The first

It cost $12 million, of which

the District provided $3.2 million, DOE provided $6.8 million and CEC supplied
$2 million.

The second one-megawatt increment cost $10.4 million of which

$3.6 million was provided by the District and $6.8 million was furnished by
DOE.

Further development of photovoltaic generation has been indefinitely

postponed because costs have not fallen as rapidly as originally predicted.
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PURCHASED POWER AGREEMENTS

Western Agreement

In 1954 the District entered into a 40-year contract with the federal
government for the purchase of 290 megawatts of Central Valley Project <CVP)
power delivered to the District via Western transmission lines.

In 1966, the

contract was amended to provide for the purchase of an additional 70 megawatts
under the same general terms and conditions.

On April 15, 1983, the District

and Western executed a contract amendment and settlement agreement that
terminated a lawsuit filed by Western to resolve a dispute over the
interpretation of the contract.

That agreement extended the contract until

2004, and give the District the right to purchase 100 megawatts of peaking
power in addition to 1ts 360 megawatts

capacity and energy.

PGandE Contract

The District executed a contract with PGandE in June 1970.

The PGandE

Contract is a power sale, exchange and integration agreement which provides
for the integration of the District's generation into the Northern California
power system.

A principal feature of the PGandE Contract is that the parties

share reserves so that when there is an outage of generation or transmission
facilities, the resources of the entire interconnected system are available to
meet loads.

Another important feature of the PGandE Contract is that PGandE

purchases nearly all capacity and energy produced by the District which is
surplus to the District's requirements.

This enables the District to operate
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its nuclear plant at a high load factor so that the'cost per kilowatt-hour can
be held to a minimum.

A third important feature of the PGandE Contract is

that it provides that if the District's power supply resources are less than
its requirements, PGandE will make capacity and energy available to the
District on an exchange basis <subject to certain limits>.

This will enable

the District to borrow power from PGandE if it encounters delays in bringing
additional generating resources into operation.

South Sutter

~ater

District

In August 1981 the District entered into an agreement to pay the debt service
on approximately $16.9 million in bonds issued by the South Sutter Water
District as well as certain operating costs and royalties for the output of
the Camp Far West hydroelectric project.

Th~

Plant which began commercial

operation on February 1, 1985 is rated at 6.8 megawatts and anticipated to
produce 27 million kilowatt-hours of energy in an average water year.

California Power Pool

An extra-high voltage <EHV> transmission contract was

negoti~ted

in 1967 with

the California Power Pool <comprised of PGandE, SoutherQ California Edison
Company, and San Diego Gas and Electric Company) which placed in service EHV
transmission lines linking the Pacific Northwest and California.

This

contract provides the District with 200 megawatts of the interties' capacity
available on a long-term basis.

This intertie capacity can be used to deliver

surplus peaking capacity and surplus energy which may be available from the
Pacific Northwest.

This contract terminates in 2005.

SOURCES OF POWER
MEGA WAITS
2500

SYSTEM
PEAK DEMAND~

500

1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990

LEGEND:
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f,',',',j t'IESTERN AREA POWER ADMINISTRATION PEAKING (Purchased Power)
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RANCHO SECO DESIGN, OPERATION AND SAFETY

The 913-megawatt plant was built by the District with assistance from the
architectural and engineering firm of Bechtel Power Corporation.
pressurized reactor design was supplied by Babcock &Wilcox.

It's

With regard to

Rancho Seco's design our first and foremost concern has been the safety of our
employees and the people living in proximity to the plant.

Because Rancho Seco was designed with safety as the most important
consideration, engineers and scientist contributing to the project used
"Safety in Depth" as their criterion.

Multiple barriers and redundant systems

were used extensively to provide protection for the employees as well as for
the public.

This means that if for some reason one essential system fails,

there is a second, or back-up safety system ready to take over.

The heart of all nuclear activity is confined to one carefully controlled
area--the reactor containment building.

This building houses the reactor

vessel and two steam generators.

The reactor vessel and steam generator components are encased in reinforced
concrete which supports the vessel and provides a shield against radiation.

A

leak-tight steel shell lines the domed structure where the reactor vessel and
components are housed.

The structure's massive reinforced concrete wall,

3-1/2 feet thick, acts as another radiation shield and is the final protective
barrier.

The central control room constantly monitors and regulates the

reactor.

From here, the reactor can be shut down manually or automatically in

an emergency situation.
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Throughout the nuclear power plant, there are safety systems and devices which
trap potentially harmful amounts of radioactive materials to prevent them from
being released to the outside environment.

Filters, evaporators and other

equipment remove radioactive materials and thus allow it to be treated and
stored or disposed of safely.

In addition to all the shielding built into the power plant, there are also
many operating procedures, access controls and security measures designed to
keep both the workers and the public safe.

Emergency Planning

Despite the protection offered by these physical barriers, and system
redundancy, the nuclear industry and regulators, along with responsible local,
state, and federal emergency response organizations have developed
comprehensive public protection plans which integrate the various authorities,
resources, and expertise to deal with extraordinary events at nuclear plants,
if they occur.

In SMUD's case, this involved working directly with the County of Sacramento
as early as 1971.

Following the Three Mile Island accident in 1979 the

Emergency Planning Zones were increased to a minimum of a 10-mile radius
around Rancho Seco, so Amador County and San Joaquin County emergency planning
personnel were incorporated in our response planning efforts.
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Following the issuance of regulations and guidance by the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission and the Federal Emergency Management Agency, particularly the
guidance contained in Criteria for Preparation of Evaluation of Radiological
Emergency Response Plan to Nuclear Power Plants, NUREG 0654 FEMA REPl, Rev. 1,
published November 1980, SMUD rewrote its Emergency Response Plan.

We fully

conform with the regulatory guidance and have integrated our internal action
plans with those counties and state jurisdictions.

Major topics covered in the plans and implementing procedures include the
following areas:

o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o

Assignment of Responsibility
On-site Emergency Organization
Emergency Response and Resources
Emergency Classification System
Notification, Methods, and Procedures
Emergency Communications
Public Education and Information
Emergency Facility and Equipment
Accident Assessment
Protective Response
Radiological Exposure Control
Medical and Public Health Support
Recovery and Reentry Planning in Post ACcident Operations
Exercises and Drills
Radiological Emergency REsponse Training
Responsibility for the Planning Effort
Development, Periodic Review and Distribution of Emergency Plans

In the spirit of fulfilling our respective responsibilities to protect the
public, the District and three counties have had periodic planning team
meetings for the overall coordination of plans and procedures for response to
an incident at Rancho Seco.

These planning team meetings have been held

routinely over the past <approximately> five years.
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Three major emergency response exercises have been successfully completed with
these jurisdictions in the past four years.
scheduled for this fall.
are made.

A fourth major exercise is

Each time an exercise is conducted, new refinements

Much of the current effort is focused on training, notification of

personnel both on- and off-site, improvements in county communications, and
procedure review.

Based upon the comprehensive nature of the current plans and procedures which
are in place and with the continued training, drills, and exercises, and
cooperative teamwork the public health and safety can be appropriately assured.
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Operational Problem Areas

From the beginning of its operation, much of the scale-up in size of Rancho
Seco was based on the technology developed for fossil-fueled power plants.
Staffing and maintenance programs were largely modeled after them.

SMUD staff

weren't initially equipped to prevent the nuclear plant from going through
shutdowns as frequently or severe as those tolerated at fossil plants.

Crew

size was too small and maintenance standards were inadequate to assure a high
degree of plant reliability.

With an environment which led to lack of attention to detail, little problems
began to compound into more serious ones.

While the plant was new, it could

withstand the impact of these problems and operated fairly well.

But as it

matured, it became more susceptible.

The Three Mile Island accident caught both the industry and regulators off
guard.

They simply were not prepared to deal with anything like it.

The

industry reacted largely by being defensive and resisted proposed changes.
SMUD, in particular, as a fiscally conservative public agency, dug in its
heels.

With the pressure on its elected Board to keep rates low, management

did not want to admit its weaknesses or errors and was re1uctant to ask for
more money or staff to deal with inevitable changes.

So, by 1980, SMUD was under-staffed, under-trained, with less than adequate
maintenance standards, and faced with new regulatory requirements and
additional plant modifications.

The management and staff were now in a
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reactionary posture.

The initial solution was thought to be more temporary

help (to get us over what was judged as a short-term problem) so a large
contingent of contractor personnel was brought on board.

At the same time no additional permanent SMUD management personnel were hired
and its undermanned staff was unable to provide the supervision, long-range
planning, or coordination that was required.

Instead they found themselves

consumed with paperwork, daily projects, and plant operating problems.
was not sufficient time for training.

There

Maintenance philosophy was, "repair it

now, we'll find out later why it happened."

Unfortunately, more projects came

along and no one had the time to go back and follow up.
supervisors were overloaded and overwhelmed.

Managers and

On top of that there was a lack

of management systems or controls in place to deal with the resource and
workload problems being encountered.

As productivity and efficiency suffered,

commitment dates <agreed to with the regulatory agencies) came and went
without completion of some of the modifications.

NRC audits began to become

more and more critical of the District's handling of most aspects of Rancho
Seco.
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Finally, in 1984, the SMUD Board of Directors commissioned an 1ndependent
management audit of Rancho Seco.

All the problems that had been developing

over the past ten years of operation and the reasons for them came sharply
into focus in the written report submitted to the Board in November 1984.
tiame 1y:

Staffing
Training
Maintenance
Attention to Detail
Management Systems

o

Lack of

o
o
o
o

Poor
Poor
Poor
Poor
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Corrective Action

The Board reacted quickly hiring a member of the LRS organization, strong in
nuclear plant management, to act as the technical advisor to the newly created
<Board) Rancho Seco Implementation Committee.

This committee was to be the

eyes and ears of the full Board to assure the approximately 90 LRS
recommendations were reviewed, modified (if necessary), and implemented as
soon as possible.

The Board also approved an immediate effort to increase the depth of the
existing staff, recruit new talent, and expand the management team.

Last

Fall, a new nuclear organization was established to provide a better span of
control and greater indepth accountability.
personnel are being phased out.
Training Manager.

As new people are hired, contract

One of the first positions filled was that of

That organization has a major increase in staff, a new $8

million reactor control room simulator and training facilities have been given
the 11 90 ahead 11 by the SMUD Board, and four of Rancho Seco's training programs
have recently been accredited by the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations
<INPO> and recognized by the NRC.
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1984 NUCLEAR MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATION
DIRECTOR
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CHANG~S

General l'\11anager
AGM Nuclear
Plant Manager
Operations Manager
Operations Superintenden~
Health Phys!cs Superfr:tsndsnt

I
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MANAGEMENT PERSONNEL ADDITIONS

• TRAINING MANAGER AGM D!rect Report
• NUCLEAR PROJECT MANAGER AGM Direct Report
o

MAINTENANCE

1\~ANAGER

-

Plant IVianager Direct Report

• SCHEDULING r,JJANAGEA Plant rJJanager Direct

Repor~

• TECHNICAL I'J1ANAGER Plant rJianager

~lrect Re~ort

Meanwhile, more attention Is being given to the plant systems.
and industry attitude toward redundancy has changed.

The regulatory

Instead of taking credit

for the back-up safety system as part of normal operating or shutdown
conditions, the new philosophy Is to modify the plant and procedures to reduce
the potential for needing <or challenging) the back-up safety systems.
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MAINTENANCE PROGRAM

IMPROVE~JiENTS

•ADDED SINGLE MAINTENANCE MANAGER REPORTIUG TO
PLANT MANAGER

•INCREASE MANAGE!JENT/SUPERVISORY PEFISONNE!. TO
ALLOW IAORE SUPERVISORY TIME IN FIELD

•iMPLEMENTATION OF A PLANNING AND SCHEDULING STUD.V
•IMPLEMENTING GRADUATED QUALITY PROGRAM FOR WORK
ON MAJOR SECONDARY PLANT. EQUIPMENT
• PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE PROGRAM IMPROVEMENTS

Additional outside expertise was brought in to assist.

A plant manager from

the record-setting Duke Power Company was asked to come and work with us.
Duke Power Operations Superintendent also came to help.

More recently a

top-notch team from Management Analysis Company is providing the senior
management guidance to the nuclear organization to assist In coalesing SMUD's
new nuclear team in moving ahead with a comprehensive plant performance and
management improvement program.
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ADDITIONAL OUTSIDE ASSISTANCE
• MANAGEMENT CONSULTANT TO BOARD SINCE JANUARY 1985
Carl Andognlnl
• EXPERIENCED PLANT MANAGER SEPTEMBER- NOVEMBER 1985
Ed Smith
• EXPERIENCED OPERATION SUPERINTENDENT MARCH- JUNE 1986
George Cage
• MANAGEMENT ANAL YSJS COMPANY TEAM
SINCE MAY 1986 . Phase I
Phase H

An elaborate plant performance and management improvement program, fully
staffed by approximately 100 people, is now underway.

Its objective is to

examine past plant performance and management shortcomings, identify fixes,
and implement changes to assure lasting improvements for safe, reliable plant
operations.
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PLANT PERFORMANCE
AND
MANAGEMENT IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM
Improvement ,___..,
Program
Overview
Panel

Nuclear Dept.
Managers
•~Mar

Independent
f'lovicw P;mcl

Plant

eQuality

•Eng. . etfng
• lraW'IIInC)

Asst.
Performance
Improvement
Manager

•Uc·-

Performance ·
Analysis Group
e Aes.outcet
e Pto,utement

• Org•rua:auon
e uarnagem.ml Sratama

' PJocech•••

• SctwQule

• F~Uonat kl&erlacet
• tntonnaHon Olaaemonahon
&. Feedback
e P•rformance lnd+GatOfa

Recomendation. Review
& Resolution Bonrd

This objective translates into a very formal, tough, comprehensive, detailed,
time-consuming effort on the part of the District.

Included is this program

are:
o

A determination of the consequences of component and system failure

o

Personal Interviews with each member of the plant staff to identify
previously unreported or unresolved plant equipment or procedure
problems.

o

Careful investigation of the precursors <reasons for and contributors
to) of events, failures of equipment or procedures, or human error in
the past.

(i.e. what would happen if).

Once the above investigations are completed, their significance will be
determined by the following screening criteria:
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1.
2.
3.

Does it cause a reactor trip?
Does it challenge any safety systems?
Does it cause over- or under-cooling following a reactor trip?

If the answer to any of the these questions ts "yes" for a given piece of
equipment or a procedure, they will be given top priority for quick
correction.

All of those which affect over- or under-cooling will be

corrected before the plant comes out of the current shutdown.

RAHCIIO SECO
PERFORMANCE IMi'fiOVEMEIIT PROGnAM

PEnF0/11\IANCE

•Deterministic Failure
Consequences
ePlant Staff Interviews
•Precursor Review
eEvent-related Actions
eSystem Review & Testing
• BWOG Stop-Trip Program

•
•
•
•

Oisposlliou
PriorIty
Implementation
Follow-up

•Pro-active Approach
•Morale Improvement
•Project Management Program
•Enhanced Quality Program

.Reduce Challenges
to Safety Systems
•Enhance Plant Reliability
•Reinforced Procedures
• Restart Report
.Revised Living Schedule
• Resource Allocations
• Test Program Definition
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The benefits resulting from this intense effort are:
o
o
o
o
o

Reduced challenges to safety systems
Enhanced reliability
Reinforced procedures
Clearly identified, and agreed to fixes from regulatory agencies on,
what needs to be done before the plant can restart
Key corrective actions factored into our long-term scheduling to
assure resources are available to meet commitment dates

Rancho Seco's Future

As I pointed out in my discussion of generation resources, Rancho Seco is the
backbone of our baseload generation.
generation facilities.

It represents 54 percent of all our

It represents one of the cheapest sources of

electricity for our customers (i.e. only hydro is less).
capacity factor, it can pay for its cost of operation.

This is well below its

current lifetime total of 46 percent <capacity factor).
benefits to the SMUO customer-owners are enormous.

Even at a 28 percent

Rancho Seco's

In its 12-year operating

history, it has saved over $800 million compared to having built the
oil-fueled alternative.

Its fuel cost is 20 to 30 percent of that for oil,

even with the recent drop in oil prices, and likewise it remains cheaper than
coal energy delivered to the Sacramento area.

Rancho Seco's capitalized costs

of $642 million equates to approximately $700 per megawatt which is a
tremendous bargain to Sacramento electricity users.

The quality of the overall plant design is good.

What got us to our current

situation was a breakdown of our management systems.

These are repairable.

It is one of the single, most valuable resource in Sacramento County.
well on our way to recovery.

We know what has to be done.

We are
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We have taken major steps already.

We've increased staff, brought in new

management with new perspectives, we've installed, and are installing new
equipment.

Most importantly, we're determined!

Our objective is to operate a safe and reliable nuclear plant and to achieve a
greater than a 70 percent capacity factor for Rancho Seco by 1990.
happened at Rancho Seco is not unique.

Some utilities recognized it sooner

than others, and made the necessary adjustments.
on the road to recovery.

What has

Others, like SMUD, are still

But we have a plan and we are well along that road.

BABCOCK & WILCOX TESTIMONY BEFORE
THE CALIFORNIA STATE SENATE NUCLEAR SUBCOMMITTEE

J. H. TAYLOR

SENIOR TECHNICAL CONSULTANT
THE BABCOCK & WILCOX COMPANY

MAY 28, 1986
SACRAMENTO, CALIFORNIA

BABCOCK & WILCOX TESTIMONY BEFORE THE
CALIFORNIA STATE SENATE NUCLEAR SUBCOMMITTEE

Good Afternoon.
My name is J. H. Taylor and I am a Senior Technical Consultant and Manager of
Nuclear Plant Licensing for the Nuclear Power Division of The Babcock & Wilcox
Company. I have worked for Babcock & Wilcox in various capacities for the past
32 years. Nearly all of this time has involved work in the nuclear area.
I am pleased to have an opportunity to speak briefly before your subcommittee
today to present a B&W perspective on the issues you are discussing.
It seems appropriate to begin with a very brief statement concerning our
company. B&W today is a very diversified company with many areas of involvement
in the energy business. Our company began 120 years ago with the development of
an innovative steam boiler. Since that time, B&W has become a major supplier to
the electric utility industry in providing central station boilers and related
equipment to both domestic and international utilities.
B&W's involvement in the nuclear industry started in the early 1950's. Since
that time period, the company has been extensively involved in both the
commercial and the Navy nuclear power activities. Currently we are a major fuel
and component supplier to the nuclear Navy. In the commercial arena, we are a
major fuel supplier and provide diverse services to the commercial nuclear power
industry.
B&W's involvement in the large central station commercial nuclear power field
began in the 1960's. Currently, there are eight B&W reactors with operating
licenses in the United States and four additional units are under construction.
There is also one plant of the B&W design in Germany, which just received its
operating license within the past few months. Physically, the arrangement of
the Reactor Coolant System on all of these plants is very similar. That general
configuration is shown in isometric form in a figure included in my written
testimony (see Figure 1).
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B&W reactors were designed, licensed, and built to the same regulatory and code
requirements as other plants going through the cycle in the same time period.
Although the regulatory requirements are common, the performance characteristics
for B&W plants are different. The B&W plants were designed with a different
type of steam generator. This difference was designed into the plants to allow
the utilities to change load at the request of the load dispatcher more rapidly
than other reactors. The use of steam generators which are physically and
functionally different has both pluses and minuses from an operational
standpoint. For example, on the plus side, the tubing in the B&W steam
generators is more readily inspectable. From the beginning, the water chemistry
requirements imposed by B&W have been quite strict. The combination of strict
water chemistry requirements and more easily inspected tubing has produced an
outstanding steam generator tube integrity record for B&W plants. Tube
integrity is significant from a safety standpoint. On the down side, there are
certain component malfunctions which require prompter corrective action because
of the rapid load change capability designed into the plant. When talking about
overall safety, the tendency is frequently to focus only on the negatives and
lose sight of the positives.
The B&W reactors contain some other plus" safety features which no other
reactors have. These include vent valves in the reactor internals and direct
injection of flooding water into the reactor vessel, both of which enhance core
cooling under certain accident conditions.
11

In terms of performance records, the B&W plants are very representative of the
entire industry. In comparing such things as plant availability and reactor
shutdown frequency - two key performance parameters - there are some B&W units
which rank among the very best in the country, there are some which are average,
and there are some in the lower half of industry performers. f~y written
testimony contains a figure showing both the overall industry and B&W plant
performance in the availability area (see Figure 2). I should point out,
however, the relative positions of each plant vary depending upon the
characteristics being compared.
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B&W believes firmly that its reactors represent a very low risk to the health
and safety of the public. At the same time, B&W is committed to further
improvements in reactor plant design and operation. We believe that nuclear
power is a safe means of generating electricity and that the nuclear option is
important as an element in the nation•s energy future. As members of the
technical community, we acknowledge that there is no such thing as zero risk,
but relative to other societal risks we believe that the risk from nuclear power
is very small.
We also believe that any significant malfunction at a nuclear plant deserves
review to determine what can be learned from it. Advantage should be taken of
these lessons. Consistent with this belief, B&W initiated a unique program
about six years ago to gather information about the operating experiences at the
B&W plants. This accumulation of operating experience information has begun to
pay off. We anticipate that the benefits of this program will become much more
visible within the next two to three years.
Also, because of the belief that operating experience can teach many lessons, we
are providing significant support to SMUD, some of it at no cost to them, to
help assure that when Rancho Seco returns to power, it will be the beginning of
a long period of substantially improved performance. It is in this same spirit
that we are aggressive, active participants in the Babcock & Wi1cox Owners
Group, which is a unique industry organization having as its major current
objective the development of new ways to safely improve the performance of all
B&W plants. Some of the support we provide to the B&W Owners Group is also at
no cost to the member utilities.
The B&W Owners Group, of which SMUD is a member, presently has underway a major
reassessment of the member plants aimed at finding ways to further improve
performance. In my written testimony, there is further information regarding
this reassessment effort. (See Attachment A.)
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In concluding my brief comments, it would be appropriate to comment specifically
about Rancho Seco. It is no secret that Rancho Seco's performance record has
considerable room for improvement. At the same time, there have been some
periods of very good performance at Rancho Seco. There is currently a major
effort being mounted to set the stage for sustained performance improvement at
Rancho Seco.
There should be no doubt that Rancho Seco is capable of significantly improved
performance. There are no major technical differences between the .Rancho Seco
Nuclear Station and the Oconee Nuclear Station, which currently holds the
world's record for continuous days of power operation. The Oconee Nuclear
Station has been a reliable and economically attractive plant for its owner,
Duke Power Company. Rancho Seco can be likewise.
As an indication of the type of performance which Rancho Seco is targeting for,
some very ambitious and yet quite achievable performance goals have been
submitted by SMUD management to the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations to be
achieved by 1990. These goals include a diverse set of performance parameters
covering ten important performance areas. They cover the spectrum from plant
availability to personnel exposures and industrial accidents.
I believe that Rancho Seco is very capable of safely, reliably, and economically
generating electricity. B&W is eager to play a part in the Rancho Seco
turnaround program.
Thank You.
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B&W PLANTS '

ATTACHMENT A
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
(From B&W Owners Group Performance Improvement Program Description)
(Submitted to the NRC on May 16, 1986)

Two abnormal transients at B&W plants in 1985 - one at Davis-Besse and the other
at Rancho Seco - resulted in increased NRC concern regarding the frequency of
reactor trips and complexity of transients on B&W plants. The NRC's perception
that there may be a generic risk significance associated with these transients
resulted in a decision to call for a broad reassessment of B&WOG plant design to
assure their design requirements result in levels of safety comparable to other
PWRs. In undertaking this effort, the NRC recognized that the B&WOG must play
an important role in performing this reassessment, and as a result requested
that the B&WOG take the lead in the reassessment.
The B&WOG readily accepted the opportunity to take the lead in this reassessment
effort and acknowledged,
the B&WOG has in-depth expertise and familiarity with B&WOG plants
the B&WOG has access to a substantial operating experience data base
accumulated through their Transient Assessment Program (TAP)
the B&WOG has inherent incentives and responsibilities as owners and
licensees to further improve plant performance.
The B&WOG immediately formed a special team comprised of Utility and B&W
personnel and led by experienced Utility personnel. The first action by the
team was to develop a more precise and quantitative definition of the perceived
concerns. This was necessary in order to ensure the development of a meaningful
program plan with specific and measurable goals. The NRC's concerns regarding
the frequency of reactor trips and complexity of transients were quantitatively
defined:
The quantification of reactor trip frequency was straightforward.
To define complex transients required the development of specific criteria.
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After quantitatively defining the concerns, and gathering and evaluating the
data, performance improvement goals were established for reducing the frequency
of reactor trips and complex transients. The basis for defining complex
transients and the establishment of performance goals was the existing B&WOG TAP
Data Base.
Previous B&WOG programs had placed extensive effort on reactor trips, but a
re-review of the TAP Data Base in view of the concern about complex transients
helped to focus on post-trip response and to identify those areas of the plant
where additional emphasis may be needed.
A program plan was developed to define the actions necessary to achieve both of
the distinctively different, but yet related, program goals; reduce the number
of trips and complex transients at B&WOG plants.
Throughout the development of the plan, NRC input has been obtained both through
meetings and written communications. This input has been carefully considered
and the resultant plan is intended to address the NRC's concerns.
One of the main guidelines used in preparing this plan was for it to be
comprehensive and yet focused on real problems. This guidance is reflected in
the plan. Its comprehensiveness is demonstrated by the scope of new
investigations, and the inclusion of an in-depth study comparing the response of
B&W NSS to other PWR designs. It includes entire systems such as ICS/NNI, main
and auxiliary feedwater systems, and secondary plant relief systems. This is
further illustrated by the search for new problems through such means as special
plant visits and interviews with operators and maintenance personnel. The
program is focused in that it has specific goals; a reduction in trips and
complex transients, and specific means to achieve them are being pursued.
Due to prior B&WOG emphasis on trip reduction, many actions were underway which
would contribute to achieving that portion of the program goal. This plan
reflects and incorporates those previously initiated activities. With regard to
transient response, the review focuses attention on those specific systems and
components which affect heat transfer in the steam generators. More
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specifically, the plan focuses attention on those systems and components which
affect steam generator inventory and pressure.
In general, the program plan calls for three types of actions:
1.

Those actions which can directly affect specific parts of the plant and
which can directly contribute to the reduction in trip frequency and
improved transient response.

2.

Those actions of a programmatic nature which can affect the plant in a more
indirect but yet important way.

3.

Those activities related to assessing the risk significance of complex
plant transients.

Within each of these types of activities, the program plan calls for integrating
actions which are sponsored by the B&WOG, individual utilities, or other
industry organizations such as EPRI and INPO.
The first type of activity includes those things which affect plant operations
such as hardware configuration, maintenance, procedures and training. From a
hardware standpoint, the plan includes review of instrumentation, controls,
fluid system components and their motive power.
The second type of activity is included to further strengthen B&WOG actions in
certain areas where past experience indicated a need to do so. Specifically,
the plan calls for the development of an improved and more structured approach
to seeking the root cause of problems. It also calls for more formalized
follow-up to determine the timeliness and effectiveness of implementing
performance improvement recommendations. The plan calls for a means of regularly
monitoring B&WOG progress towards the program's performance improvement goals.
The third type of activity is included in the program to develop a more
objective understanding of the relationship between core melt risk and complex
transients.
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The program schedule calls for the completion of a major part of the
investigative activity in 1986. Significant action will be underway through
1986 to reduce trip frequency and improve transient response at B&WOG plants.
Implementation of other significant actions will extend over several years but
will be consistent with the INPO performance improvement goals.
The B&WOG program is extensive. When fully implemented, it is expected to
produce a significant reduction in reactor trips, plant transient behavior will
be improved, and an improved understanding will hav~ been developed regarding
the significance of transients on B&WOG plants.
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OPENING STATEMENT

J. F. Lang
Electric Power Research Institute

to
The Senate Subcommittee on Nuclear Facility
Safety and Emergency Preparedness
May 28, 1986

I am Jim lang. I work at the Electric Power Research Institute in Palo Alto
in the Nuclear Safety Analysis Center. We are working to understand the
events of the Chernobyl accident and to develop an understanding of what
lessons from that event can be applied to our U.S. commercial nuclear power
industry. The first step is to understand the Chernobyl design and how it
differs from our own light water reactors.
The first obvious difference between the Chernobyl reactor and U.S. light
water reactors is the use of graphite as a neutron moderator. The Soviet
design evolved from earlier weapons production reactors that used graphite and
low enrichment uranium. U.S. designers selected light water moderation over
graphite moderation for power reactor applications for a number of reasons.
They wanted to avoid graphite's potential flammability, the unique physical
and chemical changes that occur in graphite in a reactor, and the huge
physical size and complexity associated with the use of a graphite
moderator. The Chernobyl reactor contains about 1800 tons of graphite
penetrated by over 1600 individual pressure tubes, each with its individual
inlet and outlet piping. In addition, U.S. designers wanted a self-limiting
reactor where a loss of water would shut down the reactor. This is not the
case with Chernobyl.
The next major difference between U.S. and Soviet reactor designs is in the
defense-in-depth barriers provided to ensure that nuclear fuel and fission
products cannot escape the core. The Chernobyl reactor and U.S. light water
reactors use the same kind of fuel surrounded by a zirconium cladding of about
the same wall thickness. However, the next barrier of defense against release
is radically different. The Soviets use over 1600 individual pressure tubes,
each 3 l/2" in diameter, to contain the fuel elements and light water coolant
flowing past the fuel elements. The pressure tube walls are less than 1/4
inch thick, whereas the pressure vessels in U.S. light water reactors are
about 16 feet in diameter and have walls 6 1/2 to 8 1/2 inches thick. This
means that fuel in the Chernobyl reactor lies right next to the pressure tube
and, if damaged, has a much greater chance of penetrating this second barrier
of defense (the pressure tubes} than in a U.S. light water reactor where there
is an expanse of water and steel between the fuel and the single large
pressure vessel.
3979NS6
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These first two Soviet differences, use of graphite as the moderator and thinwalled pressure tubes, combine to form a third distinction, the possibility of
creating dangerous hot-graphite/hot-steam reactions from a breach in the
pressure tube wall.
The subject of Soviet containments has generated a great deal of discussion in
the last few days. Early Soviet reactors like Chernobyl did not have
containment. Incremental steps have been taken on subsequent versions, but
Soviet technology appears to remain far behind the technology applied to our
commercial light water reactors.
To us, full containment means complete enclosure of all reactor and primary
support systems for the reactor such that any design basis accident is fully
contained inside. Full primary containment is achieved typically in the U.S.
by building a strong, thick, and practically air-tight steel and concrete
containment building around all primary reactor systems. On the other hand,
at Chernobyl, only part of the reactor system appears to be contained within a
boundary intended to be pressure tight. At most, there are compartments
around the lower part of the reactor to suppress the pressure from breaks in
the inlet piping but there appears to be no way of isolating pipes outside
these compartments. This seems to be substantiated by an Associated Press
report that Ivan Yemilianov, Deputy Director of the Soviet design
organization, "confirmed speculation that the reactor did not have a
conventional containment vessel used in the West to prevent radiation leaks in
case of a breakdown."
The final area of U.S. and Soviet designs that I wish to address is safety
systems. This topic is perhaps the most difficult area of comparison, but
also is the area that is likely to yield the most useful applications to our
industry. First, the Chernobyl reactor is not self-limiting as our U.S. light
water reactors are. Loss of cooling water at Chernobyl can cause reactor
power to increase. Translations of Russian reports and papers, which we have
studied, state that under certain conditions these reactors have been reported
to be unstable and difficult to control.
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Soviet publications show emergency core cooling systems with modern designs,
which appear to be similar to Western approaches but appear to lack
degree
of diversity and backup components that we provide in our modern light water
reactors. We also have concluded that Soviet designs do not address the full
scope of design basis accidents that we do in the U.S •• nor do they treat
severe accident and emergency planning in the detail we do. Finally, we think
that our limits for reactor operation, emergency procedures, realistic
operator training, and many other operations-related features that are
important to reactor safety in the U.S. may not receive the same level of
attention in the Soviet Union.
There may well be lessons for us from the Chernobyl accident; however, because
of the design differences I just described and the improvements made in U.S.
reactor operations over the last seven years, information from the Soviet
Union is not turning up any deficiencies in U.S. light water reactor
designs. Rather, the lessons of Chernobyl may some day suggest opportunities
for further improvement.

3979NS6
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1qt~
On Saturday monling, Harch 1G, both major Sac ramer' to newspapers car-

•

/

ried front page stord.eh about a 51 billion clnirn~filcd agninst the
Sacramento Municipai Utility District (.SHUD) the Jay before, a claim
contending, according t'o the newspapers, that large quantities of radioactive water from SMUD' s Rancho Seco nuclear powf: c plant have endangered
the public.

I was particularly interented in the alJegatior. becau::>e I

have known for years thut analyses of milk samples from cows near Rancho
Seco have shown the presence of radioactive iodine-131 which could hardly
have come from any source but Rancho Seco.
Morton Friedman, attorney for the claimants, confirmed my nssumption
that the

~iling

of the claim was merely the legally nr>CARsnry preliminary

to a lawsuit to \>e filed against SHUD after the anLi,:ipah:d rejection by
SHUD of the claim.
At its regular meeting on th;;, "vening ot April 4th, the SHUD board of
directors rejected without discussion the claim by

11

Conrad and Patricia

· Weisker, et al 11 for damaees resulting from rudioHctive contamination of
the area

a1~und

Rancho Seco.

On March 20 the SMUD Public Information Office had sent to news mediA
representatives the "5th in a Geries of informational reports 1' (Report)
which presumably indicates SMUD 1 s levAl of under::otand.Hlg of Rancho Seco 1 s
radiation problems.

The Report is

replt~t~

with insup:-1ortabl e statAments i

for instance, that "the Intt:rnational Council on Radiatior. r':-otection
[presumably meaning the In terJ,,> t ional Council on H:tdio loc; i c:1l Protection]
has established a limit of 5,000 mi11lrf'ms pf'r ye<H· as a lt·vcl at which

(O·l/£1<)

Document 2,

spc~aking

of iu;

Lf;q,

oror>-).S•.d 1irntt of 1'/G rni11i:·.:ms (mr) per

year for the general popul;-Jt1orc- 1/30 of t.ht: 5000 mrjy.:ar

vrcup~tional

limit! --state that "This li:nitatlOn nlJCc:~;·ro;1riJy invvlvc<; a comprorr.i~;e Lctween delete rio us e f fee ts and

~;oci

terms are needed in the !iesign of

<tl t;enL: f i U; .a~ l'ecornm•: nda :::i rm in qunn t ita t i vc
po~twr

plantr; ••• it is felt thnt th:iR level

provides reasonable latitude for the expanRion of atomic energy programs •••
It should be emphasized that the limit may not in fact repreGent the proper
balance between pos[;ible harm and probable benefit ••• "
.Since the promulgatipn of Lhe 170 mr/year limit, the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency (in December 1979) reduced the permissible

~xposm·e

of the

general population to radiation resulting from the "nuclear fuel cycle" t_o
a limit of 25 mr/year.
exposur~

In

sp~

te of pressure to do so, the occupational

limit of 5000 mr/year -- 200 times as high! -- has not been also

reduced, for the obvious reason that any substantin1 reduction would incapacitate nuclear power plants.

Rancho Seco, for instar.ce, has wori{ed men

i"n radiation fields of at least 15,000 mr/hour!

(In 1978 EdwHrd Radford,

chair of the U.S. National Academy of Sciences Committee on the Biological
Effects of Ionizing Radiation (BIER

Co~mittce)

testified to a House of

Representatives comm1ttee that new evidence indicated occupational exposure
limits should be
c~ncer

induction.

red~ced

by a factor of at least 10 because of the risk of

S0ymore Jablon, also of NAS, noted that "if a person

receives the NRC limit, he is going to have effects."
Not even the 25 mr/year wns conRidered by the EPA to bf hrtrmless; on the
contrary, in proposing

~he

regulation the EPA

staLPd f'XUli.citt~ly

limit was considered to be a compromisf' b0tw0en thr- r,<'fl•·ti

~

that the

C'Am.>ef> r.nd

othpr hf'nlth effects to be exp,dr·d from such expo:,u:cs, nr:d thP b,nefits

-3of nuclcnr· power pJ.-,nt op,

l'Dl

iun.

as the SHUD Public Kicinform;dion Office.

/

(_o ~~~~)

ESTIMATES OF RADIATION-INDUCED CANCER DEATHS
OF REACTOR WORKERS FOR 1980 EXPOSURES

BEIR I (1972)

2-4 CANCER DEATHS

(50-80 PER 106 PERSON-REMS)(A)

BEIR II (1979)

3-15 CANCER DEATHS

(70-353 PER 106 PERSON-REMS) (B)

BEIR III ( 1980)

3-10 CANCER DEATHS

(77-226 PER 106 PERSON-REMS)(C)

UNSCEAR (1977)

5 CANCER DEATHS

( 100 PER 106 PERSON-HEMS) (D)

RADFORD (1981)

1Q:-.30 CANCER DEATHS

(2()()._600 PER 106 PERSON-REMS) (E)

GOFMAN (1977)

200 CANCER DEATHS

(3771 PER 106 PERSON-REMS)(F)

MORGAN ( 1978)

350 CANCER DEATHS

( 7000 PER 106 PERSON-REM.S) (G)

A) NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON THE BIOLOGICAL
EFFECTS OF IONIZING RADIATION (BEIR COMMITTEE), REPORT FOR 1972.
B) BEIR COMMITTEE, 1979.
C) BEIR COMMITTEE, 198o.
D) UNITED NATIONS SCIENTIFIC COMMITTEE ON THE EFFECTS OF ATOMIC RADIATION,
1977.
E) RADFORD, E., SCIENCE, 1981 AUG. 7.
F), GOFMAN, J. W., HEALTH PHYSICS, 1981 JULY.
G) MORGAN, K. Z., BULLETIN Q!.!!!,! ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, 1978 SEPTJlmER.
(MORGAN•S ESTIMATES ARE

BASED~ON

HANFORD DATA OF MANCUSO, STEWART, AND

KNEALE PUBLISHED IN HEALTH PHYSICS, 1977 NOVEMBER) •

••••••••••••••••••••
THE ABOVE IS FROM ANALYSIS

.Q!.: !!!!£

~

Q!! NUCLEAR POWER PLANT WORKER

EXPOSURES !Q RADIATION, FRED MILLAR AND BOB ALVAREZ, ENVIRONMENTAL
POLICriNSTITUTE, 1981 SEPT. 1.

~

Takes

Se

As it braces for a reorganization soon served by a decision to scrap or overhaul ant, the B & W reactor may allow the
this particular system quickly. This
of only 30 to 60
to be announced by the President, the
dry, while other
Nuclear Regulatory Commission {NRC) would be a painful decision, costly in fi.
nancial terms, in lost energy production,·
allow 30 to 60 minules..
this month comes to grips with the most
of !he
difficuh !t:chnical decision it has had to and in lost prestige for !he companies
ment poses no hazard ordinarily, but
face since the accident at Three Mile Is- concerned. But il would be less costly to
the i.nduslry than a prolonged record of when
uueriy unex~ted
land a year ago.
pens, as was the case al Three Mile bAt issue are the safety and reliabili!y stumbles and near-accidents.
Alternatively, if there is no fundamen·
land, or when the computer fails. as was
of !he reactor made by Babcock and Wil·
the case a!
River, it
magcox (B & W), the type !hat went out of tal design weakness in the B & W reacnifies the demands placed un human cacontrol at Three Mile lsl~nd and which is tor, !he NRC will have to demonstrate
installed in five other operable gener- that the accident at Three Mile island
pabilities. Not every operator can manage a reactor
a crisis.
ating plants around the country. II is just and the severe .. transient'' at Crystal
River are unrelated. It will need to de· ·
po:~slble, says Darrell Eisenhuc, acting
Here, in
is· how Eis.:nhut dedirector of the NRC's division of oper· fend any policy that allows these reac·
scribes the
River
The
tors to continue operating without re·
ating reactors, that the NRC staff will
"took off and did
own
find this system unstable in its present moJeling.
when the computer in the !CS
reThe trouble with the B & W system
configuration.
anu
out erroneous inforEisenhut's deputy, Robert Tedesco, may be that it is too rambun•.:tious. Like
mation. The trouble
when somewas asked on 13 March to lead an intense an overbred racehorse, it may be too jit· thing (it is still not known what) created a
2- to )-week review or the problems with tery to settle ·down placidly to its task short circuit in a section of the control
B & W reactors and come up with some (boiling water). II likes !o cavort. This ls
room not related to I he reactor conlrols..
definitive condusions based on the last not I he way the NRC describes the
The
Florida Power. claims !hat
12 months of study. The review was lem it is examining this month. The anal·
the short circuit was caused either by a
prompted in part by the gyrations of a re·
actor in late February at the Crystal River plant in Florida, in which the system
overheated and dumped radioactive wa·
off
ler onto the floor of the containment
building. That reactor was made by
~he computer in the ICS began ..,....,.,.,""'
a & w. giving out erroneous information.
The NRC staff must investigate this
latest incident in an atmosphere of some
uncertainty. The original investigation of
steam system troubles in B & W reactors last year grew out of a request made ogy is suggested
a phrase that
the control
by Commissioner John Ahearne, lhe neers use when they talk about the
or
maintenance work
man named
President Carter in De- unique characteristics of the B & W
done on an
panel. The short did
cember as the new, but tempor...r.ry, chair- equipment: it is "ex!remely responno! knock out the entire system but did
man of the NRC. Carter has already giv- sive," they say. Is i! perhaps too respon·
distort
all the
en notice that Ahearne will nol remain sive for ordinary control room operators
chairman, and he has indicated that the to ride?
in a B & W reactor remain within a rdare~hutfte of NRC authority will give
In a sense, the question has already
narrow band of temperatures. The
Ahearne's successor greater power to di· been answered. During normal
computer, which is instructed to worry
recl, hire, and fire members of the staff. the B & W reactor is run with the help of about such
that the
Will the new chairman share Ahearne's an instrumentation and control system
coolant was growing too cold. It thereconcerns'? One cannot say.
(!CS), which uses a dimputer !o make
upon began lo accelerate the nuclear reThus, with uncertain leadership in the split-second judgments and adjuslmenu
action in the core by
conlrol
NRC and the White House, the NRC governing the reactor. The computer is
rods. It
reduced the flow
st;.~lfers are tackling an issue whose resonecessary, the NRC"s Eisenhut
of coolant. The reactor overheated.
lu!iun could be very importanl to lhe fu· because a mortal operator cannot be exdrove !he pressure up lo 1he danger levture of nuclear power. If !he B & W sys- pected lo respond rapidly enough to
el, and then
shut down.
tem is as problem-ridden as some on lhe keep up with the reactor when its deli·
The befuddled computer inslrocled
NRC stafflhink il is. then !he public and cate
is dis!urb~:d. He
the pressure relief valve
and rethe nuclear industry would be well out, for example, that with a loss of cool·
main open. This """"''"'."
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-- 2 -of a "desiRn defecl in the electrical system." The emergency core cooling r;ystem hegan pumping water inln the reactor. An astute operator noticed lhe computer's error in opening the relief valve.
and several minutes later plugged !he
leak by switching shut a block valve.
Water filled the reactor to the top and
then poured out through two safety
valves. One of these did not at first reseal properly. Befnre it was ~ver. 43.000
gallon~ of radioactive water were
dumped on the floor.
While this was no! a major accident, it
has proved a ffif\ior embarrassment for
the NRC. It occurred on the very day the
commission announced that it would resume licensing new reactors, a procedure which had been suspended for II
months while the Three Mile Island accident was being studied. Secondly. the
Crystal River incident seemed to confirm
douhts about the B & W system raised
by the NRC staff last fall.
Harold Denton. director of the NRC's
office or nuclear reactor regulation.
wrote to ownen of 8 & W systems on 2.5
October. alerting them to the NRC's in·
vestigation and a~king for their help. A
paper which he appended stressed a
broad concern: "The slaff is concerned
by the inherent responsiveness of
B & W OSTG [once-through steam gen·
eratorl design. While some specilic instances are rresented in !he next section
of this paper. I he staff concern!! are al:o~o
of a scncmll nature. It i!l felt that good
design practice and maintemmce of the
defense-in-derth concert require a
stable well-behaved ~yslem. To a lnrge
part. meticulous operator atlention aml
prompt manual action is used {sicl on
these plants to compensate for the sy!ltem sensitivity. rather than any inherent
design features. The staff believes the
general stability of the B & W plant control systems should be improved ......
Many changes were made as a result
of this study and others done by the industry. But the significance of the Crystal River foul-up is thai !he problem persists. The extr~!'"-~- .. ~~~itivity" of
SCIENCE, VOL. 207, 211 MARCH 19110

B & W reactors. identilled as a source of
trouble al Three Mile Island. may be a
fundamental !law for whi~h no
te~hnical till is available.
Duval Holt. a spokesman for B & W.
said his company is not yet prepared 10
comment on the transient at Crystal River or on any of the generic problems
associa1ed with B & W equipmenl.
Florida Power. which owns the plant
at Crystal River. is "well satisfied" with
the B & W equipment thus far. according to spokesman William Johnson. No
damage was done to any critical equipment; the radioactive waste has been removed from the conlainment building
and prepared for shipment lo South Car·
olina's disposal site. It is too soon, John·
son said. to estimate the \ost of this incident or to render a linal judgment on
the plant's performance.
The Nuclear Safely Analysis Center
(NSAC), a research organiza!ion created
lasl year by the electric utility industry.
concluded a brief study of the Crystal
River incident in early March. The staf·
fen~ who worked on the project at first
proposed to make recommendations for
changes in specific lypes of equipment,
but in the end they decided to offer
broad. generic suggestions. As one
NSAC slalfer said. the operators at
Crystal River were "11ying blind" during
the crisis hecause the control room instrumentation had failed. Therefore. the
principal recommendation of the NSAC

study is that some 11ort of redundancy be
buill into the controls that govern normal
operation of the plant. This would require a redesign of electrical power supply systems.
·
No matter what remedy the NRC
chooses, the decision will be difficult.
for lhe commission works in a highly
charged polilical environment today. Industry leaders are protesting loudly thai
the (!Overnment has become too con·
cemed with the trivial mechanical problems of nuclear plants and not enough
concerned with impending energy shortages. Yel the NRC can hardly ignore the
safely-related problems thai its own staff
ami NSAC have identified. It will be interesting to see how lhe lessons of the
Crystal River incident will he applied.
-ELIOT MA.RSHALL
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111 !he Nuclear

Commission INRCI whose

i~ lo

pre·

vent nuclear accidenls work in a ~chizo
environmenl. As demands for
protecling rmhlic ~afcly grow more numerous and more complex. the federal
support for dealing with them grows
weaker.
Ever !Iince the accident nl Three Mile
Island, lhe NRC has tried lo broaden its
outlook on ~afely i!l~ues. II ha!! focU!!ed
less
on I he po!!sibility of ~pectac·
ular but
event!~, such 1111 large
pipe breaks, which seemed Ro lmporlant
10 yean ll!ZO. Now it has begun lo look
al f'Oienlial con11equence!l of
mundane mi~hapn. Three Mile hland ·
showed !hal the small and rar more likely
slipups may be
a:. di~astrous a!l 1he
big ones. Thus. !he NRC ha!ll opened up
a whole new category
worry. In lhe
process. il has produced an enormous
list of
that mu~t be in·
ve~ligated and remedied
AI lhe same time. lhe
told 10 CUI ils J'ii'OJ'IOSCd 1982
12 percent, jusl like other federal agencies. The cuts will full
on !he
staff and on research.
officials cstimu!e thai rc·
search
ahsorb aboul 75 percent of
the mandated reduction. On lop of lhi'l.
the Adplini~lration hus a'lketlthe NRC' lo
accelerate the
of light water
ami lo prepare lo licen~e the
breeder renchlL
new Jemamh
also 'ilrain resources.
The AdminHration is
cool
the NRC's

lors. holds
waler ihal

from the reactor core.
slccl lose~ resilience.
well tmdersloml. Bul
thermal

becomes quite brillle. II becomes briHie
even at
lcmper!IUm::s.
!he range
220" to 290• F. Flaws in !his
seclio~ of lhe vessel m11y
inlo

or

crack!! and, under certnin circum~limce!'l,
!he cracks
which Is needed
This t:ould nHrln<:IIL
hoi

or

rc<>eurch
increase tht? turmoil in nuclear
over\ighL Om: of lhe !1eneli!s of
search. it is well done. is that
an!icirmle problems
lo

!ani

of rc;u.:tor

vc~sd

nacking. knnwn in the rade ;" !he
"thermal siH~t'k i"IIC. suddenly a hot
topic a! the NRC.
;\t !he hear! oflhe problem i" the \led
VC\'cl which in pres,mited watel rcat:·
71>1>

~hock

gt·t l he NRC to

II

Hou<>e ~uhcomminee on energy aml the
thermal 'ihock could occur
environment. Udall became mtcre'l!ed
without
It i'l larger than m0\1
and urged the NRC to inve-,rigate.
other issues. Perhaps as many as 20
Qwte apart from the roluic-; involved,
water reactors may he
the NRc·, sense ofurgenq· uerivcs fmm
fecled. The remedies are awkward and
"damn good data" developed over 1hc
terribly
One solminn some·
1<.~'>1 'i years, John\on 'ays. The NRC~
limes mcniloned would he to do~e the
lo dtl ~o. the
chicf of safety technology. Thomas Muraffected
and ask the owners to try
uf
a!lent1un to th..:
ley. confirmed the worst expectations in
to anneal the weakened steel by hca!mg
thermal shock. Roe Jedmes to rank 11
relalmn 10
issues 'iince. he
Fehruary 1981 when he carefully reexit to a very
temperature for a
ammed the data from Rancho Seco and
of days. A plant
have to be put out
says, that would be like trying to ,Je..:idC
found that all the elements of a thermal
shock scenario had been present-except for a hrittle vessel.
In May 1981. the NRC asked the Oak
Ridge National Lahoratory to gather together all the availabte information on
thermal shock and to help estimate the
amount of risk involved. The laboratory
produced a draft report on 9 October.
concluding that "pressurized thermal
shock must be regarded as a serious
potential threat and merits a great deal
more !\tudy using refined techniques."
The ftnul dn&ft it due later this full: il will
say essentially the same thing.
'One of the authors. R. D. Cheverton.
says that the scenario for a thermal
shock accident is quite pi:IUsible and thai
the consequences could be severe. But
he points out there are huge uncertainties in the data used to calculate what
happen~ at each step in such an accidenl.
To grc~sp the degree of uncertainty,
consider the difference obtained simply
Rancho S.CO 1, Clay Station, Cslllomls
by using different computer models to
simulate a thermal shock. The Oak Ridge
During un emnflt'flcy shutdown in Murch 1978. the opt'mtors a/ this plum unwillin~lv Jimuiatt'd alltlrt' elt'mt•nts of a thnmul slrack incident. Forllmtllt!l)', the rem tor l'cswl was too
staff used two techniques, known as the
ytTUfiR {J years old) 10 auck, us an older l't'Hrl might l1a1'e done.
IRT code and the TRAC code. both of
which were developed for studying the
which of his children he likes the best.
of commission for 2 years to do this.
behavior of an overheated fuel core. One
NRC onicials do not want to appei!r
Even this might not be adequate, for
difference is that IRT assumes incorrect,
neglectful of any of the problems that
metallurgisls have not had enough expe·
and TRAC assumes correct. operator
have been winnowed out anti placed on
rience with irradiated steel to a,uarantee
action. They were adarted. not entirely
the !is I of unresolved
issues! USil.
that annealing would remove all lhe
SUCCessfully. for e!>timaling What WOUld
All of these are
an "A" ranking in
flaws from a weakened pressure vesseL
happen to an overstressed pressure ves·
priority Uhermal sh•>ck is listed under A·
sel. The Oak Ridge group found that in
NRC Chairman Nunzio Palladino mel
II, "reactor vessel materials toughsimulating a break in the main steam
wilh the members of lhe independent
ness") and are worked on together.
line. the IRT said that a reactor vessel · Advisory Commillee on Reactor SafeIn thc past, I he NRC was criticized for
would he vulnerable to rupturing after
guards (ACRSl on 16 October to discuss
only J or 4 yc;m; of use. With the same
shunting aside !he
problems. Ia·
plans for coping wilh thermal shock. The
beiinglhem "generic 1ssucs." and studya.,.;umptions. the TRAC code showed
ACRS told Palladino that thi-; was an
ing them to death. The USI lisl is a
that the pre"ure vessel would 1101 rupurgent maller, bul no I one requinng immanagerial gimmick dcsigncJ lo over·
ture during its entire lifetime.
mediate plan! closings. PallaJino. howcome thatlendem:y. Once a problem has
Many year-; of research on 'ileel cylin·
ever, could not
the ACRS a firm
been ranked as a USL it acqtures spectai
ders have produced nothing more defischedule for his own plans lo clarify the
sigmticance. A task manager is assigned.
nite than this. The engineers have conrisks involved. By common consent. it
Milestones and deauline;. for solving the
cluded I hat America·, aj:!ing prc-;•wrized
seems 10 have been decided that the
problem are set.
reports to
reactors may already pm.e a 'ierious
NRC will have a grace period of I year in
Congress descrihc: thc: proj!ress of work.
thrcal to public safety. And they have
which to come up with better informaThe August report h~ted 16 active
adJed a l{lolnnle '>aymg that much of the
tion thai will confirm or di~pelthe lhreaL
data lt:admg to th1s condusion may be
US I' s, running from A-1. "water hamHerbert Kouts. a mcmher of the
wrong.
mer." !o A-·Hi, ·
ACRS. is a physici~l al !he Broukhaven
Tlw; safety problem is different from
sures aml cll'c;.;l-;
National Laboratory who has carried out
hurn-. on
tllhe1' that bedcv1lthc NRC in a couple
research on reactor ves~cl prohlem' for
few \eem
of re,rect-,. llnlike co1 rosion prohlem\.
more than 2U years. in his
!he
\hod;. many
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NRC Reviews Brittle
The staff would
.but
Although the United States generally
leads the world in setting standards for
nuclear safety, it has not been the first to
act on the hazard known as pressurized
thermal shock. This came to light during
a review this March before the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC), which
must decide what to do about thermal
shock, a problem that has received a lot
of notice in the press.
The danger is essentially this: the steel
vessel that contains the hot fuel and
water in a pressurized water reactor is
designed so that it should never crack
during its expected 40-year lifetime.
However, under high stresses, a vessel
could burst apart, creating a severe leak
of radioactive water. The possibility of
this happening is remote, but recent discoveries make it seem less so. The most
important new information is that the
welds in certain vessels made of steel
plates contain impurities, and these are
causing the welds, in the presence of
high neutron radiation, to become more
brittle than the plates which they hold
together. If cooled too rapidly, a flawed
weld might crack. The original safety
codes assumed that the welds would age
at the same rate as the steel plates, but
now it appears that welded vessels may
have a shorter lifetime than anticipated.
~unzio Palladino. chairman of the
NRC. ordered a review of the thermal
shock hazard last year. On 9 March. he
and the other commissioners listened to
two briefings on the problem. one prepared by the NRC staff and the other by
industry spokesmen. Palladino asked,
among other things, whether foreign
governments were worried about reactor
cracking. The staff briefers gave little
information; the industry spokesmen,
less. But one NRC employee in the audience said that West Germany has
changed the way fuel is loaded in at least
two reactors to reduce the risk of a
thermal shock accident.
According to an engineer at the Oak

ac

Hazard

summer,
industry sees "no near term" risk at all
The NRC has studied the problem of
steel embrittlement with growing intensity for about a decade. The industry, too.
has poured several million dollars into
structural analysis during the last 5
years. And in the past year, stimulated
by the NRC"s concern, several plant
owners have changed the way fuel is
handled to reduce the neutron bombardment of the vessel walls. They have
the
schedules so that
fuel is used longer in the reactor. and
more depleted fuel bundles are placed at
the outer
of the core to lower
radiation levels near the waiL But no
U.S. group has gone as far as the Germans in revamping construction or fuel-

NRC chairman Nunzio Palladino

Ridge National
West Germany decided in l9i5 that all reactor
vessels would be made of forged steel
cylinders with a steel cap at each end.
The new design was intended to make
vessels built after 1975 stronger. would
require fewer welds, and the welds
would not be near the middle of the
vessel, where damaging neutron radiation is most intense.
Like the United States. West Germany operates some older reactors made
welded steel
In two of these. at
Stade and Obrigheim, the Germans have
reduced the amount of neutron radiation that reaches the walls of the vesseL
in the
Fuel bundles have been
core with
elements near the
outer edge to absorb neutrons
from the center toward the steel walls.
This has slowed the process of embriulement.
Finland also has decided to shield the
this vessel is made
parently the Finns
radiation was so intense
weakening the steel
gree.

The NRC has not required any major
change in vessel construction. except to
raise the standard for weld
The
NRC has not ordered a change in fuel
arrangement. although the staff expects
some new rules may be issued later this
in June. Until now, the
year.
government has been reluctant to impose
this area.
is ill defined. Meanare
the
was
Clark Gibbs, vice
president of Middle South Services and
chairman of the Atomic Industrial Forum ·s committee on reactor licensing
and
He told the NRC that a
recent Oak Ridge
on vessel cracking exaggerated the risks. The study reported that some vessels might be in
danger of cracking within a few years. In
fact, Gibbs said, the
own calculations made in December and January
show ·'that there is no significant nearconcern"' about vessel
Gibbs said that · many utilities
have instituted low
fuel load
which may reduce the
overall rate of vessel embrittiement. · ·

through .1 kmd ot' ,rre<>;, It I'> nor
endure lr w,l\ m crheated, rhen
cooled at
prcs:-un.:.
hJ.Z.1rd known JS
shock." The ~RC !us been n;nn•rnt'l
several years about the pmsibilltY that welds
crack under
between the steel pl.1res
stresses such as these. L.1st 1u!v the Comnmsion issued a rule
against this risk.
had two coo!down events, a
one m
1978 and a minor one on 2 October 1985.
Judging by the NRC report, the environmenr in the control room was chaotic after
the power went out. (The investigators have
not yet discovered why the power failed.)
Many indicators and controls are programmed w go to mid-value when power is
lost. When this happened at Rancho Seco,
water flow to the reactor decreased, leading

lk

crrhekss, it took se\·cral hours
whole
tuck
Brad

an "ov,;ners'
mer
examined the
and announced that the mcidem had
no general
for this tvpc of
reactor. They
that Rancho Seco will
that loss of control
rapid cooldown

I;

.-:

Rancho Seco Reactor
Suffers Another Mishap
An "unusual event" at the Rancho Seco
nuclear reactor 25 miles from Sacramento
lasted onlv 4 hours, from 4:30a.m. to 8:41
a.m. on 26 December, but it triggered a
special inquirv by the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC). According to a preliminary NRC report dated 5 January, all
power to the plant's computerized control
system was lost for 26 minutes. A pump
burned out, spilling 450 gallons of radioactive water onto the floor of an auxiliary
building, some of which escaped to the
atmosphere as radioactive steam. A spokesman for the owner, the Sacramento Municipal Utility District, says that a person standing at the edge of the sire boundary would
have received no more than 0.2 millirem of
extra radiation, a trivial amount. Two workers received small exposures to excess radiation.
Despite the happy outcome, the incident
aroused concern for rwo reasons. The
chromcle of the 4-hour crisis indicates that
the control room was thrown into confusion
and that operators had only a tentative grasp
of what was going on inside the plant when
the electrical power was out.
Second, the steel reactor vessel was put
3H

Third thermal shock

Rancho Seco has now had three mishaps resulting in excessively rapid coolduwn.
to an increase in pressure and heat. Other
systems went faster at mid-value. Within
seconds, the reactor automatically shut
down because of the pressure buildup. At
this point "many fire alarms," a
actuaa
tion alarm, a seismic al.1rm,
temperature alarm for the spent fuel pool
went off.
The operators made several false starts in
anempting to bring the system under control. They anempted to close some valves
using hand cranks, and when a couple of
them apparently got sruck. they resorted to a
wrench. It, too, proved inadequate to the
task. Meanwhile, the emergencv heating and
cooling system sprang into action, "significant1y" increasing the noise in the control
room. Nine minutes later, someone shut this
emergency svstem off to maintain
A
sentor operator,
exhausted from his
work on the hand cranks, collapsed on the

An

~RC

official in California savs a more
in Febru-

to get into
irs own, without
from operators. "We think
may be necessarv
the control
ro make the plant more forofficial savs. "We'd like to
don't have
to take any actions
to 20 minutes"
into a crisis. In this recent case, the operators
the cooldown from
more severe

sooner than
The NRC has not decided vet
the incident has
time has been
Ill ELIOT .MARSHALL
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The RBMK·1 000 reactor

There are appra'CtmateZv 20 of these "J!ressure
tube" reactors in the So!'ier Union, the newer
ones rated at 1000 meqan•atts. All are said to
be shut don;n at J!rem7t, balving the Soviets>
J!roduction of nuclear eleetn"city. Unlike U.S.
reactorr, the_v haPe no J!ressure vessel or
containment dome. The uranium dioxitk fuel
and woli11.g water are contained in hundreds
of metal tubes, each linked to the coolant
pumps a11d mvunred in a core matk of
graphite blocks. TIJe core is surrountkd by
inert gas and sits in the bottom of a wncrete
n•ell. Tbe blast at Chernobvl tore awav the
upper part of the building ·reJ!rmnted in this
drawing.
on it

"evaporate instantaneously."
in an 18-mile radius around the
plant were evacuated in Kiev city buses, a
process that began 36 hours after the reactor
caught fire. "The situation remams complicated,'' according to Tass, but technicians are
mil manning three other reactors at Chemobvl.
At the outset, Soviet officials gave few
detatls beyond acknowledging that there
was an accident. Indeed, the Soviets went
this far only when Swedish diplomats demanded to know why a radioactive cloud
crossed into Sweden sometime on Sunday
27 April. At first, the Soviets denied that
there had been an accident. Then Swedish
officials in Moscow cited data that pointing
irrefutablY to a reactor blowout. On 28
April. the Soviets offered a terse confirmation. Also in this meeting, Soviet officials
informallv asked for advice on putting out a
graphite reactor tire. They also sought advice from Wt-st Germanv. The United States
otfered help the same d;v, but the offer was
declined. However, Robert Gale, a bone
marrow transplant specialist from the Universitv of California at Los Angeles, tlew to
Russia on 2 Mav to offer private help.
The Soviets must have been aware that an
accident was in progress as early as 25 April,
observers sa\'. In anv event, the Soviets
failed to warn ne1ghh~ring countries of the
impending crisis. This did at least as much
harm to Soviet prestige as the fallout itselt
In a belated efiort to repair the damage,
several Soviet officials have granted interto
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views to Western news media, but
have
provided few additional details.
The Soviets were not the onlv ones embarrassed bv the information blackout. With
unbecoming haste, U.S. officials on 29 and
30 April repeated some confused rumors
that flickered across the news wires in the
early days. For example, thev gave credence
to reports that thousands had died. The
director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Kenneth Adelman, said it
would be "preposterous" to think otherwise.
Tho Secretary of State said he would "bet
$10" that the deaths were "far in excess of'
the numbers given by the Soviets. The
White House and State Department also
gave authoritv to reports that a second
reactor at Chemobvl (unit 3) had melted
down, that the graphite fire would bum •'for
weeks," and that the reactor had been used
to produce weapons material.
It may rum our that none of this is true.
While it is difficult ro be certain about the
damage, U.S. scientists sav that it is
that 2000 people were killed outright.
"The Russian reports, sparse though they
are, make sense," savs Richard Wilson, the
Harvard physicist who chaired the American
Physical Societv's 1985 srudv of severe nu·
dear accidents. "My guess is that we will get
80 dead. That's a lot, but ir's nor 2000 ....
They evacuated probablv evervone within
10 miles downwind, and if vou look at our
emergency planning
they say,
downwind ....
evacuate people 12
The Russians have done the

so the
would

contaminated wne
percent
a few
the cesium got out, we mav be
1000 square
which isn't
that much."
radioactive dust which
become airborne

was
rare
anvone who remained
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I should like to summarize our findings by reading excerpts from the
executive summary with some slight paraphrasing.

A copy of the full executive

summary and the conclusions and recommendations is attached.
Reading from executive summary.
I should like to add the following comments, which are in the body of the
report.

Calculated emissions differ widely depending on details of the plant

and details of the accident scenario.

An early, significant failure or by-

passing of the containment is very likely to produce much larger emissions
than a late failure.

Some key parameters such as the timing of containment

failure and the size of the opening produced currently are not predicted
from a mechanistic analysis but are inputs provided by the computer code
users.

Other key parameters such as the size of aerosol particles entering

suppression pools or the temperature of the molten core attacking the concrete
base mat are estimated mechanistically; however, they enter into other calculations in an extremely sensitive way so that evaluation of the computed
emissions must reflect the accuracy with which these complex processes have
been modeled.

Since our understanding and predictive capability are now and

will continue to be incomplete, sensitivity or uncertainty analyses must be an
essential part of source term estimation.
Risk involves both the probabilities of a set of accidents occurring and
the severity of the consequences of those accidents.

Chemistry, physics, and

engineering can help quantify the consequences of accidents and this was the
subject matter of the American Physical Society report.

There are also

important institutional questions such as quality control in construction,
plant maintenance, operator training, and others that are essential for
maintaining an acceptable risk to the public by reducing both the probabili-

ties~evere

accidents and their consequences.

n
DE F
AS FRO.\i S
RE
ACC!DESTS AT SUCLEAR PO\VER PLASTS
EXECUTIVE SUM;..!ARY

Rt:pc)rt prepared by a study group of The Amc:ri~·.1n Physical
under contract with the US Nuc:kar
tor:r Commission
In
The American
formed a
stud) group on radionuc!ide release from severe :1ccidents
at nuclear power plants to '·review the
of the
techr,ic:ll bas<! upon which the
models
for radionuclide release from
cidents are constructed, the
seh es, and the correct use of the
that
these models in the
sequences."
rese:~rch came: from the: obThe
to the
servation that much less radioactive iodine: was rdeased
the: Three ~file Island accident than had been expected in an accident of that magnitude. It is of obvious
interest to inquire how g<!neral that obs<!rvation is.
Although this executive summary describes, explains,
and paraphrasc:s some of the conclusions of ~his report,
any r<!fcrence should lJe to the
conclusion as written in Chapt<!r VIII rather than to the executive summary.
This report is concerned with the release of radionuclides from a hypothetical severe nuclear reactor
accident-more severe than any that has yet taken place.
It discussc:s both the predictions and the scientific basis
for making them.
we have not calculated
abilities of individual accident sequences, we have chosen
for detailed discussion those sequences deemed by others
to be "risk dominant" or to involve a wid<! range of physical and chemica! phenom<!na.
The study group finds considerable progress in developing both a scientific basis and computational ability for
predicting the consequences of hypothetical nuclear reactor accidents since the R<!actor Safety Study of 1975
(WASH- !4001 which is the current basis for
concerned with severe accidents. In several cases, the new
calculations indicate that significantly smaller quantities
of radionuclides reach the environment than calculated in
the Reactor Safety Study. In other cases, the calculated
quantities have not changed dramatically.
A reactor accident can lead to severe consequences only
if several barriers between the radioactivity and the environment are breached. One postulated scenario by which
this could occur is the failure
the core heat-removal
syst<!:ns. This would cause the core to overheat, lose
coolant, melt, fall to the bottom of the reactor pressure
vessel, melt through the vessel, and be
in the
watc:r of the re:xctor
This would release ·;team and
nonc<'r,Jenslble g:1ses to the reactor containment budding.
Jnd thereby incr.:a~e the preo.,ure, •.;,h1ch would ~tress the
cont.HnmenL The Rextor Safety
.1 high
pr<;bcthilt>-~nc: :n
ould fad
;: .! •

. 'Y ';; ... -:

at th:s tin:1:-. This is fhH\. considered to be vc:y ucl~
OrKc the \>,J.:cr in the rc:actor cavity is c\.lfc'r.,rcJ, the
core would remelt from the heat generated by the
of the fission products and would attack the C()ncr;:;te
tl00r. This interaction would be very comple.x, relea,in_s
gases ::md radioactive aerosols. Calculations indi-:a~e th1·
this \\Ould cause the containment building to fail from
ov.:rpres>ure m:my hours latc:r-although it is
(and claimed by some inve~tigators) that the conuinment
would hold for m.my
If the containment does nct
the molkn core might <!Ventually penetrate the ba~e
mat, but this possibility would have only modest immediate consequences for
Where new calculations indicate: that radionuclide
emissions would be less than those reported in the Re:K·
tor Safc:ty Study, the reduction can be attributed to three
principal factors:
(i) the recognition that the containment buildings, which
are de::.igned to contain the radionudidc:s in the event
an
are stronger than was assumed in the Reactor
Safety Study and ther<!fore would fail, if at all, at later
(ii) the inclusion in the modeling of various physical and
chc:mical phenomena, previously neglected, that will
to retention of fission products; this retention is particularly eff<!ctive if more time elapses before containment
failure; and
(iii) the inclusion in the calculation of a number of sites
which can retain fission products--such as suppression
pools and ice beds, and in some cases
buildings-that had not previously been considered in
tail.
The Reactor Safety Study pessimistically assumed that
iodine would be released to the environment as gaseous
molecular iodine. There is good evidence that the iodine
reacts with cesium to form cesium iodide, a salt of low
volatility, which would either dissolve in water or condense to form an aerosol. Some of the aerosols would
deposit on surfaces in the primary reactor system or, if a
sufficiently long time were available, on surfaces in the
containment building; in either case, the release to the environment would be reduced.
Some reactors are equipped with suppression pools anrl
ice condensc:rs that are designed to condense steam.
These can reduce the release by scavenging the fission
products. However, experimental studies to evaluate their
effectiveness are only now in progress (suppression poolsl
or have not been planned (ice beds). Moreover the effectiveness of these devices has not been subjected to detailed
peer review. Reactors that contain these scavenging
sites-the Boiling Water Reactors with suppression
and those few Pressurized Water Reactors with ice condenser containments--have been studied far less than
Pres;urized Water Re:1ctors with large dry containments,
and little confirmatory work has been carried out. The
group recommends more study of h:
severe J<:;;Jdents mvolving lhese reactors.
Tho:: study group looked for phenomena which m
incr.:a>e tho:: ~:1dionuclide releases above thu-,e ~;~;,-~.I.Jf

:he R•·:JCU•~ S,
5: udy. One "Uch effxt is :he
· r~:::a~e of non\ o::.tile rad1onuclides during the :::orein !traction. Some nonvolatile fission products,
~uch as ianthanides, and some transuranics, such as plutonium, are biologically quite dangerous. The phenomena
in the core-concrete interaction are complex and are not
releases depend critically upon the tem;>erature achie>ed in the core-concrete interaction, and
other parameters which are n<'\t understood. Moreover,
the calculations are
in a preliminary stage. Some recent calculations indicate that ·releases of nonvolatile
spxies may be greater than predicted in the Reactor Safety Study for some postulated accident sequences. More
experiments and analytical work are needed to improve
the knowledge of the chemistry and physics in this crucial
area.
Phenomena that could generate aerosols or volatile
iodine late in an accident sequence as the result of decay
or chemical reactions may also be underestimated.
The aerosols or iodine might have very slow deposition
rates, and even be emitted to the environment following a
late containment failure. These phenomena are not included in the present ~RC computer models.
The study group examined results produced by the
computer codes used by participants in the severe accident research program. These codes have not, in general, been publicly released. Although these computer
codes go a long way toward describing the complex phenomena involved, and represent a major advance in the
art of accident description, the normal scientific procedure for establishing the reliability of the results is not
complete. The study group recommends that the theoretical and experimental studies be published in archival,
peer-reviewed journals, and that the computer codes towith a clear and complete technical description of
the models and the assumptions be made available to interested parties.
Reliable estimation of possible radionuclide release during severe accidents at nuclear power plants requires
direct calculations, complex computer codes, small scale
experiments, and large scale experiments. This research
has been underway in several countries, some of the·
research being of an international cooperative nature. Because of the complexities of the phenomena being
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m,:~eied. it is ~~tntial to c~•::;::--~1:-e :h~ .:._ ·,~1-:;; .. l::r (. "~-~
a&:J.inst ~ell controlled, small ~::ale ~).penmen~;, ar-d
against realistic. adequately iqstrumen:t"d. Ja:g= '-:all"" Integral experiments to ensure that all important phenc•mena are modeled with sufficient accuracy. Such compar·
ison is not yet completed. Because of this. the study
group concluded that it cannot endorse at this time
specific quantitative estimates for the amounts of radionuclides released. However, the general trends shown
by the calculations are consistent with our understanding
of the chemical and physical phenomena involved. Fortunately, some of the key parameters are largely determined by o>erall energy considerations las for e.>.ample
the maximum pressure reached in the containment) and
these can be estimated with a reasonable degree of confidence.
The quantity of radionuclides released is called the
source term. It consists of contributions from groups of
radionuclides, broadly classified as ga<.eous, volatile, and
nonvolatile. The contributions from the first two of these
have been widely considered to have the most
nificant potential impacts on public health. These are
better understood now than they were previously.
The environmental impacts and mechanisms for
releases of noble gases are the best understood. Their
releases 'are not tboug_h_Uo differ importantly from those
calculated in the Reactor Safety Study, except insofar as
radioactive decay could reduce their radioactivity when
containment failure is late. Some current calculations of
the release of the volatile radionuclides to the environment predict substantially smaller values than those reported in the Reactor Safety Study because of the later
times to containment failure. The magnitude of the contribution from the nonvolatile radionuclides is still open
to question, primarily because of the uncertainty of the
core-concrete interaction.
For the reasons described in the previous six paragraphs, the study group believes that it is not yet possible
to derive factors by which the source terms for all radionuclides and all reactors can be changed from the
\'alues reported in the Reactor Safety Study. Research
that is currently in progress will impro> e this situation
and may enable such factors to be determined for all important radionuclides and reactor ~equences.
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and othc:r_><:-iunces h:lYe be-:orne rebtiHly more important. In order to make sure th~!t the
risk dc•r:1ir;ant sequences hav:: be~n
identified
an-:i in>ec;tiga:d, we strongly urge another iterJ.tion of the
pro.::::-;s of
the se..:;uc:n::cs in the
of the
und~~<.Lh::n:;
so far.
that
consicc:-c:d include containment isol:J.tion failure and containmer.~ bypass sequences, inc 1 uding the
of
ste:lm gent:rator failure dur',ng a TMLB sequence, and
events e."<tema!ly initiated by an event such as an earthquJ.kc, fire, or flood fsec: Sect;on II! 0.
VI1I.C.2. Analyses of the Pressurized Water Re:.~ctors
with large dry containme:1t> have been more e.\tensive
th:.m these with ice conde:her> a:1d of the Boiling Water
Re:1ctors. We urge that
attention be paid to
these other re:1ctor types.
VHLC.3. If
a:nounts of the volatile ele:nents cesium and ioeine were rele:.~-;d,
would dominate the
he3.lth hanrd. For that reason, most of the studies to
date have correctly concentrated on the magnitude of
cesium, iodine, and to some extent, tellurium releases.
However, if the calculations predict releases of· cesium
and iodine of less than a few percent of inventory, this by
itself 9oes not ensure a small source term. Considerable
attention must then be paid to releases of the nonvolatile
elements (see Sections II.B and IV.Bl.
VHI.C.4. There is a tendency to accept the premise
that ~-~ontainment failure late in the accident will lead to
small releases. However, some phenomena, not fully
analyzed, might lead to higher releases than often calculated. These include the following.
(a) Volatile fission products retained in the primary system might revaporize from decay heating at a time when
there is. less aerosol in the containment to scavenge these
newly liberated species.
(b) Deposited aerosols might be resuspended as a result
of a sudden depressurization of the containment, or because of mechanical forces as3ociated with steam explosions or hydrogen combustion.
(c) The calculations for the core concrete interac:tion for
some accident sequences suggest far larger releases of hazardous nonvolatile radionuclides than were assumed in
the Reactor Safety Study. At this time it is neither clear
that the physical and chemical phenomena involved have
been correc:tly modeled nor clear that the calculations
have been done correctly.
(dl The deposition of the aerosols may not be as rapid
as calculated, as a result of thermal stratification or lack
of complete mixing.
(e) The airborne concentration:; of aerosols within the
cont:1inment are sensitive to the time when condensed
src::c<c-; are intrcxluced. Conclusions must ret1e..:t the unc:ertJ! nty in the mJss rde;l.Se rates and aervsoi characteristic-; >sin~. density, and shape! of aerosols from both the
pmnary system and the -:ore c:oncrcte !flteractlon {s.:e Seci=;,
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VI!I.D. Possible implications

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has used the
methodology and conclusions of the R.:acll'f Safc:y
as the basis for emergency planning. The '..'RC has es:ablished an emergency planning zone of te:1 mile-; radius
primarily on the premise that beyond ten miles few, if
any, prompt deaths would occur in even the worst calculated accident. A fifty mile zone was established for con. sidering health implications of contaminated food and
drink.
Although recent calculations indicate that the source
terms for several radioisotopes in a number of important
sequences are smaller than the values obtained in the
Reactor Safety Study, other consideratior.s contribute to
present regulations on emergency planning. Because these
were not within its chaner, the study group takes no position on the desirability of changes in those regulations.
The methodology of the Reactor Safety Study has also
been used to evaluate proposed changes in reactor and nuclear plant design and operation--either for future reactors or for retrofits to existing reactors--to reduce the
probability of accident. The study group bs not studied
the question of reducing the probability of accidents in
detail and, therefore, merely notes the obvious general
point that it is desirable to prevent accidents as early in
the chain of events as possible-for then the reactor may
well stay int:1ct in addition to the public beinJ protected.
The insights gained from source tem1 resr::arc:h and
modeling should be reflected in the design and operation
of light water reactor plants so as to minimize the scur-:e
term-and therefore the risk to the public:-in costeffective ways.
VIII.E. Major recommendations

The study group believes that the source term re>earch
cannot yet be regarded as adequate.
VHLE.l. The NRC should continue to ensure a strong,
integrated, program of experimental and analyticJI studies in order to provide a sound data base for ;,;akubricn of
the source term.
VUI.E.2. The '..'RC should undert.ake uncenai:tty J:t.J!yses so that calculated radionuclide rele:nc-; can be >t.l~d
within e\plicit limns.
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Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
I am Ross Scarano, of the Nuclear
Walnut Creek, California

Commission's Region V office in

I am appearing before you today to provide you with a brief overview of the
regulations governing emergency preparedness at, and in the vicinity of,
nuclear power facilities licensed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
In August 1980, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission upgraded its regulations in
order to assure that adequate protective measures could be taken in the event
of a radiological emergency at a licensed nuclear power facility. A copy of
these regulations are enclosed with my testimony.
I would like to highlight some of the major provisions of the Commission's
emergency preparedness regulations. First, no NRC operating license for a
nuclear power reactor will be issued unless the NRC finds that there is
reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken
in the event of a radiological emergency. The NRC bases its finding on (1)
an NRC assessment as to whether the applicant's onsite emergency plans are
adequate and whether there is reasonable assurance that they can be
implemented, and (2) a review of the Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA) findings and determinations as to whether State and local governments'
offsite emergency plans are adequate and whether there is reasonable
assurance that they can be implemented.
Secondly, the regulations extend emergency planning considerations into two
"Emergency Planning Zones." One zone is related to direct radiation
exposure, and the other to exposure via the food chain. The exact size and
configuration of these zones surrounding a particular nuclear power reactor
are determined by such conditions as demography, topography, land
characteristics, access routes, and jurisdictional boundaries.
The third, and final provision, of the regulations that I would like to
mention is that which identifies the standards that both onsite and offsite
emergency plans must meet. There are sixteen listed standards. These
standards include a wide range of planning considerations that need to be
addressed in utility, state and local emergency response
includt, among other things: assignment or identification of primary
emergency responsibilities; use of a standard emergency classification
scheme; establishment of emergency notification procedures among affected
organizations, as well as members of the general public; establishment and
maintenance of adequate emergency facilities and equipment; and provisions
for training of emergency response personnel to include the conduct of
periodic emergency response exercises. The inspection and enforcement
program to ensure ongoing compliance with the Commission's regulations is
implemented by the NRC's Region V office.

-2To summarize, it is clear, based on the public record compiled during the
emergency preparedness rulemaking, that onsite and offsite emergency
preparedness as well as proper siting and engineered design feat~res are
needed to protect the health and safety of the public. It is also clear,
from the accident at Three Mile Island, that the protection provided by
siting and engineered design features must be bolstered by the ability to
take protective measures during the course of an accident. The accident
showed that onsite conditions and actions, even if they do not cause
significant offsite radiological consequences, will affect the way the
various state and local entities react to protect the public from any dangers
associated with an accident. In order to discharge effectively its statutory
responsibilities, the Commission must be assured (1) that proper means and
procedures will be in place to assess the course of an accident and its
potentjal severity, (2) that NRC and other appropriate authorities and the
public will be notified promptly, and (3) that adequate protective actions in
response to actual or anticipated conditions can and will be taken. The
Commission's emergency preparedness regulations were adopted to provide these
necessary assurances.
This concludes my prepared remarks.
questions that you may have.

I would be pleased to answer any
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DOMESTIC LICENSING OF PRODUCTION AND
1. &timaUI of CI11!Strvclion costa The
:Mormatlon thai will normally be required of
appllcantll which are newly formed entities
will not differ in scope from that required of
eslabllahed orpni.utions. Accordmgly.
applicantallhould submit estimate• as
described above for established

CommiHion fi~MfVH the riFt. howev~t, to
require additions! financial information at
the conttruction permit ttege. particularly in
caaes mwhich the proposed power
;pnerelil'l3 facility will be OOIDI:Iionly owned
by two or mora exi11ting companiet or in
which flnanc:ins dependa upon loll8-tarm
lliTIIlllementJ _for llharin8 of tha power from
the facility by two or mora electrical
pnerating companies.
Applic:anta are encourqed to CO!llu!l with
the Commisaion with reapect to any
question~ they may have relaq to the
requiremata of the Commiation's reguistiona
or the Information aet forth in this appendix.
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Orpalsatiaae
A. Applications for COMtruction ptJrmitll
1. &tilm::Jte of construction eot~lll. For
electric utillliea. Ncb applicant's estimate of
the total coet of :lae proposed facility llhould
be broken down u follow~ and be
accompanied by a atstement detel'ibqthe
baaet &om which the ettimata II derived:
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dum that specified. if aucb mformation II
pertiatmt to estebliflhins the applicanfa
ll.oancial ability to COIUitrucl the propoaed
facility.
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150-S3{flud lhilappendix diatinguiah
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cpenting aperience IJid be able to IUbmlt
&anciaJ atatementa renect~na tha financial
ranlta ol put operati0111. With respect.
llowever. to the applicant which ill a MWiy
fcnMd company ntabU.bed primarily for tha
purpoae ol Cllll1')'lna out tha lic:e:nsed activity,
with little or 1110 prior opi!f'&ting b.i.ltory,
IICIIlii8VIhatmondetsileddataand~
cloc:ume11tation
will senenilly be~
For thie NUon. the appendix deterlba
·
lep!IJ'IItaiy the ecope of Information to be
~ in applications by ncb ollhae two_
. _ of applicanta.
In lhrtllll'lllini.nc an applic:ant'e Bnanclal
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IIUIUmiiiiiiiiDOimt of Information ~
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pni!ICiibed for IRlbmittilll the Information. 1n
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GeMnl Wwmatlaa
1'biJ appendix Ia Intended to apprise
applic:anta for licren.set to conttruct
production or utilization facilitiet of the types
deecribed In l50.21(b) or 150.22. or testing
fac:Wtiet. of the pneral kinda of financial
data IIUid other related Information that will
clemoutrata the financial qualification of the
applicant to carry out the activitiet for which
the permit Ia aought. 'l'he kind and depth or
Information deterlbed in lhil guide Ia not
IDI«mded to be a rilld and abao!ute requirement
In IOIH instance.. additional pertinent
material may be needed. In any caae. the
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,... If the fuel ill to be acquired by leate or other
arrangement than purchate. the application
~ llhould ao atale. 1'he Item~~ to be Included in
a: these calegol'iet llhould be the same aa lhote
IL. defined In the applicable electric plant and
; nuclear fuel inventory aecounta preacribed by
the Fedaral ~Regulatory Commiaaion or
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m. Annual Financial Statement
Each holder of a construction permit
for a production or utilization fadlity of
a type described in I 50.21(b} or i 50.22.
or a testing facility is required by
l50.7l(b) to me ils annual financial
report wilh the Commission at the time
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atimlltes for production and utilization
facilities otLer than nuclear powar reactora
will vary acx:orc:Una to the type of facility, no
particular format Ia auaested for submitting
web estimates. 1'he estimate llbould.
Saowev~t. be Itemized by categories of cost In
!l'llfficient deteil to pmnllu evaluation of ita
reaaonableness.
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applicstion 111bould a lao include the
applicant's-latett publilbed an~~ual financial
report. topther with any wmmt Interim
financial atetamata that are perlinenllf en
umual financial raport II not published. tha
balance sheet IJid operatina atstement
coverlna the illtat complete accounq year
topther with all pertinent notet thereto and
C!ll'tifteation by a public accountut llhould be
fumilbed.
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2. Sou1'Cie of COI!Struction funds. The
application thould specifically identify the
110urce or aoUI'Ciel upon which tha applicant
relies for the fundi necetaary to pay the cost
of conatructing the facility. and the amount to
be obtained from each. With respect to each
eource. tbe application should describe in
detail the applic:ant'e legal and financial
relatioDllhips with Ita 11tockholdera. corporate
affiliatet, or otherl(auch ae financial
inltituti0111 J upon which the applicant is
relyillll for financial aesiatance. If the sources
ol funds relied upon include parent
companies or other corporate affiliates.
Information to aupport the financial
capability of each auch company or affiliate
to meet ita commitmenta to the applicant
llbould be aet forth in the application. This
mfprmation ahould be of the same kind and
ecope aa would be required if the parent
companies or affiliates were in fact the
applic:ant Ordinarily, it will be neceuary
that copies of agreement~ or contracts among
the companies be 1ubmitted.
lu noted earlier in lhilappendix. an
applicant which II a newly formed entity will
DOmlally not be in a poaition to tubmit the
usual typea of balance abeets and income
atatementa refiecting the resulta of prior
operations. The applicant should. however,
~Delude in ita application a statement of ita
alltlt>ta.liabilities. and capitalstructu.re aa of
the date of the application.

of issuance thereof. Thh~ requirement
d~s not
lo licensees or holders of
~ construction permit& for mPdicaJ and
~ research reactors..
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IV. Additional Information

ThP. Commission may. from time to
lime. rP.quPsl the applicdnt. whether an
esldhlished org:mizatkm or newly
(ormf'd en lily. lo tubmil add ilion>~ I or
more detailed information respecting its
financial arrangements and statue of
funds if such information is deemed
necessary to enable the Commission to
determine an applicant's financial
qualifications for the license.
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Emergency Preparedness Section

Summary:
Inspection on April 2-11 and 21-25, 1986 (Report No. 50-312/86-14)
Areas Inspected: Unannounced routine inspection of the licensee's emergency
preparedness program including: knowledge and performance of duties, licensee
audits, protective action decision making, emergency detection and
classification, changes to the emergency preparedness program, notification
and communication, and followup on open items identified during previous NRC
inspections. Inspection procedures 82201, 82202, 82203, 82204, 82206, 82207,
82210, and 92701 were addressed.
Results: Of the 1 areas evaluated, 3 apparent violations (with multiple
examples) of NRC requirements were identified. The violations concerned: (1)
The licensee's failure to insure emergency plan training is provided to all
appropriate personnel required by Technical Specification 6.8.1.; (2) The
licensee's failure to maintain their emergency implementing procedures
current, as required by Technical Specification 6.8.1.; (3) The licensee's
failure to follow some of the requirements contained in 10 CFR 50.54(q) and
Appendix E.

1.

2.

2

(Closed) IN-85-62, Backup
numbers for the NRC Operations
Center. The licensee has followed the
in this notice and placed
backup numbers for the NRC
Center on the ENS
in the
Control Room (CR), Technical
Center (
, and the Emergency·
Operations Facility (EOF). A physical inspection of the ENS phones in
the CR and TSC demonstrated that the labels had been placed on the phones
and the correct numbers were in place.
(Closed) IN-85-77. Possible Loss of ENS Due to Loss of AC Power.
According to the licensee's file on this issue, the information notice
had been reviewed and an evaluation of the wiring for the ENS system was
made. The licensee determined that the system was adequately wired and
would remain operable if there was a loss of AC power.
3.

KNOWLEDGE AND PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES (TRAINING)
The Emergency Plan, emergency implementing procedures,and records of
training were reviewed and interviews with plant personnel, Emergency
Planning Personnel and the Training Manager were held. The following are
the findings and observations.
A review of the licensee's emergency preparedness training program
revealed the licensee's contracted training program and related training
procedure (Temporary Change AP 580) for emergency preparedness training,
had expired on 12-31-85 and had not been replaced by the beginning of
this inspection. When the temporary procedure was allowed to expire
without being replaced by another procedure, an outdated 1983 procedure,
which was not being implemented, became effective. The licensee
currently plans to use the site training organization to accomplish EP
training. On April 14, 1
, the licensee acquired an additional
individual to help reestablish the emergency preparedness training
program, and to update AP 580 (Training).
The EP, Section 8.1.3.(a), states in part, "It is the responsibility of
the Emergency Preparedness Coordinator to assure appropriate personnel
receive Emergency Preparedness Training." In addition Section 8.1.3(c)
also states "Records of the District's Onsite Emergency Response
Organization training will be maintained by the Emergency Preparedness
Coordinator (EPC) with a copy to be forwarded to the Nuclear Training
Superintendent." The intent of Section 8 was to insure that someone in
the emergency organization was tracking EP training to assure personnel
maintained their required training. The review of training performed
indicated the EPC was not maintaining training records or tracking
required training. The EPC was in posse~sion of a box of records from
the former contracted training organization. However, the EPC was unable
to produce selected records of the onsite organization, which included
Control Room staff, and did not appear to have a method to track required
training. The discussions revealed the EPC was not cognizant of the
status of EP training implementation. In addition, the licensee did not
appear to be maintaining a tracking system to assure appropriate
individuals receive timely training. The licensee committed to the NRC in
a letter dated August 31, 1984, to establish a tracking system to assure
that training is maintained. This review determined that the licensee
had initiated a Nuclear Tracking list, but failed to maintain it, in that

4

4.

CHANGES TO THE EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS PROGRAM
Records of changes to the EP and
interviews with licensee personnel were
licensee's Emergency Response Organization (ERO) were examined to
determine that the EP and implementing procedures are being adequately
maintained, and changes to the Plan and procedures do not degrade the
effectiveness of the EP. As a result of this review the inspector
identified a number of instances where the EP and implementing procedures
were not maintained current. The following are the inspector's findings:
a)

Prior to July 1985 The Herald Fire Department and lone Fire Academy
were designated as offsite relocation points and provisions were
made to store emergency equipment and supplies at these facilities.
During July 1985 the licensee elected to remove emergency equipment
from these 2 facilities. although they still remain offsite
relocation points. AP 519, "Site Evacuation" was revised to reflect
the changes made to the Herald and lone facilities. The revised
procedure states in 5.2.2, "Radiation monitoring and decontamination
equipment must be brought from Rancho Seco to the offsite relocation
point." The following procedures were not maintained in that
emergency equipment and supplies are still listed as available at
these facilities.
1)

Section 7 of the EP still lists the Herald Fire Department &
lone Fire Academy as a place where dedicated emergency
equipment and supplies are stored. Emergency lockers,
ambulance kits, and decontamination (decon) kits are
specifically mentioned.

2)

AP 516, "Personnel Decontamination," Section 4 refers to
decontamination kits which are maintained at the Herald Fire
Station and the Ion Fire Academy.

3)

AP 552, "Activation And Operation Of The Offsite Relocation
Points," Sections 1 and 5 also reference emergency equipment,
protective clothing, survey instruments, decontamination kits
and respiratory equipment, etc.

4)

AP 305-9D, "Personnel Decontamination," Section 3, still lists
Herald & lone as an area where decontamination kits are stored.

It should be noted that during a walkthrough with an individual who
would fill the position of the Radiation Assessment Coordinator the
individual was not aware of the removal of the emergency equipment
formerly stored at the offsite relocation areas. The individual
also stated he had not received emergency plan training in over a
year. The matter of training necessitated by changes to the
Emergency Preparedness Program was
ly discussed in Paragraph
3 of this report.

The
Technical
Room and
area and

Additional
of this
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Protective Action Guides, AP
Dose Assessment Codes

Jade. and

Interviews with key personnel responsible for dose assessment in the
Control Room (CR), Technical Support Center (TSC) and the Unified Dose
Assessment Center (UDAC) were held. The interviews with plant and
contractor personnel and procedural reviews identified several problems
as discussed below.
Radiation monitors Rl50044 and Rl50045 are the high range effluent
monitors for the reactor and auxiliary building vents. These monitors
were installed pursuant to item II.F.l of NUREG 0737 and provide the
capability to measure gaseous effluents that might be expected during an
accident. The licensee's procedures that utilize source term for dose
assessment are contained in AP 509, "Control Room Dose Calculation,n AP
511, "TSC Dose Calculation," and AP 512g "EOF Dose Assessment". None of
these procedures contain reference to nor incorporate any methodology to
convert high range instrument response to a source term. The importance
of being able to utilize data from the high range effluent monitors is
partially illustrated by a careful review of AP-509, "Control Room Dose
Calculation". This procedure addresses release pathways from the
auxiliary building stack. If a calculation is performed using the
maximum reading from the normal range monitors (R15001 and R15002) and
default values (most conservative) for vent flow rate and X/Q, the
projected doses obtained are below the lowest range of Protective Action
Guide values listed in AP 528. Consequently, the procedure as written is
of limited value in assessing the dose consequences from a severe event
with a release rate greater than the capabilities of the normal range
monitors. From a previous NRC inspection (Report No. 50-312/86-06), it
is noted that AP-501, "Recognition and Classification of Emergencies"
also makes no reference to the high range monitors for purposes of
classifying an event. The failure to update and incorporate instructions
for use of the high range effluent monitors (Rl50044 and Rl50045) in
procedures AP 501, AP 509, AP 511 and AP 512 represents an apparent
violation of Technical Specification 6.8.1.e which requires that written
procedures covering the emergency plan to be maintained.
Additional deficiencies were noted in procedures AP 509, 511 and 512 and
are discussed below.
a)

procedures AP 509 and 511 only provide a methodology for determining
the release rate from the auxiliary building. No methodology is
provided for the containment (reactor building) vent.

b)

procedure AP 512 states, "obtain the release rate from Attachment
7.1." Attachment 7.1 has a place for recording release rates (noble
gas and iodine) but provides no methodology on determining what the
release rate is from instrumentation readings.

Paragraphs (a) & (b) above are additional examples of failure to maintain
procedures.
Interviews with licensee personnel established that computer based dose
assessment is the principal method
to be used
the
in

procedures
these procedures the
techniques. AP 511, under
states, "NOTE: These
"RACODE". No further
code, a
512 has a
performed
The inspector noted that
is the correct reference
instructions
running the code. However
instructions on code
provided. Failure of
based dose calculations
Specification 6.8.1 e for
examination
assessment
11

0

JADE 11 ,

Various
The
code.

"

in all cases
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The licensee's failure to
primary to secondary system source
an apparent violation of Technical
maintain procedures.

calculate doses from a
for the
represents
6.8.l.e for failure to

One apparent violation for failure to maintain
pursuant to
Technical Specification 6.8.l.e (with multiple examples) was identified
in this program area.
6.

NOTIFICATIONS AND COMMUNICATIONS
The inspector reviewed A:P 506, "Notification/Communication" to determine
that adequate provisions exist for notifying both offsite agencies and
District personnel of an emergency event. This included a review of AP
506.01, "Activation of the TSC", and AP 506.02, "Activation of the EOF".
In addition, the inspector had discussions with one individual from
security. This individual would be tasked with making notifications to
activate the TSC during the evening and backshift hours.
The inspector determined that the licensee has the capability, by
procedure, to notify all appropriate personnel and agencies. However the
discussion with the individual from security further substantiated
weaknesses in the area of training. The individual indicated that it had
been more than a year since emergency plan training had been provided,
and he was unable to locate the proper procedure for notifying District
personnel to activate the TSC. The individual was also unaware of proper
record keeping procedures. AP 506.01 requires records of names of
individuals contacted and the time of contact for planning purposes.
No violations were identified in this program area.

7.

LICENSEE AUDITS
10 CFR 50.54(t) requires licensees to provide for a review of the
emergency preparedness program by persons who have no direct
responsibility for implementation of the emergency
program.
A review of the 1986 annual EP aud1t was performed. From this review the
audit appears to satisfy the regulatory requirements contained in 10 CFR
50.54(t). An examination of the 1985 annual EP audit (audit 0-692) was
also performed to ascertain the status of items identified as deficient
during 1985. Emergency Preparedness Audit number 0-692, the 1985 annual
EP audit, identified deficiencies in the Training Program, maintenance of
the Emergency Plan and implementing procedures, and the licensee's system
for maintaining required records (Plaza 50 Files). The findings of audit
0-692 were transmitted to Corporate and Plant management by letter dated
March 22. 1985. The findings of this inspection and the licensee's 1986
annual EP audit indicate that major deficiencies exist in the Training
Program, maintenance of the Emergency Plan and implementing procedures,
and the licensee's record system. It appears that the licensee has been
ineffective in correcting identified deficiencies (86-14-03).
There were no violations observed in this area.

8.

EMERGENCY DETECTION AND CLASSIFICATION

scheme.
classification
be consistent with
The
parameters

(l)

9.

10

(a)

Lack of guidance in the procedures for a protective action
recommendation based upon plant conditions.

(b)

General impediments in the dose assessment area.

(c)

Training deficiencies affecting the performance of key individuals.

The capability of offsite officials to make protective action decisions
and to promptly notify the public was discussed with licensee
representatives. Licensee procedures made provisions for contacting
responsible offsite authorities on a 24-hour basis. Backup
communications links with offsite authorities were available.
There were no violations identified in this program area.
10.

EXtT INTERVIEW
An exit interview was held on April 25. 1985, for the purpose of

discussing the preliminary findings of this inspection. Licensee
personnel present have been previously identified in paragraph 1 above.
G. Perez, acting Senior Resident Inspector was also present. The
licensee was informed that violations were identified in a number of
program areas, and that NRC Management would determine the specific
course of action to be taken. The following observations were made by
the inspector:
1.

Training was deficient for numerous personnel in the onsite
organization, and the licensee's EP training program and
implementing procedure for training were not current.

2.

The Emergency Plan and implementing procedures were not being
maintained. District Personnel were also aware of this fact, This
may have an adverse effect on their effectiveness during an
emergency.

3.

The dose assessment program appeared marginal in several areas.

4.

The licensee had been ineffective in correcting problems previously
identified by the NRC and their own audit program of the emergency
preparedness program.

5.

The licensee does not have the capability to use their procedures to
determine a protective action recommendation based on plant
conditions.

h
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for various types of potential disasters.
In recent years the
County has committed hundreds of man-days and considerable
resources to Rancho Seco emergency planning. This planning is
an important aspect of the overall County effort, and
considerable resources will continue to be committed to it.
A full scale exercise is planned for October 1986. The main
objectives of that exercise will be to test the coordinated
(three county, State, utility) decision making process, and the
procedures for issuing coordinated information to the media.
Part of the problem in these two planning areas is the lack of
adequate communication equipment to support the plan. The
utility has given assurance this will be corrected after the
exercise.
The Rancho Seco Emergency Response Plans for Amador, Sacramento
and San 3oaquin Counties were developed jointly to ensure a
coordinated response to a radiological emergency. The three
counties have worked together closely in plan development,
exercise participation, and plan revision. Until recently,
there was very little effort on the part of the utility to
coordinate their plan procedures with county efforts.
Since the State Nuclear Power Plant Plan is generic for all
utilities, there are areas that lack coordination with county
or utility plans. No coordination with FEMA plans has been
demonstrated. The State Office of Emergency Services should be
the agency to ensure that all Federal plans interface with the
local plans.
A final problem with the planning process is a lack of
good-faith cooperation by the Sacramento Municipal Utility
District. The over-all attitude of the utility has been to
resist solving offsite jurisdiction problems as long as
possible, particularly if the solution involves the purchase of
equipment. More than once elected officials of the counties
have exerted pressure by considering withholding or rescinding
approval of a county plan.
In conclusion, with
utility, State OES,
planning efforts to
will be made in the
Seco.

the County plans nearing completion, the
and Federal agencies should coordinate all
insure the public that a unified response
event of a radiological accident at Rancho

New SMUD management policy purports to improve working
relationships with offsite jurisdictions. In view of the
utility's past performance, we are taking a "wait and see"
posture.
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metal cable holding it broke. It missed the reactor mouth by inches, striking instead, a protruding flange and seal plate, shearing off a nut and bolt
and c:1 using a leak of radioactive water. An unexpected, sudden shift in speed
(from low to high speed) by the crane, caused stress to the cable and it snapped.
Six days earlier a heavier seven-ton load was lifted over the highly irradiated
used fuel assemblies - in clear violation of NRC rules.
-SMUD claimed that radioactive iodine detected in milk from a farm near Rancho
Seco was caused by fallout from Chinese nuclear testing in 1976 and not from
the plant. Dr. H.W. Ibser (Physics professor, California State University, Sacramento) claimed that odds were "one in 5,000 trillion" that a single atom of
radioactive iodine still lingered from the blast and the NFC agreed with his
calculations.
-In 1981 the NRC rated bancho Seco below average in safety and,. performance,
based on mishaps reported by 80 operating reactors.
-A brand of circuit breakers used to shut down the plant proved 11 unreliable 11 and
had malfunctioned at least fourteen times at Rancho Seco.
-In November, 1982, SMUD General Manager John l,1attimoe told the NRC that the
utility did not have time to provide information recuested for con~ressional
hearings. He wrote, "No major steam genera tor repairs are anticipated for
Rancho Seco for the next five years • 11 Two days later, a steam generator tube
leak occurred at the plant.
-Radioactive water was discharged into Clay Creek until 1984 when it was discovered that s;,rnL had used calculations suited to release in an ocean or large
body of water. Approximately thirteen million gallons of this waste water was
released.
-The normally non-radioactive secondary cooling system is now radioactive because of leaks. This causes additional exposure to workers and the rest of us.
-Auxiliary batteries which would provide power to the plant in the event of an
emergency were found corroded and of no use.
-The Integrated Control System that balances heating and cooling at Rancho Se~o
has failed time and again.
-Faulty water-flow ga~es have caused control problems.
-Rancho Seco has consistently been classified among the ten worst reactors in
the U.S. The NRC cites poor plant and personnel performance.
-SMUD did not implement all required changes after the Three ~file Island accident.
-The utility downplayed to the public, safety and operating problems at r~ncho
Seco. It also withheld inforrnation from the s:\mD Board of Directors and the
NRC.
Another problem at Eancho Seco deals with our high-level radioactive storase
area. The spent fuel pool has been re-racked twice so that its capacity was doubled and then doubled again to hold additional amounts. Ko EnvironTtental Impact
heport '.vas prepared for this potentially dangerous 11 hot s_r::ot' 1 • Dr. Ibser states
that it would take only a fraction of one percent of the cesium 137 in the pond to
contaminate Sacra men to County to the point where it would be uninhabitable (1984
figures). The potential for an accident increases as the spent fuel asse:nblies
are packed closer.
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for accidents in the General Emergency cate:;ory. Five of the ten "worst case"
senarios involve either a 11 possible or ultimate failw'e of containmenV'. Despite
this confirmation, s::.~UD General U:anager John Matti:noe (former general manager) was
quoted many times as saying a failure of containment could not happen here.
There is also a problem related to transporting nuclear waste. Spills and/or
accidents on our freeways could be disasterous. The route taken by vehicles removing radioactive waste from hancho Seco starts at the plant, west on Twin Cities
Road (104), north on Hishway 99, north on Interstate 5, east on Interstate 80 to· its
destination. During the recent meeting with the Sacramento Colli~ty Board of Supervisors it was noted that the portion going through downtown on Interstate 5 is notorious for accidents, especially near the J Street exit. An effort was made to help
with this problem by having all large trucks stay in the lane nearest the center strip,
however this is only a token action when one considers the consequence of a serious
accident in the center of downtown, just blocks from the state capitol.
The true costs of nuclear power have been hidden for years. In 1984 direct nuc~ar subsidies totaled $15.8 billion. This is nearly as much as the total retail
revenue from 1984 nuclear output. This figure does not include the Price-Andersor:
ceiling on liability for nuclear accidents. Federal loans and guarantees saved the
nuclear industry $3.32 billion in financing costs. Tax breaks totaled $10.2 billion
(source: The Wall Street Journal, Sept. 17, 1985). The liability limit of SUUD in
the event of a major nuclear accident is only ~640 million. As a nuclear power plant
operator S~UD could also be assessed up to $10 million in the event of a major accident involving any licensed nuclear reactor in the U.S.
All these facts make one wonder how we ever got into this situation. And this
is but the tip of the iceberg. Rancho Seco is connected to the entire cycle of radioactive contamination. The land which is being mined for uranium is poisoning the
environment around it. Mill tailiLgs are left in hu:;;h piles to irradiate the land.
Workers have high rates of leukemia and cancer. Much of the land being mined belongs
to Native Americans. One such place, Big Mountain, is a sacred religious place for
them and they say, all people,
Mined uranimn must be refined, enriched and fuel fabricated. In each of these
processes there is a large potential for accidents and the release of radioactive
materials, and it continues. Fuel is loaded at Rancho Seco and the release activity
continues. F'ueJ is re:noved from the core. Some of it will be radioactive for hundreds of thousands of years. At some time in the future (it keeps getting pushed further away) this Spent fuel is supposed to be stored in a place where this living earth
will not shift or roll •.• ever.
There has been research trying to deal with informing future ~enerations so that
ti:..:;y stCJ.y d.>'~i:::..Y from tr,e;ct.; wc.stes. Ed.vir,g been a 1-'rocic.ction director for c. graphic
design studio (S~.!UD was our account at one time, the phrase "Your Electric S.ervice 11
was my contribution) I consider myself adept at understanding illustration relating
to comrnunication. However the most recent attempts to convey this message were all
but in vain. This waste could contaminate our earth over and over and over again,
past the ti.Tte where we could even kno·N the children of our children, of their children,
of their cr.ildren and on and on. ·::e must be responsible consumers, caretakers of our
world.

tenance.

fix it.
and we

